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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to analyse China's security interests, in terms of a
wider definition of security, in the post-Cold War era. First and foremost, it must
be stated that the concept of security here is broadly conceived, which is
congruent to the Chinese emphasis on comprehensiveness (quan mian hua). In
particular, this thesis aims to incorporate non-military elements of security, such
as political security and arguably, the most important of all, economic security. It
will be argued that the adoption of a broader definition of security is vital, for
only by doing so will it enable us to gain a better understanding of China's
security interests in the post-Cold War era. This study is in itself important, as
China's role in international relations is increasing over time. Geographically, the
scope of the thesis is focused on Northeast Asia, although certain issues relevant
to the central argument of the thesis, such as human rights and the collapse of
communism, are also included. This introductory chapter is divided into two
sections. The first surveys the post-Cold War security environment in Northeast
Asia, which forms part of the milieu in which Chinese policymakers assess their
security interests. The second section explains the structure of the thesis and the
assumptions, also setting out the research methodology employed.
2The context: The post-Cold War era and Northeast Asia
As the Cold War ends, China's security agenda is naturally affected and
there is in general a need to reassess the new security patterns and structures
taking shape in the international system. This means that China's security
policymakers have to react to changes both to the system in Northeast Asia and,
indeed, to the entire international system. For our purposes, Northeast Asia may
conveniently be regarded as a geographical area that includes Japan, China, South
Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan and the far eastern portions of Russia.
Historically, this has always been a region full of contradictions and conflicts.
During the twentieth century, Northeast Asia experienced three wars, the 1905
Russo-Japanese War, the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War and the 1950-1953
Korean War. In addition, the Cold War confrontation was also fought out in
Northeast Asia. This has led to the possibility of conceptualising Northeast Asia
as a "security complex". Barry Buzan explains that "a security complex exists
where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by
virtue of its relatively strong, inward-looking character, and the relative weakness
of its outward security with its neighbours".' Security relationships will be more
strongly linked between the states in Northeast Asia than say, between states in
Northeast Asia and those in Southeast Asia or South Asia. Therefore, for the
purposes of making the scope more manageable and also to achieve more
analytical depth by focusing on a particular region, it is useful to explore China's
aim to seek comprehensive security in relation to the Northeast Asian region in
3the post-Cold Era. It is also important for us to look back briefly at the Cold War
period.
Looking back at the Cold War in Northeast Asia, it would be convenient
to look at its manifestation in the form of two adversarial security alliances. One
was formed by North Korea, the Soviet Union and China; the other was formed
by South Korea, the United States and Japan. Each of these security alliances was
fon-fled through bilateral treaties among the different parties and this structure was
basically maintained for about 40 years (from the early 1950s to the late 1980s).
Although there were some changes during those years, the overall security
structure in Northeast Asia did not undergo any fundamental changes.' The
"classification" of the United States as a Northeast Asian power lies in the fact
that, although situated outside the region, America has a strong influence over the
region and plays an important role in shaping the regional strategic environment.
Therefore, Chinese perceptions of the American threat have to be assessed in this
thesis, as this will bring additional insights on China's security interests as a
whole.
After the Cold War ended, Northeast Asia has become an even more
important region for analysts and policymakers alike not to ignore. Today, the
geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of Northeast Asia cannot be overstated.
As Samuel Kim points out, this is a sub-region of Asia where four of the world's
five recognised centres of power, the United States, Russia, China and Japan meet
and interact; where "a mixture of two-power, three-power and four-power games
4are played out on multiple chessboards with all their enormous complexities and
shifting configurations"; and "the only region where the Cold War has ended only
partially, contrary to the more synchronised rhythms and expanding virtuous
circle of great power co-operations elsewhere".2
To be precise, security in Northeast Asia has consistently been very
important to China in recent years. Apart from Europe, all of the most important
forces that interact internationally with China are gathered in this region. For
China, this is its "backyard". Therefore, it comes as no surprise that analysts such
as Steven Levine have argued that Northeast Asia has been the greatest area of
concern for China in security terms'. History shows that China fought several
wars to maintain its security in Northeast Asia. Some campaigns were successful,
others were not. China fought against Japan twice, in the 1894-1895 and 1937-
1945 wars. Beijing intervened when the onset of the Korean conflict in 1950
brought American military forces to China's north-eastern doorstep, within easy
reach of the capital. In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, China fought a
small-scale border war along the Ussuri River with the Soviet Union in 1969.
Although the use of force as a means to protect its security interests is
increasingly unlikely today, it is true to say that China still faces some regional
powers in the Northeast Asian region, who may pose threats to China's security.
For China, this region, as part of the larger Asia-Pacific region, is vital for
its comprehensive security. Therefore, it comes as no surprise when Chinese
President Jiang Zemin states:
5China is now going all out for economic development and this requires not
only domestic stability but also a stable international environment. We
attach great importance to political stability in the Asia-Pacific region,
because this constitutes an important condition for ensuring economic
development in the region.4
This statement essentially sums up China's security agenda in the post-
Cold War era. China seeks economic and political security, in addition to military
security as it continues on the road to regional power status in the twenty-first
century. The political and economic aspects of security constitute central themes
in this thesis, and are of vital importance to China.
In this thesis, focusing on Northeast Asia also coincides with China's
attempt to refocus its diplomacy on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. This is in
some ways reinforced by the international repercussions arising from the 1989
Tiananmen Incident. Furthermore, as Harry Harding points out, the developments
in Eastern Europe and the Gulf War in 1990-1991 indicate the need for China to
adjust its foreign policy, with emphasis on improving relations with its Asian
neighbours, as communism crumbled on a large scale and the United States
dominated international security issues as the Cold War ended.' James Hsiung
notes that China has begun to focus on a broad range of relations with its
neighbours, which he describes as zhoubian (surrounding area) diplomacy.° As
6Michael Yahuda argues, to a certain extent, this in some way signifies the first
attempt at a coherent regional policy that is not subordinated to the relationship
between the two superpowers.' Qimao Chen also states that establishing cordial
relations with neighbours is regarded as the first priority in China's diplomacy.' A
key factor driving China's regional policy, as the rest of the thesis will
demonstrate, is the role of economics.
Therefore, it would be helpful to look at China's diplomatic impetus in
relation to the growing significance of Asian countries to China's economic
development in general, and to the policies of economic reform and opening-up in
particular.' In addition, one can also point out that the economies of Northeast
Asia are integrating more closely among themselves and intra-regional trade now
accounts for over two-thirds of total trade in the region.'° What appears important
for the Beijing regime is that China wants to build up its power base in Northeast
Asia before eventually hoping to emerge as a truly global power status.
It is also important to note that this thesis does not disregard the
importance of other regions, such as Southeast Asia or South Asia, entirely. To be
sure, there is no doubt that China also has security interests in other parts of Asia.
For example, China has expressed its desire to establish a stronger presence in the
Indian Ocean by negotiating for port facilities in Burma; Beijing's involvement
was alleged to include the building and upgrading of naval port facilities,
including that at Hanggyi Island at the mouth of the Bassein River and Great
Coco Island near India's Andaman Islands." This type of manoeuvring is bound
7to arouse India's suspicions and should be looked at as part of China's security
interests in relation to the countries of India and Pakistan. However, this will
require delving into the regional security issues of South Asia, which is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
In addition, there is the question of China's security interests in relation to
Southeast Asia. This issue has been given further prominence by events in recent
years, specifically China's alleged assertiveness in relation to its territorial claims
in the South China Sea. It is fair to say to make a preliminary statement that this
has been triggered largely by Beijing's search for economic resources. As the
following chapters will show, what is important is that this type of issue
highlights the economic aspect of China's security interests. At this point, it must
be clarified that the threat China allegedly poses to countries in Southeast Asia is
not the subject of this thesis. The fact is that, as serious as the disputes between
China and other Southeast Asian states regarding the Spratly Islands may be,
these disputes do not appear to threaten the national security or existence of China
directly. The aim in this thesis is, after all, to look at China's security interests,
not those of its neighbours.
In sum, it is fair to say that both South Asia and Southeast Asia are only
relatively less important security concerns for China, compared to Northeast Asia,
the main focus of this thesis. In practical terms, the military strengths of potential
enemies in these regions lie far from the Chinese capital and the military threats
they may pose weigh little compared to any instability in the Korean peninsula, a
8resurgent Russia or an expansionist Japan. Undoubtedly, China's security
interests certainly extend beyond the regions aforementioned to places such as
Central Asia or even further west, but, again, these are outside the scope of the
thesis.
Having established the primary focus on Northeast Asia, we can now look
at what the ending of the Cold War in the region means for China's security
interests. This is useful as a brief guide to the following chapters in this thesis.
Today, China certainly perceives some threats surfacing to its security interests in
Northeast Asia, and Chinese academics and writers have discussed these issues in
some detail.' Firstly, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist Party faces threats to
its legitimacy. Rapid modernisation and industrialisation has created many
political and social tensions and the gap between the poor and the rich is
increasing in China. This might create divisions in Chinese society, undermining
the unity of the state in the long run. Given that fact that China only achieved
unity in 1949, issues relating to political security are bound to be major security
concerns. Although for China, the Russian threat has diminished, the United
States remains the sole superpower in the world and therefore in Northeast Asia
as well. How China perceives this challenge will be dealt with in Chapter 8.
Moreover, it has been noted by China, among others, that various sources
of tension, which have often been submerged because of the demands of the Cold
War, may resurface. These include the enmity between Japan and South Korea,
9and also between China itself and Japan. Furthermore, nationalist aspirations on
the part of states in the region may appear, such as in the form of a more powerful
Japan. On a wider scale, it is conceivable that the cessation of the Cold War
means not merely that the danger of a direct superpower clash has receded, it also
signifies that the potential for anarchy is higher. All these factors are bound to
threaten the stability of the region, which means that Chinese security analysts
will find it harder to judge the flux of changes and formulate policies accordingly.
This is an important point to bear in mind.
As for the instability in East Asia as a whole, numerous debates have been
raised. For instance, Gerald Segal and Barry Buzan argue that "as the particular
distortions imposed by the Cold War unravel, many historical patterns that were
either suppressed or overridden by ideological and superpower rivalry are
reappearing", suggesting that "political fragmentation and hostility" will
characterise the region's international relations.' Aaron Friedberg puts forward
the proposition that Asia could be "the world's primary generator of war (as well
as wealth and knowledge)", just as Europe was for a half millennium.' Richard
Betts argues that in East Asia, there is "an ample pool of festering grievances,
with more potential for generating conflict than during the Cold War, when
bipolarity helped stifle the escalation of parochial disputes"." Thomas Berger
notes that none of the western arguments for the decline of the possibility of war,
including the well-rehearsed one that democracies do not go to war, seem to apply
in East Asia.' This strand of thinking posits that most of the countries, including
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China are not fully developed democracies and in addition, their political culture
also suggests that Northeast Asian authoritarian regimes will feel less inhibited
than Europeans in using force to settle their disputes." At present, many disputes
still exist and have prevented the establishment of closer ties among these nations.
One example is the Northern Territories (the Southern Kurile islands) issue,
which still remains an obstacle to Russo-Japanese relations. Relevant for our
analysis is the fact that China contests with Japan over the sovereignty of Diaoyu
Islands (Senkaku Islands).
Most important of all, China still regards Taiwan as a renegade province,
and this rivals the hostility between North and South Korea. The possible rise of
regional hegemons in the long term is also a matter of concern. The emergence of
Japan as an economic power has certainly posed new questions for China's
political leadership. Similarly, a resurgent Russia, although unlikely at the time of
writing, will also cause concern for China. In general, as evident from the above
analysis, structural changes in the international system have made China rethink
its security interests in general and to those in Northeast Asia in particular. How
/
these changes affect China's military, political and economic security will
become clearer as the thesis progresses. But first, we need to set out the research
methodology, the structure of this thesis and the central hypothesis.
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Research methodology, structure and hypothesis
Before we start to analyse China's security, it is worth noting that, given
the paucity of relevant information available, analysing the security agenda of
China is often a frustrating and complex task. Hence, it would be appropriate to
acknowledge several methodological problems at the outset. Firstly, the use of
"China" in the title does not assume a uniform net security assessment of the
political leadership in Beijing. Neither does the accepted convenience of
reference to Beijing assume a monolithic perspective across regions, service or
generations. More importantly, on issues of political security, one can question
whether this relates to just the Chinese Communist Party or the country as a
whole. In this thesis, the Communist regime's security is generally taken to mean
China's as well. It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss Chinese domestic
politics and how different factions in society, including Chinese dissidents,
interpret political security. In addition, a divergence of probable and possible
threat perceptions held among both military and civilian analysts is not only
plausible but is attested to by widespread interviews and media sources.
Therefore, all these require tentative conclusions on what security threats are
expected, in what sequence and priority, and by which sector of the regime.
Nevertheless, what is indisputable is that on certain issues such as Taiwan,
nationalism may prompt identical assertions where Chinese sovereignty is viewed
as being threatened. This thesis aims to offer a synthesised and complete view of
the threat perceptions in China, which will on the whole reflect the general trend
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of security thinking in China. Further discussion on the coherence of China's
security interests will be explored in the next chapter, when we take a closer look
at China's concept of security.
Secondly, sources of information present other problems. Secrecy is
endemic in national security affairs but doubly so in communist states such as
China, where transparency is at a minimum and security consciousness is
maximal. For instance, it is very much the standard practice that interviews with
foreigners must be conducted with the expectation of the content being relayed to
foreign governments or a public audience. This in some ways suggests that the
Chinese experts expect some sort of return, such as positive publicity for their
various causes, in exchange for any information that they want to divulge. In
addition, domestic political-bureaucratic budget battles and patron-client
alignments are universal in the Chinese political system. This has, to a certain
extent, complicated the context for Chinese comments on future threats
conditions, and on what is said and not said to foreigners or in print. What this
thesis tries to achieve is to give as full a view as possible, while attempting to
avoid the twin pitfalls of assertion and description.
On a more positive note, it must be noted that, in general, access to
ceen
military and civilian security analysts has 48eR a definite improvement over the
Mao Zedong era. Repetition of contacts by many Western academics over time
permits longitudinal comparison through changing domestic and international
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situations." This type of contacts would certainly help security analysts looking at
China get a better grasp of Beijing's view.
Although interviews do not constitute part of the research methodology,
this thesis will draw on official Chinese statements, such as those made by the
president, premier, and foreign minister; the official news agency, Xinhua; the
official press, such as the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, Renmin Ribao,
and the Chinese People's Liberation Army newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao; and also
publications of Chinese academics writing on security issues, in order to achieve
an insight into the minds of those influencing and formulating China's security
agenda. The publications by China's experts in international relations at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Contemporary International
Relations Research Institute, Beijing University and the China Society for
Strategy and Management Research are useful in furthering our understanding of
China's security interests.
While some Western academics might regard most of the above-
mentioned Chinese sources as part of Beijing's propaganda tools, it is equally
important to note that these Chinese publications are extremely important as they
can give the non-western reader insights into the Chinese mindset.' The critical
task is to realise that these sources vary in authoritativeness, audience and
sophistication, and hence one must use them selectively insofar as they shed light
on China's security concerns. For instance, some sources may reflect a particular
faction of the Chinese leadership and hence the audience they are addressing must
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also be taken into account. In general, as is the case with interviews, official
constraints combine with the changing domestic and bureaucratic-political
context would in general tend to affect the tone and argument in the Chinese
sources. This thesis attempts to provide as fair and just an account as far as
possible. In addition, the problem with Chinese sources is further complicated by
Hong Kong press "leaks", which in general tend to vary in reliability with little
basis for confirmation, particularly where personalities are allegedly involved in
foreign policy disputes!' Indeed, private assessments of different Hong Kong
publications by veteran reporters show little agreement on their degree of
reliability; these Hong Kong press "leaks" often reflecting certain controversial
policy views of a particular faction in Beijing engaged in political struggles.
Nevertheless, they add another point of inference to be tested against logic when
evidence is lacking.
Perhaps most important of all, one has to judge the authoritativeness of the
publication. For instance, although the Ta Kung Pao is a China-owned
newspaper, certain less important articles attributed to staff reporters normally do
not carry authoritative weight. However, at the same time, it is unlikely that the
Ta Kung Pao could have, for instance, quoted an "authoritative" Chinese ministry
official without permission from the Hong Kong office of the official Chinese
news agency, Xinhua. In general, it is true to say that Hong Kong newspapers
should be used sparingly, compared to Beijing publications, due to the issue of
authoritativeness.
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However, the use of China publications must not be over-excessive, as
this may led to the danger of a "Sino-centric" approach that could lead to charges
that the thesis is nothing more than Chinese propaganda. Hence, a variety of non-
Chinese sources Beijing's security policy will also be used. This will give a more
balanced view to the thesis and help the reader judge, for instance, both sides of a
particular argument. The Western literature used includes academic journals,
books, and Internet sources on China's security. A key resource is the BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC SWB), which provides Western readers with
an up-to date account of the news situation in China. Of course, releases from the
official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, form the bulk of the China section of BBC
SWB. In short, despite the acknowledged problems, the media is a necessary
albeit insufficient source.
Lastly, a final methodological problem concerns the impact of security
threat perceptions on behaviour. This applies not only to China, but also to every
state in the international system as well. This further raises the larger questions of
information processing, cost calculation and political decision making in Beijing.
It is worth noting that Chinese scholars are just beginning to address these
questions on the basis of archives, memoirs and interviews from the Mao Zedong
era. The preliminary result is that systematic research on subsequent years
appears to lack a similar evidential base for comparison, much less generalisation.
Given these limitations, it is true to say that projections of probable linkages
between perceived threats and specific behaviours must remain speculative. We
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must bear in mind that perception is essentially a cognitive process. While it may
provide insights into a particular way of thinking, it must still be subjected to
different interpretation and debates, which is part of the larger problem faced in
conducting research in the social sciences.
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, certain key assumptions frame
the security threat forecasts inferred from the sources used in this thesis.
Domestic dissidence and regime factionalism will not jeopardise the Chinese
Communist Party's control of the country, at least not totally. Otherwise, the
tradition Chinese premise of "internal unrest, external danger" (nei luan wai
huan) will significantly heighten threat perceptions in relation to security
interests. Moreover, it must be pointed out that attendant efforts to unite the
country will also magnify external security threats.
In addition, this thesis aims to capture a longer Chinese perspective within
the framework of key post-Cold War events, including the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Gulf War and the evolution of the US Asia-Pacific policy. This does
not preclude change over time, given the problematic evolution of the Chinese
leadership. For instance the passing of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping may
have pushed Chinese foreign policy towards a "bureaucratic" model of foreign
policy decision making. With Jiang Zemin currently at the helm, China might
send out more diffuse and at times, even conflicting signals to the outside world,
in the absence of a paramount central figure in the decision making process.
However, at the time of writing, certain basic premises of China's security
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interests have not been altered in any drastic manner. Moreover, relative stability
of the political and economic priorities since 1979 encourages cautious projection
for the past and present patterns of threat articulation. In sum, in this thesis, it is
assumed that China will resemble some form of a unifies'state in the foreseeable
future, and its security interests will show a certain extent of continuity with those
in place at the time when this thesis is being written. Every effort will be made to
keep this thesis up-to-date, although it must be pointed that the thesis was written
before the Asian economic crisis started.
With these in mind, we can set out the hypothesis in this thesis. The
central argument is that:
China's security interests in the post-Cold War era should be studied by
incorporating the non-military elements of security. This is in line with
China's notion of comprehensive security. In order to achieve a full
explanation of China's actions in the post-Cold War era, we must
incorporate political and economic aspects into the analysis of China's
security interests.
From this central tenet, we can go to say that focusing on a broader
definition of security will enable us to understand China's actions in relation to
the following states: the United States, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea
and Taiwan. It will also enable us to understand China's security views in relation
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to the following issues: the collapse of communism, "peaceful evolution", human
rights, trade and development of the Chinese economy. The concluding chapter
will state the wider implication that a broader definition of security enables us to
gain a better and fuller understanding of a state's security interests in the post-
Cold War era. Although one say that this type of approach is not entirely new, it
can be argued that this has not been done in-depth and in a systematic way in any
longer piece of research, as far as analysing China's security in the post-Cold War
era is concerned. This is precisely what the thesis aims to achieve.
We can now turn to the structure of the thesis. This will be useful to the
reader as a kind of "map" to facilitate the "tour" of the thesis. The next chapter
looks at China's comprehensive approach to security, discussing the influences on
Chinese thinking. Chapter 3 focuses on the decline of the Russian threat and the
collapse of communism, which have ramifications for China's political security.
Chapter 4 examines China's security interests on the Korean peninsula, including
its traditional military and political ties to North Korea as well as the more recent
economic ties with South Korea. Chapter 5 looks at China's security interests in
relation to the rise of Japan. Chapter 6 deals with Taiwan as a security issue for
China, again looking at the economic and political aspects, in addition to the
purely military ones. Chapter 7 deals with Chinese perceptions of the "peaceful
evolution" threat and here the emphasis is on the non-military threats China faces
from Western countries such as the United States. Chapter 8 looks at China's
perceptions of the United States and its economics interests in relation to this
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superpower. Chapter 9 looks at the implications of China's drive for great power
status, as Beijing searches for ultimate security. Chapter 10 provides conclusions
stemming from the thesis.
A final word: This thesis is based upon materials available at the time of
writing. Every effort has been made to ensure it is up-to-date. Although the thesis
cannot be as current as the daily press, the enduring issues that are discussed and
analysed should prove to be more important than a mere emphasis on updating
events. It is hoped that this thesis will encourage further research and debate over
the evolution of China's security interests, which will no doubt constitute an
important piece in completing the jigsaw puzzle of international relations in the
post-Cold War era.
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CHAPTER 2: THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
In this chapter, the focus will be on the theoretical concept of security. In
particular, we aim to explore the Chinese concept of security in greater detail. This is
useful in setting out the approach the following chapters will take. First, we turn to
the debate on broadening the scope of the security concept in international relations,
which in many ways coincides with the growing importance of economic issues in
the post-Cold War era. Secondly, we analyse the Chinese approach to security, in
relation to the non-Chinese literature discussed in the preceding section. It should be
clear by the end of this chapter that the Chinese concept of comprehensive security is,
to a large extent, very much in line with the increasing widespread adoption of a
broader definition of security in the field of International Relations. We first turn to
the concept of security in general.
The concept of security
The concept of security is a central one in International Relations. Its
prominence ranks alongside concepts such as power, balance of power, war and peace;
and it is in many ways arguably more relevant than these more traditional ideas to the
modern study of International Relations. The increasing importance of security in
International Relations will become more evident as this chapter progresses and as the
thesis develops. Generally, it is fair to say that what security means in the domestic and
international context and how the concept can be operationalised, is a much-disputed
matter in academic circles. This comes as no surprise since security is essentially a
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multidimensional concept. It is malleable and subject to different interpretations by
both academics and policymakers alike at different times. However, despite the
theoretical problems and controversies pertaining to the operational utility of the
concept in the past, few proponents would disagree with the proposition that it is the
core value of both states and security studies in modern International Relations. To be
precise, the concept of security is one of the focal points of International Relations,
just like power, war or peace. Indeed, one can even make a preliminary proposition that
it should replace power, as the central concept in the field of International Relations.
However, at this stage, the debate is still raging over what security actually means.
Before discussing what security means, one has to take one step backwards first.
In this thesis, one possible way is to look at the concept of security in two dimensions.
The first is to conceptualise security in terms of the "level of analysis"; the second in
terms of the different aspects of security. This type of approach has been outlined in
Barry Buzan's study on security.' A useful analogy would be that the first dimension
refers to the depth of a pond while the second relates to the surface area of the pond.
The first, the "level of analysis" is in fact a well-documented problem in international
relations theory and was first noted by David Singer in an article published in the
1950s. 2 This type of thinking basically posits looking at international relations issues
in terms of the three "levels" of Man, the state and the international system.
International relations theorists such as Kenneth Waltz have applied this type of
analysis to a study on the causes of war, looking at the three "levels" of human
nature, the state and the international system in turn. 3 Although this type of approach
is highly commendable, it also means that theorists need to be competent in other
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fields to embark on such types of analysis. For instance, one would need a reasonable
knowledge of psychology, which is essential towards understanding human nature.
This means that the scope of a particular study might become too broad for most to
handle comfortably, and at times even render the scale of the entire exercise too huge
A.1
to undertake in a meaning manner. Indeed, this is a dilemma international relations
,
scholars have to cope with.
This type of dilemma also arises in the study of security. One can speak of the
three "levels" of individual security, state security or national security, and
international security. At this stage, it must be pointed out that, in order to make the
scope manageable, this thesis deals primarily with the state, specifically the Chinese
state. In other words, this thesis will not analyse security from all the perspective '
 of
the Chinese citizen or from the vantagepoint of the international security system.
It is also worth pointing out that an approach focusing on the second level is
not without its problems. There are disputes over what is or what should be the
second level. For instance, Martin Shaw has argued that society should be the
primary referent of security. 4 The distinction between State and Society is a familiar
one in the social sciences. For our purposes here, it would be fair to assume that the
debate is at present not serious enough to alter our analysis here entirely. As for the
other two "levels of analysis" - the individual and the international system, they are
incorporated insofar as they add insights and support arguments in this thesis, which
to all intent and purposes focuses on the security of the Chinese state.
In addition, one must be aware that in discussing security, there are often
contradictions between individual, state and international security. What is viewed as
..
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secure from one level may be seen as insecure from another. For example, one can
point to the classic contradiction between individual (largely subsumed as the human
rights issue) and state security. Writers such as Ken Booth have argued that the
individual should become a central referent in any attempt to discuss the concept of
security. 5 While we need not engage in this debate for our purposes here, it is
important to note that the individual's security interests may be threatened by the
state that purports to represent his or her security interests and comes into this thesis
insofar as China perceives human rights (individual security) as a national security
threat. This issue is most often linked with Chinese perceptions of the US strategy of
"peaceful evolution" (Chapter 7), a subject which tends to be ignored in analyses of
China's security interests.
Moving on to the "highest level of analysis", which is the international
system, the important thing worth noting is that China's search for security is
reinforced by the anarchical nature of the international system. The conventional
wisdom in international relations is that foreign policy and a state's security interests
do not exist in a vacuum. They are reactive as much as they are proactive. Having
said that, it must pointed out from the beginning that this "level" will not be the
primary focus of this thesis. The third level, the international security system, is
studied insofar as it sheds light on China's security interests. In fact, the first part of
Chapter 1 had started off by looking at this level, in this case the regional security
system in Northeast Asia since the Cold War ended, which constitutes the milieu in
which China assesses its security interests. Particularly problematic for Chinese
policymakers responsible for security in the region are the interplay of traditional
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state-to-state relations and various forms of transnational and multilateral linkages. It
is important to note the extent to which the new multilateral arrangements, together
with trade and investment flows and the explosion in communication and information
links, alter the geostrategic landscape and more importantly, the manner in which
China conducts its security policies. Having specified the state, specifically the
Chinese state, as our "level of analysis" in this thesis, we can now turn to the
question of what security really means.
The non-military aspects of security
The scope of security is also a subject of much debate. The question of what
should be included in the study of security is not only an academic one, but it is, to all
intents and purposes, a practical one. In general, as we move towards the twenty-first
century, it is fair to say that the traditional concept of security employed in International
Relations has become increasingly anachronistic. In some ways, this is an indication of
the changing times and the new agenda in international relations today. Certain changes
that have occurred in global politics in recent times, such as the rising importance of
economics in global affairs, have hastened the need to come to terms with widening the
scope of the security concept. A clear illustration is the perceived need to use naval
vessels to monitor the Exclusive Economic Zones over which states have legal authority
since the early 1980s. Another example is the relationship between the burdensome
foreign debt and environmental decay in some Third World regions, and the consequent
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threat of mass migration which may in turn lead to conflicts between states and even
call for forceful responses from some.
Hence, it appears that security and the accumulation of military power are no
longer seen as synonymous. Academics and policy analysts alike have begun to take
more of an interest in economic issues and in fact many have already begun to probe its
frontiers. For instance, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
published in its journal Survival a special issue on the non-military aspects of what it
calls "strategy" as early as 1989, which indicates a new way of looking at security issues
in the modern era. 6 At this point, it is useful to conduct a brief survey of this literature,
since this forms the theoretical justification for the thesis.
Steve Smith, in a review article assessing the Barry Buzan's book People,
	 —
States and Fear, acknowledges that Buzan's book opens up the subject of international
security studies from its narrow traditions and links it to the wider arena of international
studies, which coincided with what an increasing number of specialists are calling for.7
Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones list economic, sociological and psychological
dimensions of threats as important for security analysts, although they still regard these
subjects as peripheral and "only remotely related" to central political problems of
"threat perception and management". 8 To Nye and Lynn-Jones, security therefore, still
essentially mean military security. Strategic issues are identified as part of international
security studies but they believe that strategic studies (defined as "the choices between
alternative strategies for states") exclude some of the more basic theoretical questions
about the relationships between international economics and international security.
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Nevertheless, such recognition indicates that security should be conceived as more than
merely in military terms.
Others, such as Neta Crawford, but again not to the extent envisaged by other
more progressive analysts, argue for a broadening of the security agenda, including a
redefinition of security including the relationships between economic and military
security, and between the environment and security. 9 Simon Dalby also argues in favour
of broadening and suggests some specific alternative approaches to the security
problem, such as non-offensive defence and the economic and ecological dimensions of
security; evaluating these approaches, he makes the point that attempts to rethink
security are often oblivious to the theoretical and political pitfalls that imperilled the
enterprise in the first place, further questioning whether rethinking security is
necessarily the best way to proceed in dealing with issues of ecology, economics and
constructing post-Cold War politics. 10 To various extents, the above analyses indicate
that scholars have begun looking at the non-military aspects of security and explored the
interrelationships between the military and non-military aspects of security.
Joseph Nye, in another article entitled "The contribution of strategic studies:
future challenged", favoured a broader concept of security than the one traditionally
adopted within the strategic studies community, indicating that a definition of strategic
studies "limited to issues of military operations" will be severely deficient." However,
despite favouring international security as the "central concept", he does not favour
expanding into economic and environmental issues, arguing that an expanded concept
of strategic studies can keep its focus if it has the "balance of power" (implicitly
primarily military power) at its core. Such continued adherence to the familiar concept
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of balance of power is expected among analysts, but an acknowledgement of other non-
military issues is more important, as this thesis will argue. It must be pointed out that,
today, very few in the field of Security Studies have such a narrow conception of
security.
John Chipman notes that while the non-military aspects of security might
occupy more of a strategist's time th4On the past, questions relating to the procurement,
deployment, engagement and withdrawal of military capabilities is still the main
approach to understanding security, adding that the task of the strategist is to "provide
policymakers with the conceptual tools that can be applied to the task at hand", which
means "the strategist's 'intellectual' agenda for the 1990s should consist primarily of
developing the appropriate tools for the consideration of self-determination and
revolutions, collective security and war termination, economics and security, ethics and
strategy". 12
Here we see again the desire to hold on to the traditional elements of security, while
acknowledging that economic security issues need to be accounted for as well.
The familiar narrow conception of security has often been identified with realist
and neo-realist approaches to International Relations, in particular with the prominence
of the concept of balance of power. Basing much of his argument on the experience of
the Soviet Union, Edward Kolodziej stresses the importance of domestic variables, for
"economic and political assurances, responsive to societal demands now expressed with
pervasive force throughout the international system (albeit with varying weight,
intensity and saliency), must be fashioned to ensure stable and legitimate security
systems", arguing for a holistic approach to the "international security system",
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embracing a geopolitical dimension, a welfare dimension, and the issue of domestic
political stability and legitimacy. 13 This emphasis on the political dimension is pertinent
to our analysis, as China is facing threats to its political security, much as the Soviet
Union once did in the late 1980s.
At the far end of the spectrum, there are also those who rejected the notion of a
wider security concept almost entirely. For example, Stephen Walt opposes the
inclusion of non-military issues such as poverty and environmental decay into the
security agenda for he believes that such an expansion would destroy the field's
"intellectual coherence". 14 Although this thesis does not deal directly with specific
theoretical debates, this brief survey suggests that an approach to security centring
solely on military aspects is becoming increasingly anachronistic, since many writers
now support the view that security should be conceived more widely in the modern era,
albeit with different degrees of commitment. The view adopted in this thesis will
therefore challenge the thinking of those who continue to argue in favour of equating
China's military strategy solely with China's national security policy, since the case for
accepting a broader security agenda has been recognised in most corners of professional
security analysis. At the same, it is also true to say there are obvious military
implications even in some non-military aspects of security.
China's comprehensive security
Having examined the current non-Chinese debate on broadening the scope of
the security concept, we can now turn to the Chinese conception. For our purpose
here, it is fair to say that the defining feature is comprehensiveness (quan mian hua).
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There are various interpretations to this, all quite congruent with the argument of this
thesis. In simple terms, the Chinese concept includes more than just the military
aspects of security. To be more precise, as noted by writers such as Weixing Hu, a
more inclusive term, "comprehensive national strength", is used by Chinese strategic
planners in discussing long-term security strategy. 15 This type of analysis has also
been noted by Western analysts such as David Shambaugh. 16 Another manifestation
of Chinese security formulation is embedded in the notion of a "new security
concept" possessing the characteristics of being "comprehensive, all-round, and
mutually equal"; an indication of it being applied, according to the Chinese, was
evident in a major security agreement signed with Russia and other Central Asian
states in 1997, and the announcement of an unilateral disarmament in August 1997
whereby China will further cut its troops by 500,000 in three years on the basis of a
reduction of one million troops in the 1980s."
We may categorise China's security into several categories. For example, an
article in the Chinese army newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, has listed military, political,
economic, scientific and technological security, and social security as elements of the
"new security concept".
Military security and political security
From the viewpoint of military security, one Chinese description in the
Jiefangjun Bao states:
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The military force shoulders the important mission of defending the state's
territorial sovereignty and integrity, resisting foreign aggression and
safeguarding state unification. Therefore it is necessary to strengthen army
building, develop armament and reform the military organisations. The military
forces of all countries should play a role in a broader scope such as cracking
down on terrorism and drug trafficking, rescue work and humanitarian aid. 18
This is quite similar to the conventional concept of military security, which
focuses on the interplay of military threats and states' perceptions of each other's
military intentions. For China, this type of military threat has somewhat diminished
as the Russian power declined. More important for the Chinese will be coping with
new military challenges that may emerge in the region, such as the military potential
of Japan and of course, the United States, the lone superpower. It is worth noting,
however, that the role of Chinese military forces has been extended to include
crackdowns on activities such as drug trafficking, which have been identified as new
security threats in the post-Cold War era. Interestingly, the United States would
certainly view drug trafficking as a security threat and this opens up the possibility of
Sino-US co-operative actions against such threats.
This message to the outside world deserves our attention because it is an
indication that the Chinese have revised traditional security concepts; which they
equated with the "Cold War mentality" of "establishing one's security on the insecurity
of the opponent". 19 Although it must be pointed out that the Chinese definition is in
some ways a implicit criticism of the sole remaining superpower and its notions of a
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"new world order", a subject explored later in Chapter 8, there are certain elements
which are important for our analysis. For instance, by rejecting the "Cold War
mentality" and revising traditional security concepts, the new security thinking of the
Chinese is beginning to shift from a zero-sum approach to international relations, which
it has criticised the two superpowers for practising during the Cold War. In short, one
can detect that the Chinese are moving towards a more co-operative way of approaching
international relations and security issues.
We next turn to the Chinese definition of political security, which the Jiefangjun
Bao article states in the following manner:
The political body and system of the state cannot be changed by another
country, encroachment of a country's sovereignty and unification shall not be
tolerated, and no country shall meddle in the internal affairs of another country.
On the international stage, all countries, big or small, poor or rich, are all equal.
The big and strong should not be allowed to bully the small and weak. In
international political affairs, the superpowers should not be allowed to order
other countries about, pursue power politics and impose their values on others.
These are the indispensable prerequisites for global and regional security. 20
Political security includes the organisation and process of government, and
the ideology that gives the rulers legitimacy. In China's case, communist ideology is
severely under threat as Beijing becomes increasing drawn to the capitalist orbit in its
search for economic resources for national development. This type of political security
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issue is related to the potential collapse of communism in China, "peaceful evolution"
and the nature of the North Korean regime, some of the issues to be discussed later. In
many ways, China's political security is very much related to the continued struggle
between the communist and capitalist political systems.
In addition, from the above Chinese formulations of military and political
security, we can detect a strong influence imposed by historical events. Therefore, it
is felt that understanding the Chinese way of conducting interstate relations in the
past would give us a guide to the needs and constraints of Beijing's quest for
comprehensive security in the post-Cold War era. To be sure, China itself is a
civilisation going back over four thousand years and it used to dominate Asia, much
like the United States is currently dominating the international system. The term
Middle Kingdom" or Zhongguo encapsulated the Sino-centric approach to
international relations, implying that China was once at the centre and other states
had to conduct their relations with Beijing in a deferential manner; China laid claim
to a position of dominance and centrality in Asia and adjoining states such as Korea
owed tributes to China. This type of thinking is still evident has influenced, to some
extent, the Chinese security approach to the Korean peninsula, as Chapter 4 will
show.
This Sino-centric type of approach to international relations and security was
challenged by the European powers and Japan at the turn of the century. After
suffering from the effects of Western imperialism and humiliation, and the brutal
Japanese occupation during the Second World War, the communists that came to
power in 1949 were an embodiment of anti-imperialist nationalism, with their
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legitimacy based in part on an ability to defend against foreigners since 1949. Anti-
imperialism has been a central focus in the Chinese search for security, with the
result that there exists "a certain obsession with eradicating any residue of the
imperialist past in China foreign policy . 21 As far as political security is concerned,
Chinese leaders today still emphasised the importance of patriotism, aiguo zhuyi, as a
national ideology to hold society together as well as using it as a reminder to erase the
past "century of humiliation". Indeed, this type of feeling is often shared by states that
had been victims of European colonialism.
As far as the issue of political sovereignty is concerned, China had armed
liberation struggles in the Third World against colonial powers, such as against in
white-racist Rhodesia and Mozambique. China also supported the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia, in what was viewed as a Soviet-backed Vietnam invasion of Cambodia at
that point in time. China had wanted to seen as the symbol of Third World
independence from the two superpowers. In particular, the late Defence Minister, Lin
Piao, had continue to promote mobilisation against both the superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, believing in the all-out struggle against the imperialists.
Although one can say that the concept of imperialism employed by Chinese leaders
has different targets at different times, imperialism being was defined largely as
American in the 1950s and then Soviet by the 1970s, the point is that the above
highlights China's firm belief that its political security must never be subjected to
interference by the superpowers again.
China's anti-imperialism stance, evident in its conception of political and
military security, is also in many ways related to its negative experience of alliances
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in the international system. Historically, China has no permanent friends or enemies
and has been suspicious of alliances since the "Middle Kingdom" era when its
existence was essentially a world unto itself. At the height of Western imperialism at
the turn of the century, the Chinese often sought to "play one power off against
another". For example, as a means to safeguard China's political and military
security, China cleverly used France, Germany and Russia to dislodge the Japanese
from South Manchuria after it was defeated in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War.
Furthermore, one can also detect a need for self-reliance in China's search for
security, reinforced by its negative experiences as a victorious ally in the First World
War against Germany, which ended in Qingdao in Shandong Province being
transferred from Germany to Japan instead of back to Chinese sovereignty. 22 This
was, of course, a setback to China's security interests and it sparked off the 1919
May Fourth Movement, where anti-imperialist nationalistic fever reached new
heights. Later in the early 1950s, a shared communist ideology with the Soviet Union
presented China with an opportunity for a marriage of convenience. Although the
first deliberately chosen one in Chinese history, it eventually ended in the Sino-
Soviet dispute and the Soviets became a threat in Beijing's eyes. In short, the Chinese
have never experienced any positive experience of seeking alliances to enhance its
security interests. The negative experience of alliances contributed to the need for
self-reliance, which in turn leads to the current emphasis on economic development
in the bid to become a truly global power in the twenty-first century. It also explains
why China continues to emphasis an "independent" foreign policy, refusing to align
i
itself to any other power in a formal way.
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To sum up, as far as military and political security is concerned, we see a
China seeking to redefine its place in the world, drawing upon historical experience
for guidance in the quest to enhance its security in the post-Cold War era. Two
important lessons were Western imperialism and the Japanese aggression. These
have made the Chinese more critical of any emergent international order and are
bound to influence their thinking on the search for comprehensive security. The
important factor we need to note is that this anti-imperialism posture is always
linked, if not equated with nationalism, as modern China seeks to wipe out a "century
of humiliation". This will influence China's security interests to a large degree. We
can now turn to economic security.
Economic Security
China has clearly recognised that security should no longer be conceived in
purely military and political terms, therefore we need to explore the economic
dimension in this thesis. For example, one Chinese assessment in the Jiefangjun Bao
states:
The economic interests of a country must not be encroached upon; state-to state
economic relations should be established on the basis of equality, co-operation,
and common development; no country should be allowed to apply economic
sanctions to retaliate against the other, still less use economic sanctions to obtain
political gains; trade, investment and other economic activities should be carried
out in the light of the principle of mutual benefits and the most favoured-nation
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trading status and entry to the World Trade Organisation should not be used as
"cards" to exert pressure on another country and disrupt the country's economic
development; economic competition should proceed in accordance with
international rules and regulations; economic problems, friction and differences
are normal, and should be resolved through dialogue on equal footing,
consultation and talks.23
The realm of the economic is too important for Chinese leaders to discard or
ignore. This is a central theme running throughout this thesis. The impact of the Asian
economic crisis, which occurred after the thesis was written, further highlights the
importance of economic security to China. Before the Asian economic crisis, an
indication of the increasing importance of economics in China's conception of security
has already appeared in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's speech to the United Nations
Assembly in 1994:
Economic priority has become the international trend, as all countries of the
world universally attach importance to developing their economies and
strengthening international economic co-operation. The Chinese government
takes economic construction as the central task of the whole country and makes
reform and opening up one as of its basic state policies.24
dog
From the above, it isrthat national security conceived in narrow military terms
no longer seems adequate for the Chinese in the 1990s. To give a more
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comprehensive analysis of China's security in the 1990s, we must definitely include
the question of economic security. Economic security, which includes the promotion
of economic growth, free and fair trade practices, access to markets and natural
resources, is increasingly important, not only to China, but to every state in the
international system. Economic issues are increasingly taking precedence over
political ones, and it can be said that, in general, the dichotomy of "high politics"
(military) and "low politics" (economic) in international relations is increasingly
blurred and proving to be a false one. This type of argument has already been well
established in our discussion earlier in this chapter.
Interestingly, the Chinese have also come up with a concept of scientific and
technological security:
Science and technology should benefit rather than ruin mankind. For this reason)
, it is necessary to bring science and technology into the track of peace and
development.25
For our purpose, rather than put it into another category, we may classify it
under the rubric of economic security, since science and technology, including those
imported from abroad, constitute a tool for the Chinese to achieve a rapid
development of their economy. China is particularly keen to strengthen co-operation
in technological fields with other countries.26
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In addition, the Chinese have also come up with the notion of social security,
expressed as:
Keeping population growth strictly under control so as to ease the consumption
of common human property; making efforts to protect resources so as to extend
the life limit of earth and mankind; and eliminating environmental pollution and
allowing mankind to have a piece of pure and permanent land for their
subsistence.27
In this thesis, environmental security as such is not discussed. 28 Although issues
such as population growth are significant to China, they are discussed insofar as they
impinge on other aspects of security, predominantly the economic. To sum up, just as
was the case with the "level of analysis" issue discussed earlier, while subjects such
as science and technology, and environment may be interesting, they are best
incorporated into the military, political and most important of all, economic, aspects
of security for the purpose of this thesis.
Another point worth noting is that China's economic security is not internally
generated, it is also influenced and shaped by the evolving dynamics of the Asia-
Pacific region. In short, security interests, including China's, are reactive as much as
proactive to the milieu in which states operate.
Moreover, the Asia Pacific region is widely seen as likely to be the fulcrum of
economic activity in the twenty-first century. 29 The basis for this conclusion is not just
that this region accounts for one-half or more of the world's population, Gross National
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Product and trade, but more importantly because this region represents a main growth
point of new and rising economic power, that is, the core of world economic prosperity.
For example, the US Central Intelligence Agency and The Economist agree that by
2020, six of the ten largest economies in the world will be Asian. 3° Although the
current financial crisis might have cast doubts in the minds of some, it is fair to say
that Asia as whole is likely to make an economic recovery sometime in the future.31
Hence, it is very important to consider China's economic interests in this region.
China's economic reforms and its drive for modernisation and economic
development have been top priorities for its communist leaders, which is a central
theme of this thesis.
Over the last twenty or thirty years, until of the financial crisis beginning in
1997, development and reinvigoration of the countries in East Asia have added a new
chapter in the history of progress. Viewed from the perspective of politics and
economics, despite recent setbacks, East Asia is still regarded as a force that should
not be ignored in the international arena. In many ways, Asia has already entered a
new era where economic factors have become major principles underlying decisions in
the international arena. In the post-Cold War era of rising multilateralism and economic
interdependence, governments have to redefine their roles as sole interlocutors for
domestic and foreign economic relations as well as political relations. In many ways,
this creates a dilemma as the traditional nation-states, including China, attempt to
manage their security, political and economic interests in a world that both draws
entities more closely together and creates more diffuse and fluid ties.
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Furthermore, the development of subregional economic co-operation in the
region, rooted in the tremendous economic growth of intra-Asian trade and investment
dating from the mid-1980s, when country after country adopted economic liberalisation
packages, has given rise to new economic security thinking such as the concept of
"natural economic territories" (NETs) formulated by Robert Scalapino. 32 This concept,
a provocative one, is based on the notion of cross-border economic flows linking sub-
regions of nation-states rather the states' political centres, with the concomitant
suggestion that economic interests can outpace political ones. For example, how states
such as China adjust their political and security relations — as well as their economic
development strategies — to this new trend of "economics from below" may yield
insights as to how the interplay of competition and co-operation will shape the region's
economic, political and security dynamics in the transitions of the post-Cold War era.33
This thesis aims to give more emphasis to these types of economic security issues,
which have been largely underplayed in security studies on China.
In this thesis, three NETs which China is involved will be covered, namely
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, in the context of how they affect China's economic
security. At this stage, we can say that these NETs will allow China to experiment in
economic co-operation, albeit in a cautious manner, given the region's varying levels of
economic development, different socio-political systems and complex security and
political relationships. China may find NET co-operation particularly attractive for its
economic agenda, especially at a time when the official mechanisms for economic co-
operation, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), East Asia
Economic Caucus (EAEC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are in general
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proving too slow to achieve a consensus on a regional (or global) economic framework
for trade and investments. Thus, NET co-operation can also allow China to proceed
along its own path of economic development, just like Mao Zedong had "Sinified" the
political ideology of Marxism to suit China's needs. At the same time, it allows China to
go on its own path of development without the need to agree with others on any
overarching regional goals.
The relevance, as far as our analysis is concerned, is that NETs are generating
innovative means of economic interaction that have limited consonance with traditional
economic controls and political arrangements. In fact, one may argue this is a
phenomenon particularly suited to the Asian context where there is a strong predilection
for incremental rather than bold systemic change. For China, NETs allow it to
experiment with economic reform polices and gradually expand if they are successful.
The Zhuhai and Shenzhen special economic zones are cases in point. Liberalisation,
decentralisation and industrial restructuring can all combine to further motivate China to
develop its peripheries and hinterlands that remain isolated from the commercial centres
that had prospered in an earlier era. Much of the untapped potential in these areas can
be efficiently realised by capitalising on complementarities across China's political
borders, so that the subregions are now being more entwined with world markets and
emerging regional ones. This represents one way for China to enhance its economic
interests.
This is given further importance since the Chinese Communist Party has
increasingly been perceived by the masses as shifting its legitimacy to the economic
sphere, with the corollary that the communist leaders must turn to modernising the
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economy. In fact, President Jiang Zemin once told party cadres that the party will
"collapse" if the economy fails. 34 This demonstrates the importance of the country's
economic well being to the communist party which in turn affects the state's very
own survival, indicating a close connection between the economic and political
aspects of China's security. Hence, the current regime in China is using economic
development and rising standards of living as a way of re-establishing popular
legitimacy. With rising standards of living, people will tolerate the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party in return for growing prosperity and a relatively quiet life
free from Maoist-style political campaigns.
This has inadvertently created mutually reinforcing economic success and
political stability at the expense of liberalising the Chinese political system, which is
precisely what the Chinese communists desire - economic reform and transformation
without accompanying changes in the political system. Chinese reformers have also
shown that maintenance of the political system does not have to mean keeping the
central ideology intact or that there must be an outright rejection of the ideology and
its authoritativeness in order to bring about reform in the system. In fact, it has been
argued by Yan Sun that China actually pursued a "middle course". 35 This, to a
certain extent, refutes the words of a recent study by John Schull that reform
communism is unfeasible and leaves only "two options open to a political actor in a
Soviet-type system: either a conservative defence of ideology or a radical leap
beyond it, an outright rejection of the official discourse's authoritativeness". 36 These
types of political security issues will be further explored in Chapter 3, as they are
important ones often not fully explored in traditional security studies on China.
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However, it must be noted that the late Deng Xiaoping perhaps underestimated
the linkages between the inevitable pressures that would eventually surface as a result of
economic growth and enhanced material well-being. One can say that Deng failed to
create the necessary institutional mechanisms for more political participation and had
bequeathed this problem to his successors. It can even be argued that Deng failed to
grasp the most basic of Marxist precepts that the economic base will affect and
influence China's political superstructure.37 In addition, China's rapid economic growth
may spark off high expectations among the Chinese populace for improvements in their
living standards. If these expectations grow faster than the economy's ability to satisfy
them, public resentment might degenerate into social chaos. This certainly poses new
types of security problems, which have not been given the recognition they deserve in
most writings on China's security.
Furthermore, as China pursues economic modernisation, both population and
migration are emerging as major threats to the nation's internal security.38
Corruption in China is becoming so serious that senior leaders have warned that the
country might disintegrate if this is not controlled. 39 All these issues are important in
themselves, but they are discussed in this thesis insofar as they are related to issues of
China's economic security. The leadership is hoping that economic reforms will
ultimately be able to resolve undesirable tensions in Chinese society.
The current Chinese leadership believes there is no turning back. What China
needs is more economic reforms that will lead to further growth. This would solve
the "contradictions" in Chinese society. The rationale behind this is that, if growth is
sustained, then the perception of the wealth gap would be less apparent as the people
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are on a whole better off The last thing that Beijing wants is an underclass in the
making and this has come amidst the leadership's claims that "uneven development
will not divide the nation".4° Chinese leaders, for example, seem to believe that
negative effects resulting from inflation and overheating of the economy can be
dampened as long as they can meet the basic needs of the unemployed, as the "iron
rice bowl" system did during Mao Zedong's reign, providing the people's basic needs
for health care, employment and housing.
China's economic security cannot be separated from that of the Asia-Pacific
region as a whole. The Chinese economy has a direct bearing on the development of
the East Asian nations. China offers numerous trade opportunities and a large market
for the region. Equally, the sustained and stable economic development of East Asia
is crucial to China. The Asian financial crisis has been a matter of deep concern to
China. President Jiang Zemin warns that if China begins to suffer financial crises
like those elsewhere in Asia, then China cannot hope to place hope in international
assistance, due to the sheer size of China's economy and, more importantly, due to
the linkage of foreign financial assistance to political considerations. The Chinese
regard the East Asian financial crisis as a "historical event" similar to the collapse of
the Soviet Union, expressing concern that the International Monetary Fund's (IMF)
loans to South Korea, Thailand and Philippines and Indonesia included "stringent"
conditions imposed on these countries to "obey" IMF guidelines to change, reform
and open up their markets. 41 This is an indication of China's concern about
economic events that can lead to its sovereignty and security being compromised. As
mentioned earlier, the principle of anti-imperialism is not only embedded in China's
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search for security in both political and military aspects, it is also evident in the
economic aspect. This is clearly reflected by the communists seeing themselves as
engaging in a continuing struggle to free China and defend it against imperialism in
all aspects, including economic exploitation in the past era, and also the economic
dominance of the West today.
Coherence of China's security interests
Of course, it will be totally wrong to argue that modern China is a single and
simple actor. For our purposes here, it is important to look at the question of whether
Chinese security interests are inherently coherent and internally consistent, given the
flux in the post-Cold War era. This raises the question of how much is there a single
Chinese factor in foreign relations.
First, we need to take note of the nature of the Chinese political system, the
collapse of communism as a credible ideology in the post-Cold War era and the
leadership succession issue in China. To be sure, the Chinese political system is in a
transitional phase and one major weakness of communist political systems is the lack
of an orderly process for the selection of new leaders. Various historical examples
can be cited. For instance, after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, there was a period
of political struggle, with the purge of the radical "Gang of Four" eventually resulting
in the ascendancy of the late Deng Xiaoping. In China, because there is no
democratic process for the selection and removal of leaders, political selections take
place through intra-party struggles behind the scenes. Key leaders often place their
own cliques in key positions while countering the manoeuvres of rival leaders and
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their followers. A more recent example can be found in the removal of the Yang clan
from positions of power in 1992. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992,
Yang Baibing was removed from the Military Affairs Commission, the key body
controlling China's military; it appeared that Yang Baibing with his older brother,
then President Yang Shangkun, had built up a personal network of high-level
supporters within the military before and after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. 42 Yang
Shangkun was later removed as president of China when the National People's
Congress convened in March 1993. This type of internal machination of the various
factions within the Chinese Communist Party may, to a certain extent, reduce the
likelihood of a coherent security agenda.
In addition, there is the leadership succession issue, which also raises
questions of whether security interests can be dominated by internal concerns. For
example, it is worth noting that during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong paid
more attention to internal affairs compared to foreign affairs. In the near future, it is
possible that China's leaders may be preoccupied with internal struggles to the extent
that they have less time and energy to present a stronger security agenda related to
external concerns. A Chinese leadership without a paramount leader after Deng's
demise is bound to have implications for China's security interests. Nevertheless, on
certain critical issues, such as the question of nationalism, there will be little room for
manoeuvre. A new nationalist elite led by Jiang Zemin may, to some extent, regard
the Marxist-Leninist beliefs of their elders as outmoded, but they are certain to share
the same conviction that China has been in the past and should become again a truly
global power.
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Furthermore, it is also worth noting that following Deng's death, competitive
successors to the leadership such as Jiang Zemin will be tempted to exploit
nationalism to strengthen their claims to the throne and weaken their opponents. 43 As
they lack authority, the new generation will not be in a position to make compromises
on issues of national sovereignty such as Taiwan. The successor political leadership
will be unable to move in new directions or reach compromises with foreign powers
as that will weaken their already limited power. Such an analysis points to the
continuity of a coherent security agenda. This has much to do with the sectors of
security that were discussed earlier. It has been noted that dealing with strictly
military issues, one can see that there are often less major disagreements within the
leadership. This includes the policy towards Taiwan. Therefore, it comes as no
surprise that analysts such as Harry Harding have come to the general conclusion that
Beijing insists that its foreign policy has been unvarying in its basic orientation and
goals.44 However, when one moves across the range towards the non-military aspects
of security, one is bound to discover much more diversity in Chinese policymaking.
Apart from the question of whether Jiang Zemin will assert near absolute
authority, which Deng Xiaoping had done earlier, arguments can also be made
regarding the fact that a possible confluence of institutional and ideological crisis will
radically transform or even overrun the existing order. On the internal front, this may
portend a protracted and inconclusive struggle for power that can encourage powerful
local elites to demand greater autonomy from the central government. As Samuel
Huntington notes, the causes that produce military interventions in politics, to a
certain extent, lie in the structure of society, in particular in the "absence or weakness
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of effective political institutions". 45 This argument that political instability is a classic
breeding grounds for military intervention paints a scenario reminiscent of the final
days of the Qing dynasty, which later gave way to warlordism. Having recognised the
argument on "disintegration", the point is that in the view adopted here, this is rather
unlikely as the assumptions in Chapter 1 have stated. Moreover, the subject of matter
of this thesis is not about the leadership succession struggle in China nor the possible
disintegration of the Chinese state system. It is about China's security interests. As
such, this thesis assumes that China will remain as a unified state at the time of
writing. More importantly, at the time this research was being carried out, there exists
a fair degree of coherence in the formulation and articulation of China's security
interests.
Conclusion
China now seeks comprehensive security, with the connotation that building
up a strong economic base will allow it to stand up to any future challenges in the
international system. This type of thinking has coincided with expansion in scope of the
security concept over the years, as the literature review indicates. In short, this thesis
explores the military and political aspects, which form the traditional concerns of state
security, while adding to it the important economic element. By no means should this be
taken as embarking on an "econophoria", as the rest of the thesis will demonstrate.
What this thesis aims to highlight is that, for Beijing, the ability to achieve national
security is no longer wholly centred on military capabilities.
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In this thesis, while the approach to security is broader than the traditional one, it
does not delve into issues such as environmental security advocated by the most
progressive analysts. This has been done to make the scope of the thesis more
manageable. As stated in the introduction, it is the aim of this thesis to give a wider
role to economics in the security analysis of the Chinese state. Indeed, a more
inclusive term, "comprehensive" security is adopted as a means of approaching this
study, and it is with this in mind that we can now turn to explore China's security in
relation to other states in Northeast Asia.
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CHAPTER 3: RUSSIA AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM
This chapter analyses China's security interests in relation to the changes that
have occurred in Russia in recent years. It touches on aspects of China's political
security, a subject which has been neglected by most writings on China's security
when dealing with the decline of Russia as a threat. To be sure, the decline of the
Soviet Union, once an archenemy, is a gain as far as military security is concerned.
However, more importantly, as far as supporting the argument of this thesis is
concerned, is the fact that China's security encompasses more than just the military
aspects only. China is deeply affected by the collapse of communism in the former
Soviet Union, since the Soviet collapse raises issues of political security for Chinese
leaders. Therefore, it is very important to analyse the impact of the events of 1989,
1990 and 1991 on China's security agenda. This chapter first looks at the diminished
Russian military threat to China. It goes on to explore China's economic relations
with Russia. This is followed by assessments of the impact of the collapse of Soviet
communism on China's official ideology.
Military security, political security and the diminished Russian threat
Since the late 1960s, the former Soviet Union had been regarded as a military
security threat to China. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union was Freett-as.
,-._...----
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just ilnenacing as the United States, if not even more. In addition to being threatened
,_
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by the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, China actually fought a war against the
former Soviet Union along the Ussuri River border in 1969.
However, China's military security in relation to the former Soviet Union,
changed as the Cold War came to an end. To be sure, relations with the former Soviet
Union improved after Mikhail Gorbachev took power. A new Soviet approach to
relations with China was evident in Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok on July 28,
1986. Eager to reduce Sino-Soviet military tensions so that he could cut military
spending, Gorbachev called for an end to the "encirclement" of China. This was the
beginning of a new Soviet policy towards Beijing, and it accounted for China's
perception of a diminished Soviet threat to its military security. As Lowell Dittmer
has argued, in a longer chronological perspective, this was part of the strategy of
diplomatic bridge building by small steps, an approach inaugurated by the resumption
of normalisation talks in 1982.'
Furthermore, China had benefited from the new Soviet-American relations
between the two superpowers before the Soviet Union disintegrated. According to
Michael Yahuda, two of the "three obstacles" that Beijing had placed as barriers to
Sino-Soviet relations had been removed without direct Chinese involvement, as part
of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) agreement in December 1987 signed with
the United States, the Soviets removed their SS-20 missiles from Asia as well as
Europe and Gorbachev also agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan by
February 15, 1989. 2 Beijing's military security was further enhanced when the
Soviets demobilised 200,000 troops and reduced the Soviet Pacific fleet by one third,
as noted by David Shambaugh.3
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All the developments in the late 1980s paved the way for the May 1989
summit between Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev, the first Sino-Soviet summit since
Khrushchev visited China in the 1950s. The Renmin Ribao hailed the re-
establishment of relations between China and the Soviet Union, indicated that "Sino-
Soviet friendship was directed at no third country" and highlighted the inclusion of an
"anti-hegemony" position that at least proved that the Soviet Union was no longer a
threat.' In concrete terms, in 1989, China achieved a breakthrough in bilateral
relations with its archenemy, after years of hostility between the two communist
giants. Post-Soviet Russia's decline as a regional power capable of shaping event in
Northeast Asia is also very much in accordance with Chin s security interests.'
After the Soviet Union disintegrated, Gorbachev's successor, Boris Yeltsin,
further increased Russian ties with China. Yeltsin made his first visit to China in
December 1992. Later President Jiang Zemin visited Russia in September 1994. For
our purposes, it is important to note that, as far as Beijing's military security is
concerned, Sino-Russian summit meetings in 1992 and 1994 marked the progressive
resolution of border differences, and they also sharply increased significant transfers
of Russian weapons and military technology to China.' One can say that military
relations have also flourished between the two former enemies. Central Military
Commission vice-chairman Liu Huaqing visited to Moscow to discuss the purchase
of Soviet weapons systems and technology; and later, five-year military co-operation
agreement for the transfer of military technologies was signed during Russian
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev's November 1993 visit to Beijing.' Such military
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technology transfers enhanced China's military security, not only vis-à-vis Russia,
but also vis-à-vis other states as well.
It is also important to point out that for decades, China and the Soviet Union
had been locked in a bitter quarrel over ideology, with Mao Zedong denouncing
Krushchev's Soviet Union as "revisionist" in the 1960s. Both China and the Soviet
Union upheld their own way of socialism as the ideal political and economic system,
while berating that practised by the other. However, once the ideological dispute,
which had always been a major reason for undermining the relations between the two
countries, disappeared, China's ties with Russia improved.
During Boris Yeltsin's second trip to China in April 1996, Beijing announced
the development of a "strategic co-operative partnership" (zhanlue xiezuo huoban
guanxi) of "equality and trust" with Russia; acknowledging that differences in social
systems and ideology would not hinder the development of state-to-state relations.'
This is a clear departure from the Cold War era, when China was engaged the
"ideological dispute" and accused the former Soviet Union of "revisionism".
International relations today tend to be dominated by practical security calculations
rather than purely ideological disputes; from the Chinese perspective; this is a
breakthrough of great significance. 9 In addition, Boris Yeltsin has also stated that
Russia upholds the principle of "one China" in relation to the Taiwan issue.' The
Taiwan issue will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
President Jiang Zemin made another trip to Russia in April 1997, during
which both sides signed a joint statement on the multipolarisation of the world and
the establishment of a new international order. In October 1997, President Yeltsin
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visited China again. In sum, these visits between the Chinese and Russian heads-of-
state hayimproved relations between the two countries, and(hayno doubt further
enhanced China's military and political security. At a wider level, Beijing has
evinced a degree of pragmatism in promoting its ties with Russia to counter the
United States' dominance in the international system.
Perceptions of the decline of the Russian threat are now evident among
China's academics and international relations analysts. For instance, in the 1993
Chinese security symposium, only ten per cent of the analysts foresaw Russia as
China's greatest threat by 2020, arguing that perhaps only territorial disputes and
minority nationalities straddling the borders could cause conflict:' Potential border
conflicts have been taken seriously by China as it seeks to have a non-hostile
neighbour. For instance, China has established confidence building measures with
Russia on their land borders. An important military agreement was concluded in
April 26 1996, when China signed an agreement on military confidence-building
measures in the border region with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
this far-reaching accord - the most comprehensive arms control agreement in East
Asia since 1945 - restricts deployments and exercises in the border region and was
uniquely lengthy and legalistic: 2 The following year, in April 1997, China reached a
troops-reductions accord with the aforementioned countries along their common
borders: 3 Defence Minister Chi Haotian mentioned that this document on increasing
military trust and reducing armed forces in border areas, taken together with the 1996
document, made China's northern 7000km common border "a secure belt of mutual
trust"." In short, these moves were made by Beijing to bolster its military security.
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In the light of this positive development, China's historical rivalry with
Russia over Mongolia has also been largely resolved. In June 1991, the last remaining
Soviet combat troops were withdrawn from Mongolia. China sees this withdrawal
from Mongolia as having enhanced its security since its northern border has now
become more secure. More importantly, China's military burden has been greatly
6
relieved due to the disappearance 'Lhat had been for decades a threat to its very
national existence. It also means that the Chinese can now divert resources from
military spending to promoting economic development. It is this interlinkage between
military and economic security that holds the key to understanding China's security
agenda.
During the end of the 1980s, besides improving relations with the Soviet
Union, Beijing also expanding ties with five Soviet bloc countries of
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany, who had all sided
with Moscow during the Sino-Soviet split. Although Beijing had criticised them,
along with the Soviet Union, as revisionists; as relations between China and the
Soviet Union improved, China rebuilt its long-ruptured relations with these countries
as part of its general policy of opening to the outside world. Although this is not the
subject of the thesis, it is worth noting that China is on the whole maintaining good
relations with these former Soviet allies in the post-Cold War era; as Beijing intends
to strengthen economic ties with these countries. Economic interests have to a some




However, while the above analysis suggest that China is militarily more
secure with regards to Russia in the post-Cold War era, some potential new threats
may have emerged following the Soviet collapse. Most important is Beijing's
concern that a non-communist Russia might align itself more closely with West:5
There are fears that Russian and American collaboration can threaten China's
interests. For instance, when the Soviet Union's permanent seat in the Security
Council was given to th Russia, Beijing's leaders faced new problems. Russia
began to join the United States and France in promoting certain United Nations
security moves.
One assessment by a think-tank, China Strategy and Administration Research
Society, views the "Basic Document on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security
Between Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)" released in May
1997 as an indication that Russia has given tacit consent to NATO's eastward
expansion, arguing that the United States had realised its initial arrangements for the
post-Cold War world order, and had once more dominated the security pattern of
Europe: 6
 However, as far as the impact of NATO's eastward expansion on the world
is concerned, the assessment concludes that either Russia will eventually be
integrated with it or Russia will have an acute confrontation with it. In general, the
point underlying this analysis is that any semblance of Russo-American alliance will
enhance the influence of the United States in the world in general and in Northeast
Asia in particular, to the detriment of Beijing's interests. Chinese perceptions of the
United States will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 8. It is clear that Beijing
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fears it will not be able to manoeuvre between Russia and the United States as it had
successfully done in the past; it will not be able to play one power off another in the
"great power triangle".
Even if Russia refuses unconditionally to toe the Western line, the Chinese are
concerned that the West may have too much influence on Russia. Today, China is
determined to see that relations with Russia will not be influenced or interfered with
by a third country. The "three major obstacles" to normalised relations between the
two countries illustrates the point.' During the Cold War, differences in policy over
Afghanistan, Vietnam and Mongolia caused complications in China's relations with
Russia. More recently, Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin have stated that relations
between China and Russia are "based on the principle of non-alignment, and not
directed against any third country'. China does not wish to see its ties with Russia
tempered by a third party, in particular the United States. In the light of this concern,
President Jiang Zemin has expressed the view that foreign forces should not interfere
in Chechnya as this is an internal affair of Russia.'
At the same time, China feels that the West has no intention of helping the Soviet
Union to become a powerful state, as the Western countries "want a weak Soviet
Union".2° For instance, one Chinese source notes that the West (including the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund) in 1992 announced a package of loans, debt
reduction and cancellation worth US$55 billion, but only US$38 billion came
through, falling short of the announced amount by US$17 billion, or 31 percent; and
after allowing for debts actually reduced or forgiven, 42.5 percent of the promised
loan did not come through.' The source concludes that the West has partly reneged
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on its promise on loans promised to Gorbachev because the G-7 (now G-8) only want
an "obedient Russia, not a strong but disobedient Russia".
Hence, if' comes as no surprise that China wants to develop its so-called
"strategic partnership" with Russia. Although Chinese leader Li Peng's meeting with
an ailing Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on December 1996 produced no major agreement,
their talk of a "strategic partnership" was given prominence. Yet, although Russia did
transfer significant weapons to China, the relationship is far less strategic and
certainly far less of a partnership than China likes to pretend. Beijing's exaggeration
of the extent of the "strategic partnership" is, however, an attempt to counter the
United States, until China develops its economy and achieves a truly global power
status. What the Chinese leaders will like is that, in Northeast Asia, Russia remains
distant from the West and hence indirectly help to check American power in the
world and in the region. It is also clear that China prefers to see an independent
Russia, not aligned with the West.
In addition to its security relations with Russia, there are also new security
issues China faces in relation to the former Soviet satellite, Mongolia, and those
states that were once part of the Soviet empire. The transformation of Mongolia from
a one-party communist state into a democratic country in August 1991 and, more
significantly, from a Soviet satellite to an independent state in some ways represents
a challenge to Beijing. For instance, as Mongolia begins to adopt democracy and
shake off Soviet domination, Mongolian nationalism may resurface to feel the void
left over as Soviet-style communism retreats. Specifically, cross border contact with
China's Inner Mongolia province could engender some form of pan-Mongolian
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nationalism, reviving Chinese fears of the "barbarians" who had conquered China in
the twelfth century. For instance, Ulan Bator could become a base for separatist
activities in China's Inner Mongolia Province, Hence, Beijing still has to be ready to
respond to potential security threats in the post-Cold War era and must remain on the
alert for any indications of Inner Mongolian separatism.
Apart from Mongolia, the erosion of central authority, as evident in the collapse of
the Soviet empire, has also in general forced China to rethink its control over its non-
Han areas. Although the dominance of the Han people in China has been more
complete than the ethnic Russians' dominance in their vast empire, China's control of
its western frontiers is not as secure as Beijing might wish. In particular, China is
worried about the ethnic minorities on its western frontiers. As noted by Bonnie
Glaser, threats of separatism still exist and the Chinese continue to see a long term
threat to their security interests from Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Turkism. 22 For
instance, after a failed uprising by Chinese Muslims in the Xinjiang Autonomous
Region in February 1990, leader Li Peng warned against the danger of "reactionary
and splittist forces" carrying out their infiltration activities under "banners of
nationality and religion".23
The newly independent former Soviet central Asian republics have sympathy
for the people in the westernmost regions of China, which are predominantly Muslim.
China clearly wants to avoid a scenario arising reminiscent of Soviet empire's
collapse, which ended in former Soviet autonomous republics declaring
independence. Hence, in the light of this potential threat, China has sought assurances
from leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan who acknowledged that
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"national separation is a harmful destructive force" and fully supported China's stand
on this issue, adding that they will "adopt resolute measures to oppose the separatists
so that they would not gain a foothold in their countries". 24 It is clear that Chinese
leaders have not become complacent since the Russian threat on its northern border
diminished; they are aware of any potential military threats that may resurface in the
post-Cold War era.
Furthermore, a think-tank, China Strategy and Administration Research
Society, points out that, viewed from the strategic angle, the region of Central Asia
has become of "high strategic significance" for the United States in ensuring
Washington's "dominant position in leading the world"; since Central Asia links up
Europe, Asia and Africa, control over Central Asia will mean the containment of
Europe and will have an impact on East Asia, as well as containing Middle Eastern
threats.' More importantly, the Chinese know the economic importance of Central
Asia, a region second only to the Gulf in term of oil resources. China itself will need
more energy resources for its economic development programme.
In sum, Chinese analysts see the purpose of the US involvement in Central
Asia as threefold: to weaken Russia's influence in the region of the former Soviet
Union in order to guard against Russia's restoration to the "former empire"; to stop
the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran from spreading northwards; and to
restrict the expansion of China's influence into Central Asia and make use of Central
Asia to support the ethnic separatist forces in their incessant "harassment" of the
stability of China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region and other border areas. 26 We can
see from the above that the Chinese are concerned that growing Islamic activism and
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ethnic unrest throughout Central Asia and the alleged United States' interest in the
region, as Beijing continues to seek more energy resources for its economic growth.
These are issues that relate to China's political and military security.
Central Asia, which is a region is rich in mineral resources and constitutes an
important geopolitical position, may in the long term also be a possible arena of Sino-
Russian confrontation. As noted by Vladimir Shlapentokh, the other newly
independent states in Central Asia are very weak and will not be able to resist the
dominance of a great power such as China or a resurgent Russian should they chose
to exert their influence over the area.' For the moment, this scenario is rather
unlikely, as Russia has not become strong enough to sustain such challenges yet. In
relation to the Tibet issue, Beijing is pleased that Russia has affirmed that Tibet is a
part of China.' This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
However, China is still concerned about the possibility of any resurgence of
Russian nationalism." For instance, when Russia and Belarus signed a treaty in
March 1996 to form a supranational body, Community of Sovereign Republics
(CSR), this was interpreted by Beijing as the re-staging of a [Soviet] union"."
Clearly, internal developments in Russia will continue to be a concern to the Chinese.
Having dealt with China's political and military security interests in relation to the
former Soviet Union, we can now turn to Beijing's economic interests.
Economic Interests
Above all, China seeks to enhance its economic security in relation to Russia.
When Russia gradually declined as a threat and political tensions between the two
67
countries eased rapidly following the normalisation of relations in 1989, economic
ties also progressed. In 1996, Sino-Russian trade volume hit US$6.8 billion and both
sides have also expressed that through their joint efforts, bilateral trade volume will
continue to increase.'
Today, ironically, the Soviet Union, once the provider of financial assistance to
China in the 1950s, has now become the recipient of short-term government credits
from China. To be sure, the main reason for this move by Beijing is not entirely
altruistic. What Beijing hopes to achieve is a sustained development of its economy
and Russia can play a part in this regard. For instance, China can provide cheap
consumer goods which are in relatively short supply in the former Soviet bloc
countries. To Russia, China has become a market for high-tech weapons and heavy
industrial equipment. Russian consumers generate counter-trade with which China
can pay for Moscow's civilian and military technology. This type of economic
relationship is mutually beneficial. More importantly, Russia has oil and timber that
are badly needed. For example, Siberia is rich in minerals that could be exploited by
Chinese joint ventures. As noted by analysts such as Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian
energy co-operation in oil and gas has considerable potential.' It is possible that fears
of competition from other Asian countries such as rival Taiwan may have spurred
moves in this direction. Therefore, came as no surprise that the Sino-Russian joint
declaration in November 1997 included support from both sides to draw on the
"market" economies existing in the two countries to further co-operation in major
joint projects in the areas of gas, oil and nuclear energy, transport and
communications.'
68
For Russia, stable relations with China could well be the single most
important facilitator of economic development in the Russian Far East, as China is
potentially its largest and most valuable market in Asia. Despite voiced discontent
and even hatred from the Russian population in the Far East and Siberia towards the
Chinese who have intruded into their areas, for Russia as a whole, its fragile economy
can ill-afford further reductions in Russo-Chinese trade, whose volume is second
only to Russia's trade with Germany.' The Chinese understand that Russia needs the
trade with China and have consequently used this to their advantage to further
enhance their economic security.
In addition, it is quite possible that China wants to serve as a model for
economic reforms. Russian economic reformers have visited China's special
economic zones and this also demonstrates to the Chinese people that Beijing is
doing well economically, enhancing the government's own legitimacy, a subject to be
dealt with later. The two countries have also pledged to support each other in the
sphere of multilateral economic co-operation, including China's support for Russia's
entry into the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).35 Now that relations
between China and Russia are normalised, China seeks to apply its export promotion
policies to the Soviet Union, as it is part of the strategy to sustain its economic
growth and to adjust to the need to compete with other nations in the global
economy.' China would also like to diversify its trade in order to avoid becoming
overly dependent on the United States, Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong. Nevertheless,
the Chinese are equally aware that, in the long term, a rejuvenated Russia might also
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become a competitor vying for markets and investment. At the time of writing, this is
unlikely to happen given that chronic problems of the Russian economy still exist.
In sum, China appears to see Russia less as a threat today, as far as military
security is concerned. It has increased its trading relationship with Russia and hopes
to use Russia as a counter weight to the lone super power, the United States.
However, as stated in the introduction, China's security interests are comprehensive.
Although military security on its northern border seems secured and its economic ties
with Russia are growing, China's political security appears to be deeply affected by
the collapse of communism in Russia. Since the Chinese seek "comprehensive
security", one has to look at issues of political security, in particular those which
relate to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party..
Political security and the collapse of communism in Russia
The collapse of communism in Russia in 1991 has profound implications for
China's political security. This issue tends to be ignored in most of the writings on
China's security in the post-Cold War era. This thesis hopes to give a clear account of
the serious implications of the Soviet collapse in terms of China's political security.
After all, in many ways, China's development as a modern state in the twentieth
century has been deeply influenced by Soviet developments. For over forty years,
both were one-party states sharing a common ideology derived from Marxist-Leninist
principles. At various points of their existence, both have been regarded as
revolutionary powers challenging the international status quo by advocating world-
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wide revolution to overthrow the world capitalist systems Hence, the abandonment of
communism in Russia must surely be a test for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
in particular for its ability to hold on to power.
To be precise, the former Soviet Union's abandonment of communism was
preceded by the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes and this event is
worth analysing from the Chinese perspective. China was very concerned when it
knew the East European Communist states, at one time its allies before the Sino-
Soviet split, were running into problems. In fact, CCP Secretary-General Jiang Zemin
told an Soviet official in December 1989 that, as a socialist country, China "cannot
but show an interest in the developments in socialist countries". 37 As the various
Eastern European communist regimes collapsed between 1989 and 1990, the official
reaction from Beijing was what one might call a policy of "non-interference". With
hindsight, one can say that China appeared to have used the principle of non-
interference to avoid making a clear-cut decision on how to respond to the situation,
as the events happened in a sudden manner.
However, what is indisputable is that Chinese leaders were beginning to
worry about the prospect of ideological challenges to the Chinese Communist Party
itself. It is precisely for this reason that the Chinese leaders were apparently unhappy
with the Soviet decision not to interfere with the revolutions in Eastern Europe,
supposedly blaming Gorbachev for allowing the Eastern European countries to
abandon communism although they could not do very much to prevent the collapse.
In what was regarded as a pragmatic move, China, although shocked by the
sudden collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, tried to reap some benefits from
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the new situation by recognising the successor-regimes. One reason was probably
that Taiwan was pursuing a policy of trying to secure diplomatic recognition for
itself, and the fact that the former Soviet satellites recognised South Korea suggested
that they might also recognise Taiwan'. More was to follow as the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991. For our purposes, we need to analyse the implications of the state
ideology of China, communism, coming under threat.
State ideology under threat
The demise of the Soviet Union highlighted the legitimacy crisis faced by the
Chinese communists. Since communism is in principle universal, its demise in the
land of its inception could not but raise the problem of legitimacy for the Chinese
Communist Party. In general, the collapse of communism also raised questions
pertaining to the viability of communist state systems." In political science, this type
of problem arises when people question the right of their rulers to govern them and
on a wider level, also to the institutions and values through which the government
exercises the right to rule the masses.
On the home front, one might say that the collapse of communism as a socio-
political world system with an universalist ideology has seriously crippled one of the
moral-philosophical bases for organising Chinese society and state. The 1950s, when
the Soviet influence on China had been most evident, were considered by Chinese
leaders to have been its "golden decade". 4° In Maoist China, sacrificing the present
for a better future were in some ways justified by the prospects of being on the
cutting edge of history, blazing the path that would be soon followed by the rest of
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the world. Present costs and sacrifices were rationalised and justified by this vision of
a bright future, which was evident in mass mobilisation campaigns such as the 1959
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s.
Today, it appears that the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to condition
mass behaviour on the basis of belief in the collective good rather than the pursuit of
individual gain has diminished. The inner confidence of the party imbued with a
sense of mission and belief in itself as a unifying revolutionary force backed by the
support of the masses has been eroded, along with it the sense of belonging to a
world-wide movement that constituted a future for the world. Communism in the
1990s can no longer be invoked as justification for sacrifices and excesses, and thus
the main prop of the Chinese communists' legitimacy has been demolished. Today,
the Chinese leadership today cannot rely on invoking abstract ideology to justify
government policies. All these events that have occurred outside China's borders
must surely have implications for the political security of the Chinese Communist
Party.
In the Chinese state itself, many young technocrats in China are less inclined
to adhere to strict Marxist precepts. In addition, many of these party members are
attracted to pluralist and democratic values. At the same time, it is clear that totally
abandoning socialism would be disastrous as the Chinese Communist Party came to
power on this principle. Renunciation of the existing communist system in China
would mean the party leaders' self-renunciation as well, so it is certain that they will
not initiate revolutionary political changes at the top. Therefore, Gorbachev's
attempts to restructure the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were
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considered by the Chinese to be a bad example. Beijing denounced Gorbachev's
resignation as the General Secretary of the party and dissolving the party itself as "the
greatest betrayal in the international history of communism". 41 Such a stance
indicates that the Chinese leaders were concerned about the ideological
underpinnings of their own regime.
With China's political security coming under greater strain than before, party
leaders realise there would be a need for some changes while maintaining socialism. In
other words, they are willing to explore new ways of advancing economic reform, in an
attempt to justify the communist party's hold on power. In fact, when President Jiang
Zemin met Gorbachev in May 1989, he stated that "socialism is a new social system
and it will inevitably encounter difficulties and twists and turns during the course of its
development", adding that "reforms are essential for bringing socialism's potential into
play".' Realising that "building socialism with Chinese characteristics is a great and
arduous cause which is unprecedented, and therefore has no existing pattern to go by",
Jiang Zemin has emphasised "the Yanan spirit of self-reliance and hard struggle"
when the communists embarked on the Long March to establish socialism in China.43
This can be interpreted as an attempt to engage the masses to support the Chinese
Communist Party during difficult times. The task now is for China to maintain "the
flesh-and blood ties between the party and government on the one hand and the
people on the other".44 After all, the leaders need to fill the ideological void left by
the collapse of communism and bolster the party's political security in the process.
Interestingly, in order to fill the void left by the demise of Communism, some
Chinese scholars suggest that Confucianism would be suitable since it reinforces the
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desire for political stability. The Renmin Ribao argues that Confucianism has helped
"countries and regions in East Asia to modernise at a much quicker pace" and "steer
clear of defects that the West encountered in achieving modernisation", adding that it
will replace the modern and contemporary Western culture in the twenty-first
century. ' After all, China is widely regarded as the origin and centre of
Confucianism, the core dynamic that supposedly facilitated the East Asian economic
growth and political stability. Beneath these claims, it appears that the real aim is to
encourage economic growth in China without political change. The Chinese
Communist Party intends to remain in power despite all the ramifications, such as
greater political liberalisation, that introducing market economics are likely to bring.
Besides the reference to Confucianism, to fill the void created by the decline
of ideology and to continue holding the state together, Chinese leaders can also try to
heighten nationalist sentiment as a way of creating a new political myth that justifies
the continued rule of the communist party. Nationalism is a useful political resource,
given the fact that China had suffered a "century of humiliation", and anti-
imperialism will certainly strike a chord with the masses, as discussed in the previous
chapter. For instance, an article in Beijing Review is quick to note that having
survived foreign invasions, which "confers a certain national pride", China values
"patriotism". In this vein, the Chinese have rejected an article written by the US
former ambassador to China, James Lilley, that Beijing is fomenting xenophobia to
"fill the vacuum" left by the declining appeal of Communism." Moreover, China
aspires to be a great power accorded by its size and growing economic strength. In
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this context, a highly nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, anti-Western tone will help.
This drive to great power status will be discussed in the penultimate chapter.
In sum, it is clear from the above analysis that the state ideology,
communism, is under threat, and since this is the basis on which the Chinese
Communist Party came to power and sustain its hold on power, it is clear that the
party is therefore more concerned than ever over the need to maintain its political
monopoly and bolster its political security.
Political Monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party
Given that the Chinese leaders are not willing to abandon Communism
totally, it is clear that a Leninist strand will remain in China, as articulated in the Four
Cardinal Principles. First proclaimed in March 1979 to curtail the democracy
movement also known as the "Peking spring", the Principles are:
1. We must keep to the socialist road.
2. We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat.
3. We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party.
4. We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.'
Above all, the Four Cardinal Principles stress the overriding role of the Chinese
Communist Party and its ideology. In the light of this, it comes as no surprise that, in
April 1991, China showed deep concern over internal developments in the Soviet
Union. During his meeting with former Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr
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Bessmertnykh, Chinese leader Li Peng, maintained that it was up to "the people of a
country to decide how they build their country and what path they take", while
expressing concern over the situation in the Soviet Union"." This concern was
evident again in May 1991, when President Jiang Zemin told Gorbachev that he was
aware that the Soviet Union had been experiencing a "complicated and difficult
period" and hoped that the Soviets would "surmount their existing temporary
difficulties and score final victory in their social reform and construction".49
Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union was beginning to raise parallel concerns in
Beijing at that time as Chinese leaders began to rethink Beijing's political security.
Above all, the August 1991 aborted coup in Moscow was a practical lesson
for China, and the Chinese Communist Party in particular. The Chinese foreign
ministry declared that "the changes in the Soviet Union were an internal matter and
that China followed a policy of non-interference in another country's affairs".5°
However, it was clear that China remained concerned over the political developments
in its northern neighbour.
During the abortive coup in Moscow, various leaders in China perceived the
situation there in slightly different ways. There were those in China who were
prepared to give support to the anti-Gorbachev plotters.' There was no doubt that
these Chinese leaders favoured the more conservative, orthodox elements of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They were justifiably concerned about the
impact the collapse of Soviet socialism would have on the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party. Within the limits of the official policy of non-interference, it is
fair say that most were delighted with the coup but disappointed with its swift
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collapse.' In addition, the Chinese hard-liners at that time perceived that an anti-
reform leadership in Moscow would be congruent with their efforts to stem the
course of reforms in China.
However, it must be noted that support for the conservative elements in the
Soviet Union was also extremely dangerous and risky. The ease of collapse of the
Eastern European regimes had demonstrated the risks involved if China were to
crudely counter the trends of Communism fading in the late twentieth century. It
appeared that China hesitated in giving full support to a lost cause. The Chinese
idiom, sun sui tui chou, is particularly apt here. The Chinese have always followed
the tides of change and used it to their advantage. Moreover, Beijing needed to
secure Western economic inputs for its economy and overt support for the hard-line
Soviet communists would contradict their plans to see the lifting of the sanctions that
had been imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident.' The West might
even strengthen calls for sanctions against China. Therefore, Beijing did was to adopt
a cautious attitude to maximise its gains from the situation, cleverly camouflaging
this dilemma on how to respond to the situation in Russia by repeated proclamations
on the principle of non-interference of other countries' internal affairs. Furthermore,
this stance also protected China's economic and political relations with post-Soviet
successor regimes. This is a clear indication to the linkage of the political and
economic aspects of China's security interests.
In general, the Chinese perceived Gorbachev's attempt to restructure the
Soviet Communist Party as a bad example. The Chinese congratulated themselves on
avoiding the Soviet mistakes in bringing about political reforms. An internal Chinese
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document emphasised the need to "resolutely maintain the leadership of the party",
and prevent development of "a multi-party or parliamentary system".' The Chinese
Communist Party became more determined to maintain its dominance in domestic
politics in order to ensure its legitimacy remains intact and its political security
maintained.
The aborted coup also drew comparisons with the Tiananmen Incident in June
1989. Both were challenges to the ruling authorities from domestic enemies and,
ironically, Gorbachev was visiting China at the time of the 1989 demonstrations. An
internal document noted that China "resolutely suppressed" challenges "without the
slightest mercy, whereas the Soviet [Committee of] Eight was unable to implement
the dictatorship of the proletariat" and hence were defeated.' This reference to the
use of force if necessary to control any disorder and restore stability was in line with
the thinking of hard-liners such as Vice President General Wang Zhen, who stressed
the need for China to "keep reminding itself of these costly mistakes made by the
Russians"." Hard-liners in China were even more convinced that unless opposition
to party rule was ruthlessly crushed, challenges similar to those in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union might very well succeed in China. To them, such challenges
emphasised that the authority of the Chinese Communist Party must never be
challenged.
From the experiences of fellow communist states, the Chinese Communist
Party has also earned a free lesson in maintaining its political security, especially
with regards to the relationship between the military and the party. Perhaps one can
argue that the difference was that the China's People's Liberation Army played an
79
important role in restoring order in Tiananmen in 1989, in contrast to the security
forces of the former Communist states of Eastern Europe. To the Chinese leaders, the
1991 aborted Soviet coup emphasises the need to "maintain the party's control over
the gun" and more importantly, for the party to use the army to maintain political
power.' Writers such as Chong-pin Lin have argued that the People's Liberation
Army differs from Western armies and also from the former Soviet and Eastern
European armies in that it had a higher degree of political participation in the state."
Historically, the People's Liberation Army and Chinese Communist Party were two
sides of the same coin. Virtually all of the party's political leaders in the pre-1949
period were also generals or political commissars in military units. Hence, the
hierarchies of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army
remain inextricably intertwined; and Amos Perlmutter and William M Leo Grande
have identified this type of leadership pattern as a "dual role elite"." While this thesis
does not focus on the Chinese military, it is worth noting that the connection between
the People's Liberation Army and Chinese Communist Party had helped China's
political security in the past and is likely to do so, albeit to a lesser degree, in the
foreseeable future.
Although in the 1990s, the generation of military leaders that came to power
through a Marxist style war of national liberation had gone, the fact that the party and
army have formed throughout their history a single institutional system with a single
elite performing simultaneously the functions of political and military leadership still
stands. From the military's perspective, a strong central government implies the
allocation of greater funds to the People's Liberation Army and it is possible to
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describe the Chinese military as the "armed escort of reform".' The military is also
likely to support the reforming succession to Deng Xiaoping because it offered a
better opportunity for stability.' This in some ways adds to the explanation why the
Chinese Communist Party still remains in power today. President Zemin's recent
attempt to "clean up" the military establishment by separating it from its vast
economic interests has attracted the attention of many China analysts, although
disruption of relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the People's
Liberation Army is likely to be restricted to the minimum.
Economic performance and legitimacy
It is not enough for the Chinese Communist Party to just rely on the military
in order to hold on to power; something has to take the place left by the demise of
Communism. Above all, in addition to the use of Confucian and nationalist ideologies
discussed earlier, the party must now justify their legitimacy on material economic
development rather than movement from one abstract Marxist category to another
(socialism to communism). The Chinese Communist Party needs to find new
substantive validating credentials in the performance and achievements if the
economy to appease the masses it rules over and retain its power.
To be sure, undertaking this task is by no means straightforward. Chinese
leaders have been engaged in heated debates over the official line to take in the light
of Communism's demise. After August 1991, there was a debate over the approach of
the Chinese Communist Party would have to take to avoid the same consequences
suffered by the Soviets. Hard-liners such as Deng Liqun argued that the party would
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need to mount a "class struggle" against "bourgeois ideology" in order to enhance
China's political security; while the late Deng Xiaoping argued that the collapse of
the Soviet Communist Party resulted from its failure in economic reforms,
specifically caused by a lack of the sort of change he spearheaded in China, which led
to economic hardship for the Soviet masses. ' This type of thinking is further
reinforced by the Chinese perceptions that in the course of Soviet rivalry with the
United States for global hegemony, the Soviet people suffered economically, with the
Soviet Union's national income declining to only half that of America's.' As Martin
Shaw also notes, the pressure of the arms race has generated "contradictory effects
for the Soviet economic system".' This type of reasoning has important lessons for
Chinese leaders to learn.
The late Deng Xiaoping believed that this type of economic hardship would
lead to demands for change and concluded that only continued economic reform and
opening up to trade would help China." Michael Yahuda argues that the late Deng's
advocacy of openness play a large part in China becoming the only Communist
country or former Communist country to have succeeded in raising living standards
in the process of market-oriented economic reforms.' Peter Ferdinand also argues
that, perhaps, most important of all, China's economic reforms have been more
successful than the Soviet Union's.' The standard of living of the people has risen
and this has to a certain extent staved off demands for political change in China.
Deng Xiaoping firmly believed in using economic growth to keep the masses happy
so as to prevent major changes in the system; believing that this was the way to
bolster political security. Some writers such as Lowell Dittmer also argue that the
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Chinese perceive the possibility of collapse through internal political reforms to be
equally or even more threatening than the "peaceful evolution" strategy. " The
"peaceful evolution" strategy will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 7.
This type of argument is further vindicated when one looks at Samuel
Huntington's distinction between "procedural legitimacy" and "performance
legitimacy". In Huntington's argument, "discussion of democratic norms dealing with
the procedural aspects of competitive politics such as the recognition of the rights of
political minorities, the freedoms of expression and organising and the institution of
legislative oversight, contested elections and third party mediation say little about the
outcomes of policies that result from these processes"." This is especially true of
China. Historically, regime authority in China has rarely been based on "procedural
legitimacy", but more dependent on "performance" in areas such as economics. It is
clear that, since 1979, political legitimacy in China has gradually shifted from the
ideological to the material, leading to the situation that promotion of economic
growth and rising standards of living has become more important as a criterion for
judging the Chinese regime.
In other words, for China's leaders today, their legitimacy as rulers is tied to
the reforms they initiated, much like Boris Yeltsin's has been in Russia. The Chinese
Communist Party realises that its time in power is likely to be short if tries to
maintain a strictly Marxist-Leninist state. While economic modernisation may
eventually threaten the monopoly of power held by the party, there is no alternative
for the party but to place hopes of sustaining itself in power by continuing to satisfy
the demands of the masses, this time through material success. Ideology is still
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important, but appears to take second place to raising living standards in China, and
the best way to gain legitimacy and bolster the communist party's political security is
by continuing to generate widespread economic benefits for the Chinese masses
through ongoing economic growth.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored China's security in relation to Russia and the
collapse of communism. As far as the military aspect is concerned, China's security
has been enhanced in the short term by the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is
further reinforced by the fact that in general, since the late 1980s, China's relations
with Russia have been preceding in a direction desired by Beijing. In addition, China
also seeks to enhance its economic interests vis-à-vis Russia.
However, the collapse of communism and the Soviet communist state have
taught China some important lessons in the political aspects of security. Chinese
leaders are very disturbed by the possible weakening of communist party control and
are adamant that challenges to the party's authority must never be allowed to take
place. The events of 1989 and 1991 only strengthened the determination of the
Chinese Communist Party to take tough measures against any threats posed to its
political security. Since the erosion of socialist values in the Soviet Union implies
there will be a vacuum for other values to be filled and can create political
uncertainties for Chinese Communist Party, the party must now rely on sustained
economic growth to gain political legitimacy and bolster its political security.
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As the largest remaining communist system, China is trying to use economic
success to hold the state together. Regime stability now rests more than ever on
effectiveness in economic performance. As far as the linkage between the political and
economic aspects of security is concerned, the fundamental lesson the Chinese
leaders need to learn is how to encourage economic growth and move towards a
decentralised market economy driven by private capital, while at the same time
maintaining political control and resisting any challenges to the communist party's
political monopoly. Therefore, it is hoped that this chapter has shown that issues of
political security, not often raised in most discussions on China's post-Cold War
security agenda in relation to Russia, merit a higher degree of attention in academic
circles.
'Lowell Dittmer, "China and Russia: New beginnings," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.) China and the World:
Chinese Foreign Relations in the post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Westview Press: 1994, 3rd ed.), p. 110.
2 Michael B. Yahuda, "The People's Republic of China at 40: Foreign relations," The China
Quarterly, no. 119 (September 1989), pp. 524-525.
David Shambaugh, "China's security policy in the post-Cold War era," Survival, vol. 34, no. 2
(Summer 1992), p. 96.
4 "Renmin ribao: Jiang Zemin's USSR visit yields 'positive results'," Xinhua news agency, 19 May 91
in BBC Summag of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 21 May 91, p. A2/1.
5 Robert Legvold, "Russia and the strategic quadrangle," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) The Strategic
Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pp. 16- 62.
6 Harry Gelman, "Japan and China as seen from Moscow today," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,
vol. 13, no. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 49-60.
85
"Russia and China sign defence agreement; arms trade not discussed," ITAR-TASS news agency, 11
Nov 93 in BBC Summmy of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 13 Nov 93, p. G/1.
8Ju Mengjun, "Sino—Russian relations achieve fruitful results," Liaowang, no. 42 (October 1997), p.
43.
9 Shi Ze, "On Sino-Russian relations in new era," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies), no. 2
(April 96), pp. 1-8.
"Xinhua reports Sino-Russian presidential talks," Xinhua news agency 25 Apr 96 in BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 Apr 96, p. G/4.
"" Shu Xiangdi, "Russia's Asia policy," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 12 (December 20, 1994), pp. 4-7.
12 "Five-nation border agreement signed in Shanghai," Xinhua news agency, 26 Apr in BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 Apr 96, p. G/1.
13 "Chinese party paper commentary hails Central Asian border accord," Xinhua news agency, 24 Apr
97 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 26 Apr 97, p. G/1.
" "Defence minister says China's military diplomacy `unprecedentedly active' in 1997," Xinhua news
agency 26 Dec 97, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 30 Dec 97, p. G/112.
15 Jolui W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet communism," The
China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p. 19.
16 "Chinese think-tank on Central Asia, NATO," Zhongguo Xinwen She news agency, Beijing, in
Chinese 20 Jan 98, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 Jan 98 p. G/2.
17 Shi Ze, "On Sino-Russian relations in new era," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], no. 2
(April 1996), pp. 1-8.
18 "China and Russia issue joint statement," Beijing Review, vol. 37, no. 37 (September 12-18, 1994),
p. 18.
19 "Xinhua reports Sino-Russian presidential talks," Xinhua news agency, 25 Apr 96 in BBC
Summaor of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 Apr 96, p. G/5.
86
"Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992), Documentation, p. 487.
21 See Xu Yi and Long Wuhua, "On the relationship between foreign debt and political and military
affairs," Zhenli De Zhuiqiu (Pursuit of Truth), no. 9 (September 1996), pp. 15-20.
22 Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's security perceptions: interests and ambitions," Asian Survey, vol. xxxiii,
no. 3 (March 1993), p. 254.
23 "Li Peng addresses national conference on nationalities affairs," Xinhua news agency, 20 Feb 90 in
BBC Summaly of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 23 Feb 90, p. B2/1.
24 "Central Asian countries promise Xinjiang military heads to suppress separatism," Xinjiang Ribao,
3 Nov 97 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 18 Nov 97, p. G/4.
25 "Chinese think-tank on Central Asia, NATO," Zhongguo Xinwen She news agency, Beijing, in
Chinese 20 Jan 98, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 Jan 98 p. G/2.
26 "Chinese think-tank on Central Asia, NATO," Zhongguo Xinwen She news agency, Beijing, in
Chinese 20 Jan 98, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 Jan 98 p. G/2.
27 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Russia, China and the Far East: Old geopolitics or a new peaceful co-
operation?" Communist and post-Communist Studies, vol. 28, no. 3 (September 1995), p. 314.
28 "Xinhua reports Sino-Russian presidential talks," Xinhua news agency 25 Apr 96 in BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 Apr 96, p. G/4.
29 Jin Junhui, "Main features of US-Russian relationship in 1995 and its future trend," Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu (International Studies), no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 20-25.
" Ren Xianfang, "CIS: Resurrecting a Union?" Beijing Review, vol. 39, no. 17 (April 22-28, 1996),
PP . 8-9.
Ju Mengjun, "Sino-Russian relations achieve fruitful results," Liaowang, no. 42 (October 1997), p.
43.
87
32 Keun-Wook Paik, "Energy co-operation in Sino-Russian relations: The importance of oil and gas,"
The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 1(1996), p. 92.
" "Text of Russian-Chinese joint declaration," ITAR-TASS news agency, 10 Nov 97, in BBC
Summag of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 11 Nov 97, p. G/3.
34 See James Clay Moltz, "Regional tensions in the Russo-Chinese rapprochement," Asian Survey, vol.
xxxv, no. 6 (June 1995), pp. 519-526; Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Russia, China and the Far East: Old
geopolitics or a new peaceful co-operation?" Communist and post-Communist Studies, vol. 28, no. 3,
(September 1995). p. 310.
" Jiang Yi, "Sino-Russian ties: new constructive partnership," Beijing Review, vol. 38, no. 46,
(November 13-19, 1995) p. 10; and "Xinhua reports Sino-Russian presidential talks," 25 Apr 96 in
BBC Stumm)) of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 Apr 96, p. G/5.
36 John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet communism," The
China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), pp. 9-10.
37 "CPSU international relations department head in China meets Jiang Zemin," Peking Television, 28
Dec 89 in BBC Summaly of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 30 Dec 89, p. A2/1.
" Lowell Dittmer, "China and Russia: new beginnings," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, 3rd ed.),
p. 100.
Although Communism is theoretically universal, a communist political system can only take place
in the national context. See Michael B Yahuda, "Chinese foreign policy and the collapse of
communism," SAIS Review, vol. 12. no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1992), p. 129.
Michael B Yahuda, "Chinese foreign policy and the collapse of communism," SAIS Review, vol. 12.
no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1992), p.129.
41 "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 483.
88
"Jiang Zemin, 'we cannot do without the Yanan spirit'," Xinhua news agency, 14 Sep 89 in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 19 Sep 89, p. B2/2.
"Jiang Zemin, 'we cannot do without the Yanan spirit'," Xinhua news agency, 14 Sep 89 in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 19 Sep 89, p. B212.
44 "Wang Renzhi on bourgeois liberalisation," Central Peoples' Broadcasting Station, 15 Feb 90 in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 24 Sep 90, p. B2/7.
"Confucianism and economic modernisation," Renmin Ribao, 19 Sep 94 , p. 1
Wen Ming, "Patriotism is not xenophobia," Beijing Review, vol. 39, no. 48 (November 25-
December 1, 1996), p. 8.
47 Cited by Michael B Yahuda, "Chinese foreign policy and the collapse of communism," SAIS
Review, vol. 12, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1992), p. 129.
48 "Soviet foreign minister in China," Central People's Broadcasting Station, 1 Apr 91 in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 2 Apr 91, p. A2/2.
49 "Jiang on situation in Soviet Union," Xinhua news agency, 17 May 91 in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 18 May 91, p. 0/1.
5° "Chinese foreign ministry statement on events in the USSR," Xinhua news agency, 20 Aug 1991 in
BBC Summaiy of World Broadcasts Part 3 Far East, 21 Aug 91, p. A2/1.
51 Steven M Goldstein, "Nationalism and internationalism: Sino-Soviet relations," in Thomas W.
Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 264.
Lowell Dittmer, "China and Russia: new beginnings," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, 3rd ed.),
p. 104.
" John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet communism," The
China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p. 2.
89
' "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 490.
' "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 487.
" Michael B Yahuda, "Chinese foreign policy and the collapse of communism," SA IS Review, vol. 12.
no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1992), pp. 126-127.
57 "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 490.
58 Chong-pin Lin, "Chinese military modernisation: perceptions, progress, and prospects," Security
Studies, vol. 3, no. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 719-720.
" Amos Perlmutter and William M Leo Grande, "The Party in uniform: towards a theory of civil-
military relations in Communist political system," American Political Science Review, no. 76, vol. 4
(December 1982), pp. 778-779.
" Gerald Segal, "China and the disintegration of the Soviet Union," Asian Survey, vol. xxxii, no. 9
(September 1992), p. 851.
61 Gerald Segal and John Phipps, "Why Communist armies defend their parties," Asian Survey, vol.
xxx, no. 10 (October 1990), p. 975.
62 "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 491.
63 "Problems posed by the Soviet Union - a talk given by Gao Di, editor of the Renmin Ribao, to
Communist Party editors and cadres on August 30, 1991," in The China Quarterly, no. 130 (June
1992) Documentation, p. 489.
90
64 Martin Shaw, "State theory and the post-Cold War world," in Michael Banks and Martin Shaw
(eds.), State and Society In International Relations (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991),
PP . 7-8.
65 John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet communism," The
China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p. 25.
66 Michael Yahuda, "Deng Xiaoping: the statesman," The China Quarterly, no. 135 (September 1993),
p. 558.
67 Peter Ferdinand, "Russia and Soviet shadows over China's future?" International Affairs, vol. 68,
no. 2 (1992), pp. 285-286.
68 Lowell Dittiner, "China and Russia: new beginnings," in Samuel. S. Kim (ed.), China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, 3rd ed.),
p. 99.
69 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
91
CHAPTER 4: THE KOREAN PENINSULA
In this chapter, we look at China's security interests in relation to post-
Cold War developments on the Korean peninsula. We look at the North Korea's
enduring importance to China's political and military security, which is matter
debated by scholars today. It will be argued that North Korea continues to be
important to China, especially in terms of Beijing's political security. As for
South Korea, the emphasis here is on China's economic security. The final part of
this chapter looks China's interests in relation to the Korean peninsula as a whole.
North Korea: A military and political buffer state
From the perspective of China's security, North Korea is vital. China's
military and political security requires a stable, friendly neighbouring state. North
Korea shares a border with China and is also adjacent to one of China's key
industrial areas, Manchuria. From Beijing's perspective, an adversary force
controlling the Korean peninsula can use it as a launching pad to invade China
javvick9 ecia -10 aiti1'42 Oltnel 71
itself In the past, after occupying Korea in 1910, Japanese troops used Korea as a A	 01-31.
Iv) the Korean War, American troops under the auspices of the United Nations
moved launching pad for attacks into China proper in subsequent years.
Furthermore, during northwards from the southern part of the peninsula, too close
for China's comfort. Perceiving its own military security to be at stake, China
then felt it had to respond militarily. Hence, as far as its military security is
concerned, it is quite clear that China would like to have a buffer zone between it
and its potential enemies in the post-Cold War era,
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North Korea's importance as a buffer state is further reinforced by China's
historical relationship with Korea. Korea was a tributary state when China was
strong and powerful.' It was only when the power of the Qing dynasty declined at
the turn of the century that China had to vie with other regional powers for the
control of Korea. North Korea shares a border with Russia, and is only separated
from the Japanese islands by less than fifty miles of ocean. In addition to China,
both Russia and Japan are also unlikely to sit by idly should any crisis break out
on the peninsula, so near their territories. Therefore, China is wary that other
powers may get involved so near on its doorstep, proximate to its capital, should
its North Korean ally collapse or get involved in a war. Specifically, in the post-
Cold War era, the loss of North Korea means that China will be deprived of an
indispensable security buffer against potential enemies such as Japan and the
United States.
Therefore, as far as military security is concerned, it comes as no surprise
that Chinese leaders continue to emphasise North Korea's enduring importance to
China, comparing it to the function of the lips in protecting one's teeth. The
Chinese idiom, chun wang chi han, which means that once the lips are dead, there
will be nothing left to protect one's teeth from the cold, is particularly apt. In
short, North Korea's continuing existence is vital to China. Examining this from
the perspective of military security, the important thing to note is that military
links have been maintained and the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship,
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance is still very much valid.' This view is also
echoed by countries in the region, such as South Korea. For instance South
Korea's Ministry of National Defence perceives that there are no signs of any
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particular change in the China-North Korea relationship, despite Beijing's "dual
track policy" that is increasingly leaning toward economic relations with South
Korea .3
In political and military terms, China is still adamant to keep its North
Korean ally. While Boris Yeltsin announced in 1992 that guaranteed Russian
military assistance to North Korea in the event of war, as laid down in their 1961
Treaty of Mutual Friendship, no longer applies, China's still maintains its defence
alliance with North Korea. For instance, when North Korea announced in May
1994 that it would withdraw from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC),
China later withdrew the delegation of the Chinese People's Volunteers from the
MAC in an apparent show of solidarity. An alternative body known as the
Korean People's Army Panmunjom Mission was subsequently established with
North Korea renewing its call for bilateral negotiations between itself and the
United States to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty. In political
terms, Beijing's links with Pyongyang also appear to be more prominent than
those with Seoul. The principal reason appears to be the US-South Korean
alliance and Beijing's deep suspicions over United States hegemonic intentions in
the region. 4
 North Korea is still valuable as an ally, insofar as China continues to
view the United States as a threat; an issue explored in Chapter 8.
To ensure North Korea remains an ally, China needs to sustain the North
Korean regime, although the degree of commitment is a matter of debate. For
example, China is reported to have told South Korea that it will come forward to
prevent that the North Korean regime from collapse by sending food and other
assistance whenever the regime faces a "critical point". 5 As far as sending aid to
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North Korea is concerned, the Chinese also feel that due to the conflicting points
of view among the three main aiding states, Japan, the United States and South
Korea, many political conditions have been attached to the aid process. One
Chinese article notes that for instance, the United States requires that North Korea
fulfils its nuclear agreements, Japan wants North Korea to accelerate the
normalisation of diplomatic ties between the two countries, and South Korea
wants to resume dialogue with North Korea and increase transparency in the
distribution of grain aid. 6 In this article, China was not mentioned as a helper,
suggesting that North Korea had to resolve the grain crisis by adapting to change
while maintaining a stable political situation. This type of Chinese thinking
suggests that Beijing wants others to bear the financial brunt for helping North
Korea, while it reaps the benefits accruing from a continuing North Korean
regime.
In reality, the ossification of the North Korean regime can be traced back
to the nature of the system Kim II-Sung created, which is characterised by the
inseparability of its political, economic and foreign policy aspects. Preservation of
the regime normally requires adherence to established dogma in all areas of policy
and fundamental changes such as the complete abandonment of socialism, is
likely to undermine the stability of the regime itself. This is similar to the
argument relating to the Chinese Communist Party, as stated in the previous
chapter.
In addition, claims of North Korea's economic self-sufficiency in
accordance with its Juche ideology have proved to be false. In December 1993,
North Korea for the first time officially acknowledged huge economic failings.'
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North Korea's ailing economy is generally attributed to two factors. First, North
Korea's external trade environment has deteriorated since the end of the Cold
War. Deliveries of raw materials and fuel, previously obtained by barter from the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, have decreased, causing a
decline in overall factory production. Secondly, North Korea's heavy military
debt burden of an estimated US$6 billion, a huge strain on its economy, uses up
much needed material and financial resources.'
Undoubtedly, the economic well being of North Korea is essential to
China. Should the North Korean regime collapse, China would probably have to
face an exodus of refugees. Domestic instability in North Korea or the use of
force by the regime against South Korea could mean that China has to respond in
some manner. Another war on the peninsula would mean that China has to come
to the aid of North Korea lest its inaction be regarded as a sign of decline of
Beijing's military standing in the world. Any conflicts on the Korean peninsula
will go against China's desire for a stable regional environment, which is a
necessity for its economic development in the race catch up with the established
nations.
It is quite evident that Chinese interests require the gradual evolution of
North Korea towards economic reform rather than sudden transformation or
collapse. For instance, Robert Scalapino notes that China cannot condone the
wholesale change of the Pyongyang regime.' The economic systems of
Communist countries are intertwined with their political ideologies. Both the
Korean and Chinese communist parties have come to power by adopting socialist
ideology. China hopes that North Korea will follow the path it has taken to
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ensure the survival of the Communist regime. Ensuring the continuing material
well being of the masses by pursuing economic growth, as the late Deng Xiaoping
had argued, could be one way to resist attempts to change the communist political
system. In fact, many North Korean officials reportedly recognise that they can
benefit from China's experience with market reforms, rather than a
straightforward implementation of the Chinese model, in the course of "pursuing
socialism with North Korean characteristics".10
On its part, Pyongyang has recently shown renewed interest in attracting
foreign investment and joining international financial institutions. However, this
will be dependent on, for example, the United States and South Korea dropping
their severe restrictions on trading with North Korea and supporting its
membership in international economic institutions such as the Asian Development
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Japan has already
agreed that establishing relations with North Korea will bring an aid package of
US$4.13bn as reparation for the 1910-45 colonial period, which it has done
similarly for South Korea in 1965." China encourages such positive responses
from the outside world, if only to ensure it does not have to bail its North Korean
ally out financially. To be precise, China's strategy in prompting North Korea to
engage in economic reforms is not designed to bring about liberalisation of the
North Korean political system but to promote stability in its buffer state; the
strategy has been formulated to enhance military and political security on China's
borders.
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North Korea as a political ally
Apart from the purely military aspects of security, one has to realise that
historical ties between the North Korean and Chinese communist parties still
exist, although the strength of this bonding has been much disputed. Such ties,
however, are still important to the Chinese leadership and this is also true when
one looks at it from the North Korean perspective. For example, the 47th
anniversary of China's entry into the Korean War, the North Korean news agency
describes the Chinese act as a "living example of the proletarian international
support"; adding that the valued Sino-North Korean friendship "has overcome all
trials and is not affected by the changed situation after the Cold War"." In
particular, the North Koreans note that the friendly relations between the peoples
of North Korea and China play a beneficial role in defending the common cause
of socialism and independence, "advancing the revolution and construction in the
two countries": 3 While one may dismiss the propagandistic tone of such
statements, however, there is no doubt that "blood" ties between the Chinese and
North Koreans were forged during the anti-Japanese war in the 1930s and 1940s,
and subsequently strengthened by both the Korean War and the Cold War rivalry
that pitted communist against capitalist states. Further evidence of the "blood"
ties between the Korean Workers Party (KWP) and Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) occurred when President Jiang Zemin became one of the first foreign
leaders to be informed of Kim Jong-Il's public confirmation as North Korea's
leader during the 50" anniversary of the KWP's founding:4
More importantly for our analysis, North Korea relates to the political
security of the Chinese regime since both are communist, and communism, in any
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variant or form, has been both the ruling ideology and more importantly the basis
on which these regimes came to power and had retained power for such a long
time. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
states has corroded the legitimacy of communism as a political ideology. China
and North Korea are currently among the few Communist regimes left in the
world and in fact both states are the only Communist survivors in Northeast Asia,
following the demise of the Soviet and Mongolian communists. In terms of
ideology and bolstering political security, it is only natural that China sustains its
ties with North Korea, its last socialist ally in Northeast Asia.
However, rather than any ideological emphasis on a particular form of
Asian proletarian movement, both China and North Korea appear to place
emphasis on fighting against foreign subversive influences and outside
interference in their internal affairs. For example, during the 1989 Tiananmen
Incident, North Korea publicly endorsed the Chinese government position, and
mutual support in the domain of ideology and domestic politics has become even
more important in the post-Cold War era as both states attempt to counter the
Western strategy of "peaceful evolution".' After the Cold War ended, it can be
argued that a combination of anti-American feeling has actually helped to restore
some of their former closeness.
This anti-American feeling is also evident when China expresses concern
over the presence of foreign troops on the peninsula and implicitly supports North
Korea's criticism of the large-scale Team Spirit exercises held by the United
States and South Korea.' To the Chinese, the end of the Cold War means that
such large-scale exercises are unnecessary as the Soviet threat has dissipated; they
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see the joint military manoeuvres by the United States and South Korea as a threat
to its North Korean ally, indirectly threatening Beijing as well. Such a stance is
also adopted by North Korea, who criticised the joint military drill codenamed
"Foal Eagle" involving most of the American troops stationed in South Korea and
the 650,000 strong South Korea "puppet" army in October 1997.' 7 While official
Chinese rhetoric has always called for the withdrawal of American troops from
South Korea, during the Cold War, Chinese diplomats privately conveyed the
opposite because the American troops also served as a buffer against the Soviet
Union.' Once the Russian threat diminishes, China has become more concerned
about the presence of any foreign troops on the Korean peninsula.
Whatever the underlying reason, it is clear that China's concern has been
given an added impetus by Beijing's perception of an aggressive United States
determined not only to assert its hegemony over Northeast Asia, but also to export
Western democracy as well. The United States has also alluded to the possibility
of using selective United Nations economic sanctions against North Korea for its
intransigence on nuclear inspection matters. However, Washington would have to
rely on China, amongst others, for support for such sanctions to work effectively
since the United States does little trade with North Korea.' China has the power
to scupper the sanctions both either by a veto in the UN Security Council and also
through supplying North Korea with essentials in the event of the sanctions. In
fact, as North Korea's main supplier of food grain and oil, China has openly
opposed using these sanctions, backing its ally against what it perceives as
American hegemony in the post-Cold War era."
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Having discussed the military and political aspects of security, one also
has to look at China's economic interests in relation to North Korea. It is
interesting to note that since the Second World War, China's relations with North
Korea has been characterised by a large lop-sided economic aid program and
barter trade for Pyongyang's benefit, with almost all economic transactions based
on political considerations.' Today, China's economic interests in relation to
North Korea are minimal, compared to the gains Beijing can obtain from North
Korea's rival, South Korea. In this light, Beijing has decided to follow Moscow's
lead in demanding for cash payments in trade with North Korea effective from
January 1, 1993. 2' Beijing stopped supplying crude oil to North Korea in barter
trade while earlier, it annually supplied about 1.2 million tons of crude oil, of
which 650, 000 tons were in the form of barter trade and the remaining 550,000
ton on credit.' In short, one may argue that today, it seems that North Korea is
being outflanked to some extent by the growing interests of its traditional
communist ally, China, who is expanding its economic relations with South
Korea.
However, in relation to economic co-operation in the Yellow Sea Rim,
China is likely to gain if North Korea opens up. In fact, Japan and even more so,
South Korea would like to see China play the key role in opening North Korea to
the rest of the world. The Yellow Sea Rim may produce a natural economic
"bridge" to bring this about.' Although at present the economic and political
climate is not ripe yet to institute a formal Yellow Sea Rim Economic Co-
operation, one can imagine that a key motivation for some type of agreement
would create a strong enticement for Pyongyang to become involved, perhaps
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with China initiating a bilateral agreement with North Korea first. This type of
scenario may be years away, as many smaller building blocks need to be achieved
first. Nevertheless, it appears that China is the only one who can do that, and it
can also enhance its economic security in the process. We can now turn to the role
South Korea plays in contributing to China's economic security.
Economic interests and South Korea
In order to explore China's economic interests in relation to South Korea,
it is be helpful to see how the normalisation between Seoul and Beijing in August
1992 came about. Before the end of the Cold War, rapprochement between the
two sides was slow. The first official contacts occurred in 1978 and did not
increase until the 1980s. The fear of losing its ideological ally, Pyongyang, means
that for a decade, Beijing made diplomatic ties with Seoul contingent upon the
implementation of formal links between the United States/Japan and North Korea.
The end of the Cold War brought about changes in the pattern of inter-
Korean relationship and the structure of the great power relationship around the
Korean peninsula. Russia established formal diplomatic ties with Seoul, and
Pyongyang began talks with Washington and Tokyo on the normalisation of
relations. China's neighbours also improved the political climate in the region.
For instance, Tokyo adjusted its policy toward the Korean peninsula from tilting
toward South Korea to a more balanced one with both Koreas. This to a certain
extent gave an incentive for Beijing, and also Moscow, to adjust their traditional
ties with North Korea and start a balanced policy toward both Seoul and
Pyongyang. One Chinese assessment written in the 1990s argues that great power
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relationship on the Korean issue, formerly organised around two blocs during the
Cold War, is being replaced by a dual structure that centres on North Korea-four
great powers on one hand and South Korea-four great powers, on the other.25
This change in the geopolitical landscape means that the Chinese had to
revise their policy and try to extend their influence to the southern half of the
Korean peninsula. The normalisation of ties between Moscow and Seoul
presented an attractive new opening and precedent. Beijing followed Moscow, not
willing to lose out on the benefits accruing from South Korean trade deals, which
would enhance its economic security.
A complementary and perhaps more important factor was South Korea's
"Northern Policy" adopted in July 1988 to improve diplomatic relations with
China and the former Soviet Union. With China, this policy had the twin
objectives of strengthening economic ties and establishing political dialogue with
Beijing on North Korea.' Although China reacted cautiously initially, the
pragmatic policy of the late Deng Xiaoping gradually allowed it to alter its
traditional aversion to a two-Korea policy.
Therefore, in 1991, as a member of the Security Council, Beijing did not
veto Seoul's application to join the United Nations (UN). This was despite that
fact that for decades, South Korea's suggestion of simultaneous participation with
North Korea in the UN was vehemently opposed by Pyongyang, who saw it as
symbolising national division. The Chinese decision in effect left North Korea
with little alternative but to set aside its declared principle and apply for
simultaneous UN membership in May 1991. It also appeared that, at that time,
Beijing was worried that supporting North Korea might jeopardise its relations
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with the pro-Seoul position of all other permanent members of the Security
Council.
In addition, in its bid to participate in regional trade organisations, China
evinced remarkable pragmatism and flexibility by sending a foreign minister to
Seoul for the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) meeting in November
1991, in the process risking offending Pyongyang.' One can interpret this as a
way of Beijing's skilful foreign policy manoeuvring in an attempt to enhance the
economic aspects of its comprehensive security.
During the process of establishing relations with South Korea in 1992,
China kept North Korea informed as it did not wish to upset its traditional ally in
any severe manner. Beijing was in many ways trying to soften the psychological
blow its normalisation with South Korea might deal to North Korea. However, in
reality, China probably calculated that North Korea had no friends left in the
world and would not be able to do much to block its relations with South Korea.
Seeking to facilitate its enormous increase in bilateral trade with South Korea, the
Chinese had obviously done an economic cost-benefit analysis in this regard. In
addition, there has been a linkage to China's political and military security in the
normalisation process with South Korea. According to an internal Chinese text
published in the Japanese press, it was stated that, among other things,
normalisation would allow South Korea to "escape the influence of the US and
Japan" and "make it impossible for the US and Japan to check China with inter-
Korea issues".28
Above all, China's move to establish ties with South Korea in 1992 was
primarily motivated by economic factors. By extending its relations to the
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southern part of the Korean peninsula, China hopes to discover new opportunities
to facilitate its ongoing economic modernisation program. China is a developing
country with an enormous supply of low cost labour and abundant resources.
South Korea, despite the economic crisis it experienced in 1997-1998, is a newly
industrialised nation with a booming economy and has many technology-intensive
industries. China sees South Korea as the natural economic partner for achieving
its development goals.
Bilateral trade in 1994 reached US$11.72 billion, an increase of 42.5
percent form the previous year.' China has become the leading target for
investment by South Korea. By the end of 1995, South Korea-funded projects
had numbered 5800 with contracted investments approaching US$6 billion?'
South Korea is among currently the four largest investors in China, along with
Japan, the United States and Singapore. Top Chinese leaders such as former
premier Li Peng notes that the rapid development of bilateral economic relations
has "laid a solid foundation for friendly ties"?'
According to the South Korean government's estimate of the mid-1990s,
China will become Seoul's largest trading partner by the end of this century, with
a two-way trade of US$56 billion!' The recent economic downturn in South
Korea might have some negative impact on this projection, but it is fair to say that
bilateral trade between China and South Korea will continue to grow. China is
now South Korea's largest overseas investment area. Up to September 1993,
South Korean businesses invested US$1.5 billion in 2153 projects in China,
especially in the provinces of Shandong and Liaoning." In fact, South Korea is
well poised to transform Shandong Province, which lies across the Yellow Sea
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from the Korean Peninsula, as another export-launching pad since much of its
investment and trade is concentrated nearby. 34 Driven by domestic policy change,
South Korea had initially floated the idea of a "Yellow Sea Economic Zone"
when it established its south—western coast as a national priority in 1988. A
testament to the strong economic complementarities between Northeast China and
South Korea was the rapid shift in Korean investment from China's southern
provinces to the Bohai Sea areas in recent years.' Indeed, South Korea plays a
significant role in the provinces of Shandong, Liaoning and Jilin and figures
positively in China's internal policy shift towards emphasising development of
the Bohai Seas in order to balance the two economic development centres of
Shanghai and the southern provinces. For China, this has proved to be one way of
reducing disparities between the rates of economic development between the
northern and southern provinces. More importantly, such policies clearly enhance
China's economic security.
In addition, China's effort to develop economic ties with South Korea is
not only aimed at immediate trade benefits but is also intended to allow China to
diversify its economic partners and reduce its technological and economic
dependence on a few foreign sources. By normalising relations with South Korea,
China has added a major trading partner. Economic ties with Seoul can to a
certain extent reduce Chinese dependence on trade and investment from other
major partners, especially the United States and Japan. For the Chinese leaders, it
represents one way of coping with the insecurity of living in an interdependent
global economic system. Moreover, South Korea's economic structures and
technology may be more suitable for China's modernisation programmes than
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Japan's and other Western countries' in terms of expense and technology
transfer.36
Furthermore, South Korea has proven more reliable as a trading partner,
compared to the Western countries. Although Sino-Korean relations underwent a
temporary setback following the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, South Korea was
keen to improve relations as soon as possible. After all, in 1980, South Korea has
its own Kwangju Incident, often compared to the Tiananmen Incident in China.
Beijing-Seoul relations have paralleled and even transcended Beijing-Pyongyang
relations in the context of view that South Korea can act as a successful economic
model for Beijing.' Beijing is also interested in the way the South Koreans
combined the achievements of rapid economic growth with an authoritarian
political system, at least up to the 1980s. The coincidence of South Korea's move
to democracy with its current economic difficulties may also have some resonance
in Beijing, perhaps suggesting that a more pluralistic political system is not
conducive to achieving rapid economic success. China wants to have the best of
both worlds, as its approach to security is comprehensive, encompassing the
military, political and economic aspects.
The improvement in the relations of Sino-South Korean economic co-
operation reflects both a foundation of naturally endowed economic
complementaries and a degree of political confidence between the political actors.
In this regard, Ralph Cossa and Jane Khanna have contrasted the booming Sino-
South Korean economic transactions across the Yellow Sea Rim with the UN-
endorsed Tumen River Area Development Program that, despite Chinese
encouragement, failed to ignite because of lingering security tensions between the
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two Koreas, Japan and Russia, as well as a perception in Russia that China would
gain more."
To be sure, the Yellow Sea Rim project is important to China, South Korea
and also Japan, as all are seeking to create multiple options for political relations
and to cast the widest net possible in their search for economic relations.39
Specifically, the China-South Korea component of the Yellow Sea co-operation has
made the most headway in both economic and political terms, while relations with
China and Japan are processing at a more gradual pace. Economic relations between
China and Japan will be dealt with in Chapter 5. At present, the trend towards the
dominance of economics acts as a hedge against military security threats that do not
have the clarity compared to those during the Cold War, and a shift in focus away
from superpower confrontation back to regional economic security. Viewed from a
global perspective, Yellow Sea Rim economic co-operation has much potential in
Northeast Asia as China, South Korea and Japan can carve out a sphere influence of
that is not only economically grounded, but also fosters political and cultural ties.
There is no doubt that there is a growing emphasis on economic interests
in China's South Korea policy, and this emphasis is likely to remain for the
foreseeable future. Economic integration has, to a certain extent, become an end
of Beijing's foreign policy as well as means to facilitate the policy. Traditional
Chinese policy in the past towards the Korean peninsula was military oriented and
North Korea centred. Today, it is clear that Beijing wants a more comprehensive
approach to security that stresses military, political and economic relations, and
attaches equal importance to its relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul.
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Quest for a stable Korean Peninsula
Having discussed China's security interests in relation to North and South
Korea separately, it is now time to assess the larger issue of China's quest for a
stable Korean peninsula, which is fundamental to its security. To be sure,
President Jiang Zemin has stated that "without peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula, there will be no genuine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific
region".' Any adverse development on the Korean peninsula will be disastrous
for China's ongoing modernisation goals and economic security. For example,
during the April 1996 intra-Korean border tension, Beijing worried about the
possibility of conflict on the peninsula, stressing that it would continue its
"constructive role" in inducing peace. 4 ' Beijing also joined Moscow in calling for
both parties to "refrain from taking any acts that might impede detente"." After
all, China has often sought to play a major role in defusing tensions on the
peninsula, largely out of self-interest.
China's role is also related to the fundamental question on the signing of a
Korean peninsula peace agreement to replace the cease-fire agreement. Chinese
academics acknowledge that after more than forty years, the cease-fire agreement
signed in 1953 at Panmunjom by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese
Volunteer Army on one side and by the United Nations troops on the other, needs
to be revised to cope with the changing situation on the peninsula.' The Renmin
Ribao also recognises that the armistice agreement signed during the Cold War
"does not suit the development and change seen in the international pattern" and
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added that the issues concerning the Korean peninsula left over by the Cold War
system "have shifted into the orbit of dialogue, peaceful settlement"."
In 1994, Beijing gave its tacit support for a "new peace arrangement"
advocated by Pyongyang, when it announced the withdrawal of its delegation to
the Korean War Military Armistice Commission. However, as shown in a
statement later, former Chinese Premier Li Peng employed the term "new peace
mechanism" and not the term "new peace arrangement" used by the North
Koreans.' The Chinese term, "new peace mechanism", was conceived in a broad
sense to mean a new system replacing the armistice system and it was received
favourably and referred to in South Korea as the "two-plus-two" formula (North
and South Korea, and the United States and China). This was in many ways a
precursor to the current four-party talks between China, the United States and the
two Koreas, initially proposed by President Clinton and former South Korean
President Kim Young-sam in April 1997 to discuss the establishment of the "new
peace mechanism" for the Korean peninsula to replace the existing cease-fire
mechanism.
In the eyes of the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, the
stumbling block for the four party talks appears to be the tension between the US
and North Korea.' North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan in
December 1997 repeated the calls for withdrawal of American forces from the
Korean peninsula before signing a peace treaty between North Korea and the
United States, and also insisted that the United States lift economic sanctions,
while the US side argued that American troops stationed on the Korean peninsula
are needed to preclude a possible invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
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Although China continues to take a keen interest in the four-party talks, it expects
only "gradual and incremental progress", knowing that they will be a "long and
tortuous process".47
For our purpose here, it is important to note that China has now positioned
itself as the key intermediary in the Korean situation. Only the United States acts
as an external party with any real leverage on this situation, despite the key
interests of Japan and Russia. At the same time, strains in Beijing's relations with
the United States do not give China any incentive to assist South Korea, a US
ally, to seek closer ties with North Korea." What Beijing has adopted was a
cautious approach, going as far as it could to persuade Pyongyang to engage in
further rapprochement with Seoul while not appearing to side with South Korea.
Naturally, China is opposed to any aggressive behaviour on the part of
either Pyongyang or Seoul that will jeopardise the stability of the area and
consequently, perhaps, its own security. Such behaviour would also make it
difficult for China to respond, given that it still values its traditional friendship
with North Korea while at the same time increasing close economic ties with
South Korea.' Therefore, it came as no surprised that China welcomed the
historic "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Co-
operation between the South and the North" (the Basic Accord) on December 13,
1991, which provided the basis for the establishment of a peace system on the
Korean peninsula. The Basic Accord also led to North Korea and South Korea
agreeing on the Joint Declaration on De-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,
with the two sides agreeing to allow mutual inspections of suspected nuclear
facilities. Chinese President Jiang Zemin has also told the former South Korean
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president, Kim Young Sam, that "China supports the call for a nuclear free
Korean peninsula"."
From Pyongyang's perspective, developing nuclear weapons program
seems to be a cost-effective deterrent and "strategic equaliser" in its competition
with South Korea." In actual fact, China knows that the risks of allowing North
Korea to develop nuclear weapons are huge, as there are implications for China's
own security. Indeed, revelations in 1991 that North Korea either possesses or can
imminently possess nuclear weapons would hardly have come as a surprise to
China. Both countries have collaborated in nuclear research for decades, and a
number of North Korean scientists actually studied in China.
More importantly, it has been pointed out that if the United States fail to
fulfil its commitment to protect South Korea, then Seoul would seek nuclear
weapons itself.' Japan might acquire their own nuclear weapons in response to
the nuclearisation of North Korea and Taiwan might follow. All these would
deprive China of being the sole nuclear power in the region, possessing the
concomitant clout in international politics. Moreover, such developments are
likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in the region and make the regional
environment more volatile, which China does not want.
In short, China desires a less militarised Korean peninsula. This would, for
instance, permit Chinese forces in the Shenyang Military Region to be reduced."
China could then divert its limited resources to pursuing economic growth in its
north-eastern provinces. In particular, China could seize the opportunity to play an
active role in promoting regional economic co-operation schemes such as the
Tumen River Area Development Program.' If such schemes become successful,
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this means that China can avoid the concentration of its economic activities in the
southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, thereby ensuring a more even
pattern of economic development, reducing income disparities between provinces
and lessening the centrifugal tendencies of the Chinese state.
Korean reunification
With the aim of fuelling its ongoing economic growth in mind, it is
inevitable that in the longer term, the issue of Korean reunification looms large in
China's security calculations. On this issue, China has publicly endorsed the
former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung's reunification project to establish a
confederation in 1991. During talks with Kim, Chinese President Jiang Zemin
supported his position, which is based on "one nation, one country, two systems
and two governments"." At the same time, China has also made it clear that it
supports the suggestion for peaceful reunification put forward by South Korea in
1989, known as the Korean National Community Unification Formula, which
features a step-by-step approach to reunification.' Essentially, Seoul's approach
is the formation of a unified state after a process of recovering a sense of single
national community through exchanges and co-operation, whereas Pyongyang's
proposal calls for an immediate solution to unify the country.
In any case, Beijing's interest with regard to the task of Korean
reunification is due mainly to its goal of engendering a peaceful regional
environment. Therefore, Beijing constantly emphasises that only peaceful means
must be used to achieve reunification on the peninsula in order to ensure that
stability in the region will not be threatened. The central challenge for China is to
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make the external environment safe and peaceful for its modernisation drive,
therefore China is more interested in maintaining peace and stability in the
Korean peninsula rather than specifically in bringing about Korean reunification.
Beijing's policies pertaining to Korean reunification are pragmatic, as its Korean
policies in the post-Cold War era have generally proved to be.
Another important point worth noting is that Beijing prefers that the
Koreans resolve the process of reunification themselves, with outside pressure
kept to a minimum." Beijing is wary that other foreign powers may get involved
in the region. China's aim of reducing the probability of other powers getting
involved has historical roots. Regional powers such as Japan and Russia had
competed for influence over Korea when China was weak. Japan had first moved
in to curtail China's influence on the peninsula, with the 1885 Convention of
Tianjin confirming a "co-protectorate" over Korea; the convention established an
equal right for Japan to intervene in Korea, thereby confirming that China no
longer lay sole claim to suzerainty over Korea. China subsequently lost the 1894-
1895 war against Japan and had to agree to the independence of Korea. China's
influence over Korea was finally ended when Japan occupied the country in 1910.
Today, Beijing is anxious to avoid this scenario happening again, especially since
Japan is emerging as a great power. Moreover, China is also keen to avoid any
possible American intervention, such as those under the auspices of the United
Nations in the Korean War.
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A unified Korea?
Without doubt, the possible reunification of the two Koreas has important
implications for China's security interests. For instance, China would be
concerned about Seoul absorbing Pyongyang through "peaceful evolution" or in
the event of a North Korean collapse. Beijing knows that both scenario are
unattractive and even threatening to China's interests. South Korea absorbing
North Korea, a communist state, can never be a desired outcome as there will then
be acute political legitimacy implications for the survival of the Chinese
communist state system itself, as noted in the previous chapter. From Seoul's
perspective, it may not be able to afford a German style absorption of North
Korea, partly because the South Korean economy is weaker than that of West
Germany and partly because the economic gap between the two Koreas is much
larger in relative terms than that between East and West Germany.' Seoul would
have to bear most of the burden and in any case, and this might lead to chaos on
China's borders.
At the extreme, a reunified Korea, sympathetic to the West, would mean
that foreign presence, such as American, close to the Yalu River. Moreover, a
unified Korea might even pursue claims against China for territory along their
common border, given that parts of southern Manchuria had been under Korean
rule in the past.' A united Korea could also serve as a economic competitor to
China.
With reference to Japan, China and the Koreas are all former victims of
Japanese colonialism and aggression. Hence, they continue to watch their
neighbour to the east with a wary eye. Although Japan had already established
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relations with South Korea in 1965, the anti-Japanese sentiment is still pervasive
among both North and South Koreans throughout the peninsula, due largely to
Japan's historical record. Thus, this represents the one factor around which all
Koreans can unite in the long term. Japanese colonialism is often perceived by the
Koreans as humiliating and oppressive, in contrast to the previous Chinese
influence and control. Moreover, Chinese leaders past and present view their
control over Korea as a "natural order" with Chinese characters and Confucianism
readily absorbed in Korean society. 6° China will be eager to use this situation to
its advantage. China and the two Koreas can even work together to constrain a
strong Japan in the long term since neither will never accept Japanese leadership
of any kind in East Asian politics.
Furthermore, China would also like to encourage Japanese and Korean
rivalry for this represents a sound strategy and cost-effective way of attracting
more Japanese investment and technology. Korea and Japan can compete
economically and that could give China more favourable concessionary terms of
trade and investments from both sides. China's co-operation with Korea could
also serve to counter the economic power of Japan in the region. Besides, Beijing
prefers not to rely solely on Japanese investment to sustain its economic growth.
In short, Korean unification will be beneficial to the Chinese only if they are
confident that their security interests are being respected.
For Beijing, the ideal regional environment would be one in which it can
pursue its economic growth without regional powers competing for influence on
its doorstep. It is evident that in Chinese eyes, maintaining a peaceful Korean
peninsula includes some sort of Chinese influence over the region, and it is
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precisely this influence that gives China a means to enhance its regional great
power status. Some observers such as Kay Moeller and Markus Tidten argue that
Beijing's desire to acquire influence on the peninsula can be seen as "the starting
point for a return to Pax Sinica in the region".'
China as a regional power: Security interests
Historically, as a regional power, China had interests on the Korean
peninsula. China controlled parts of Korea even before the founding of a unified
Korean state in the seventh century. 62 In 1259, the Koreans surrendered to the
Mongols, who had conquered China itself. Between 1368 and 1644, Korea was a
tributary vassal of the Ming dynasty. The Manchu dynasty, which succeeded the
Ming, conquered the Korean peninsula before subjugating China. Hence, from
both the geopolitical and historical standpoints, China does have a vested interest
in the Korean peninsula. In the post-Cold War era, all four major powers, the
United States, Japan Russia, and China itself have strategic interests in the
peninsula and the nuclear issue has sharpened these interests and increased the
importance of being involved at the centre. Aware that the interests of Russia,
Japan, and the United States are all at stake in avoiding a major war on the
peninsula, China is able to use its influence on North Korea to enhance its great
power status in the region and also at a global level. Hence, the Korean peninsula
is important in China's conduct of international relations, in addition to being a
vital component in its security. China needs to compete with other powers in the
international system. After all, it was in the Korean War that China enhanced its
prestige as a great power by holding the Americans to a stalemate.
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Hence, despite the dangers a nuclear North Korea posed to China's
interests discussed earlier, Pyongyang's nuclear threat has also given China a
great power role. To resolve the nuclear issue, China's co-operation is needed. For
instance, in October 1992, South Korea and China held a summit meeting where
the focus was an agreement by China to use its good offices to persuade North
Korea to agree to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and South Korean
inspection of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities.'
While remaining North Korea's friend and ally, China has also been acting
as some sort of liaison for the West. This makes China look like a responsible
great power in the eyes of international organisations such as the IAEA and the
world community in general. Nevertheless, when North Korea rebuffed inspection
demands by the IAEA and announced it would withdraw from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, China was unwilling to pressurise
Pyongyang openly, stating that the issue of nuclear inspection is "more directly a
matter between North Korea and the IAEA, the United States and South Korea".64
China abstained from the voting on the United Nations Security Council
resolution adopted against North Korea, while promising that it would play a
constructive role in this regard, such as encouraging talks between the United
States and North Korea in May 1993.
When North Korea refused to allow full inspection of its suspected nuclear
facilities and indicated it would withdraw from the IAEA in March 1994, Chinese
Premier Li Peng argued that pressurising North Korea would be
counterproductive." When the Security Council hinted at sanctions if Pyongyang
failed to comply by the IAEA's demands, China stated it would not accept the UN
s on its claim to global power status.
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Security Council resolution.' In both cases, it is quite evident that China regards
the Security Council's intervention as an unnecessary complication. This partly
reflects China's scepticism towards the United Nations, an experience learnt
during the Korean War when the United Nations condemned China for being the
aggressor.
For our analysis, it is important to note that the 1993-1994 episode
enabled China to demonstrate its importance in relation to the North Korean
nuclear issue. Hence, one analyst argues that China views "the Security Council
as an important arena for demonstrating its status as a global power and pursuing
its maxi/mini realpolitik".' Surely, the North Korean nuclear issue represents a
golden opportunity for China to make
In this context, China is beginning to look far more like a great power, at least in
the sense that the nuclear issue requires dealing with China. Moreover, the
security order in the region is still very much in the process of being shaped, with
much depending on how the nuclear issue in North Korea develops.
Apart from using the nuclear issue to enhance its importance and status in
the eyes of the international community, China can also use North Korea as a
means to gain leverage against other powers. With Russia fading away as an East
Asian power, China is now in a better position than ever to influence a friendless
and isolated regime. For decades, both China and the Soviet Union had sought to
influence Pyongyang. North Korea, like North Vietnam, profited from the Sino-
Soviet conflict by leaning from one side to another, "sitting on the fence"
whenever it suited its interests. 68 The Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the late
1980s, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, has eliminated the capability
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of Korean leaders to manipulate tensions between Moscow and Beijing. The point
is that China today no longer needs to compete with Russia for influence in North
Korea today.
For Beijing, Pyongyang's strategic value stems from its unpredictability.
By claiming it can exert influence over an "erratic" state, China is likely to
enhance its standing in international affairs, although in actual fact, one might say
that there is very little that China can actually accomplish in reshaping
Pyongyang's national security thinking and behaviour. It is also true that North
Korea's potentially destabilising behaviour can also jeopardise China's interest in
maintaining a peaceful environment for Beijing's economic modernisation goals
and its relations with South Korea, Japan and United States.'
For our analysis here, the important thing is that North Korea's foreign
policy suits China. Pyongyang's policy calls for normalising relations with the
United States and Japan first before normalising relations with South Korea. 7° On
the other hand, Seoul's policy calls for improving relations with North Korea
first and then have the United States and Japan improve relations with North
Korea. The fact that the two positions are very far apart means China has an
important role to play. Indeed the lack of progress in establishing formal links
between the United States and Japan with North Korea has helped to restrict the
capacity of Washington and Tokyo to influence relations between the two Koreas
in a significant and, from their perspectives, productive manner.' That gives
China further leverage in its political manoeuvres as Beijing now appears to be
the key in persuading Pyongyang to normalise relations with Tokyo and
Washington.
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To all intents and purposes, Beijing and Washington have also been
pursuing parallel policies in the Korean peninsula, as it is one of the principal
areas where Sino-US interests converge. Both countries are anxious to avoid
another conflict on the Korean peninsula. Beijing has encouraged Pyongyang to
adopt a more conciliatory stance in its relations with Washington even before the
end of the Cold War, acting as an intermediary between Washington and
Pyongyang. For example, when the United States eased its restriction on
diplomatic contacts with North Korea in 1987, this led to a series of North Korea-
US councillor-level meetings in Beijing.' Such actions give Beijing greater
political leverage in its dealing with other powers as it is now perceived as having
significant influence on North Korea.
At the same time, it is safe to say that the problems of potential instability
or unstable unification of the Korean peninsula will not be easily solved if both
China and the United States are unwilling to resume a post-Cold War strategic
partnership in compliance with transparent reciprocity and interdependence. In
this regard, China may not exclude the use of the North Korea card for
strengthening its position vis-a-vis the United States, just as America may play
the Taiwan card in pressuring China. Therefore, it is plausible to view North
Korea as key piece on the strategic chessboard as Beijing plays out its
confrontation with the sole remaining superpower.
Like North Korea, South Korea is also important in that it gives China
more room to manoeuvre between other powers. Firstly, as part of the
normalisation agreement in 1992, Seoul has agreed to the recognition of only one
China, and that Taiwan is part of China. This also comes at a time when Taiwan is
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increasingly seeking recognition in the international arena. Politically, South
Korea and Taiwan had been united by anti-Communist ideology during the Cold
War era. The Seoul-Beijing normalisation has removed the last of Taiwan's
diplomatic ties to any state in Northeast Asia, and has also helped Beijing move
one step closer towards the objective of reincorporating Taiwan under its rule (see
Chapter 6).
In addition, China will be keen to exploit any tensions that have arisen
between South Korea and the United States, its perceived threat. For example,
anti-American feeling has been growing in South Korea since the 1980s, and
gestures of resentment toward the United States have been increasing.' During
the 1980 Kwangju Incident that culminated in the deaths of hundreds of civilians
in that city, the South Korea government suggested American complicity, or its
leading role in the Republic of Korea Army operation, since technically the head
of this army was American.'
Moreover, this type of resentment appears to increase as political changes
in South Korea continue to unfold. The consolidation of democracy has been
particularly rapid since former President Kim Young Sam assumed the Korean
presidency in 1993, and this trend towards democratisation in domestic politics
has translated to the call for a more independent foreign policy. The political
legitimacy of Seoul's new elites now seen4 to depend in part on greater foreign
policy and defence autonomy from the guarantors of the recent past. Although
tensions still exist between a growing desire for political independence from the
United States and an ongoing concern of a possible attack from North Korea, it is
possible to argue that decades of dependence on external protectors have
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contributed to the rise of nationalism in South Korea. This tide of South Korean
nationalism can be exploited by the Chinese.
Furthermore, China is also aware that the United States has been
constantly pressing South Korea to increase its financial support for American
forces stationed there, since the Americans desire defence cuts in East Asia. As
South Korea advances to become one of Asia's most industrialised nations, its
economic relations with the United States will become more complex and
competitive, bringing along a diverse array of problems. For instance, when the
United States accumulated an increasing trade deficit with South Korea in the
1980s, it brought up Oft the issues of fair trade and market access to South
Korea.' In response, South Korea argued that its economy is still fragile with
many "infant industries" and high defence expenditures, it had to depend on the
import of raw materials and crude oil, and it had problems of large foreign debts
and a chronic trade deficit with Japan.'
In addition, the United States and South Korea disagree on the
interpretations of inter-Korean trade. According to the 1991 "Agreement on
Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Co-operation between the
South and the North" (the Basic Accord), the South Koreans tend to regard
economic transactions with their northern counterparts as an important step
towards achieving reunification. However, the United States refuses to recognise
inter-Korean trade as "domestic commerce" entailing no tariffs, arguing that the
inter-Korean agreements actually violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) provisions.' Here, we can see a case of American economic
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interests impinging on its security policy. This type of impingement is also
happening to China.
At the same time, Seoul is aware that Beijing continues to harbour deep
suspicions over the US-South Korean alliance in general and over US
hegemonic intentions in the region in particular. Hence, the Seoul leadership is
unlikely to alienate China by pursuing a hard-line stance against North Korea. In
this sense, China may perceive that, in the long run, South Korea can act as a
counter to America's continuing presence in Northeast Asia, its "backyard". In
short, US-South Korean relations are now plagued with a host of disputes that in
essence involve the difficult transition from the Cold War military collaboration
to a new post-Cold War normal type of relationship. China can exploit this to its
advantage.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, it is clear that North Korea still remains vital to
China's military and political security. North Korea acts as a friendly buffer state
and an ideological ally. In addition, future developments of the North Korean
regime will have an impact on China's quest for a stable regional environment to
pursue its modernisation drive. As for South Korea, its contribution to China's
economic development goals is now viewed as important as any remaining
ideological ties binding Pyongyang and Beijing. By extending its official links to
South Korea, China hopes to increase its influence on the peninsula, to protect its
national security, secure a more advantageous political position and above all,
establish better economic opportunities for itself in the region.
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With regards to Korean reunification, China will give its support with the
aim of sustaining a stable regional environment so that Beijing can achieve its
own economic modernisation goals. Beijing's fundamental objective is to avoid a
situation on the peninsula that could lead to war, where the possibility of
American troops intervening close on its doorstep is almost certain.
In addition, as a regional power, China also wishes to exert influence over
the Korean peninsula. Beijing's influence over North Korea provides it with a
means to enhance its regional great power standing and also a leverage against
major powers such as the United States. Beijing's influence on the Korean
peninsula, for four decades limited to the North, has now been extended to the
South, giving it the opportunity to manipulate any tensions between Seoul and
Washington to its advantage. A divided Korean peninsula has given China an
advantageous position as the single major power that is maintaining close
relations with North Korea while developing relations with South Korea. As long
as the Korean peninsula remains divided, China will be able to assert its role in
the region, and possibly enhance its security interests in the process.
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CHAPTER 5: THE RISE OF JAPAN
This chapter examines the role of Japan in relation to China's security
interests in the post-Cold war era. The first section assesses Japan as a potential
political and military security threat to China; this is examined in relation to
Japan's ties with the United States, at a time when Japan itself appears to be re-
emerging as a great power. This topic forms the traditional writing on China's
security. The second section looks at how Japan can actually enhance China's
security interests, particularly in the economic sphere. It will be shown that this is
the dimension which most analysts and writers have paid insufficient attention to.
Japan as a political and military threat
In recent years, the rise of Japan as an economic powerhouse and the
anticipated concomitant political clout it is likely to wield in international politics
has received much attention. Among many others, those paying attention include
Chinese leaders when they formulate their security strategies. The end of the Cold
War has hastened the need to assess the Japanese "threat" among China's policy
makers, spurred on to some extent by signs of American retreat or withdrawal in
Asia in general.
China's security analysts do not need any reminding that historically, it
was Japan's rise that challenged China's long dominance in Northeast Asia and
indeed East Asia as a whole. Japan's emergence as a great power in East Asia
after the 1868 Meiji Restoration and its expansionist policies threatened China's
1910.
132
security in the past. This has, in many ways, left an indelible mark on the minds
of China's security planners, as part of the "century of humiliation" that China
suffered at the hands of the imperialist powers.' Japan first encroached on China's
security in the 1894-1895 War, defeating China and detaching Taiwan from
China, then part of the Qing empire.
In addition to Taiwan, the vassal state of Korea was occupied by Japan in
• • O	 11	 " .11 , Although both China and Japan had joined
Nildutd	 had
the victorious Allies in the&War, Japan attempted to pressurise the warlord
fri 619
government in China to accept the Twenty-One Demands ,^ which amounted to a
de facto concession of China's own sovereignty. Japan had attempted to encroach
on China's security and sovereignty in every sense. Amid mass protest,
symbolised by the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the weak and disunited
government in China gave in partly to Japan's demands and defeated Germany's
colonies in China were transferred to Japan instead of reverting to Chinese
sovereignty.
By the 1920s and 1930s, it became clear that Japan had become a serious
military threat to China. Tokyo took advantage of a disunited China during the
warlordism era and moved into Manchuria, setting up the puppet state of
Manchukuo in 1931. While Chinese leaders at that time realise the military threat
posed by Japan, they were unable to present a stiff challenge. The Kuomintang
and the Communists were embroiled in the struggles against each other, although
these two groups came together when Japan launched a full-scale invasion into
China in 1937. A period of Japanese military occupation of much of China
followed and lasted until the end of the Second World War.
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The above historical analysis is not taken merely as an academic exercise.
Its relevance, summed up under the term "the impact of history", can be found in
all strands of Chinese strategic thinking. In fact, history constitutes an important
influence on Chinese security policy. To the Chinese, Japan's threat to China's
military security is arguably the most serious one posed by any state in modern
times. While China had been subject to treaties of extra territoriality by Western
powers such as Britain in certain treaty ports, Japan has so far been the only Asian
power that actually invaded China proper in the modern era. Therefore, the
actions of Japan since the 1868 Meiji Restoration, in particular its actions in
China during the Second World War, has resulted in the legacy that Japanese
scholar Takashi Inoguchi refers to as "the debt of history".2
With this historical evidence in mind, Chinese leaders are worried that
post-Cold War Japan is likely to recover to its position as a great power. After the
Second World War, Japan was restrained from becoming a military power, largely
by its own constitution and the 1952 Mutual Security Treaty it signed with the
United States. The end of the Cold War has cast doubts on the long term stability
of this situation.
Some writers such as Robert Gilpin have argued that, since the end of the
Second World War, a "normal" strategy for Japan would be to "rebuild its
economic and military capabilities simultaneously and then bring these to bear in
raising its position in prestige hierarchies"? In addition, China shares the Realist
argument advocated by Western scholars that historically, "countries with great
power economies have become great power powers, whether or not reluctantly".4
Japan's stunning economic successes, combined with the end of the Cold War,
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mean that Japan is bound to reassessing its role in international affairs. As skilled
exponents themselves in turning limited national power to maximum use, the
Chinese leaders cannot imagine that Japan will abstain from translating this
strength into at least political power in international relations. From here, we can
discern a slight difference in the type of security threat that Japan poses to China.
In the earlier period, Japan was more of military threat while in the post-Cold War
era, with the efficacy of the use of force in international relations decreasing, it
appears that an economically strong Japan will become a country with more
political clout in the international arena.
Although China acknowledges that, today, Japan wants to play a greater
role in international affairs, Beijing is adamant to emphasis Tokyo's past, which is
in some ways comparable to Germany's Nazi past. For example, an article in
Beijing Review emphasises that Japan must first conduct a "self- examination of
the history of World War Two aggression before it can gain the trust of Asia and
the world".' One of the top Chinese leaders, Li Peng, also notes that "Japan
should seriously examine itself" over its wartime actions.' Chinese leaders,
academics and the general public all seek to remind Japan of its wartime actions
in China. This is in spite of the fact that Japan is not surrounded by weak
neighbours as was the case in the 1930s. For instance, one may argue that
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan are militarily stronger than they were
in the 1930s. Nevertheless, Beijing still contends that Japan is "still linked with
war" and warns Asian countries that "constant vigilance against Japan is
imperative": Given the effects Japan's past actions had on China, it is clear that
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Japan is still regarded as a potential military threat in many quarters of the
Chinese leadership.
While using Japan's past to check Tokyo against a possible reversion to
militarism, Beijing has also used this legacy as the starting point in their bilateral
relationship. Constantly highlighting incidents such as the revision of Japanese
history books on Tokyo's wartime atrocities in Asia and commemorating
anniversaries of Japanese wartime aggression serve as a way for China to exert
pressure on Japan to denounce its past. China is also sensitive to the alleged rise
of right wing politicians in Japan. For instance, the Renmin Ribao expresses
concern over the Japanese Diet's ambiguous "non-apology" resolution on
Tokyo's record of aggression.' Ryutaro Hashimoto's visit in July 1996 in his
official capacity as prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine, followed shortly by the
right wing politicians' visit, has been perceived as a result of a current "rightist"
atmosphere in Japanese politics.' It is this type of "rightist" tendency that
concerns China, for Beijing sees it as paralleling the rise of Japanese military
leaders earlier this century, a process that ended with dire consequences for
China's security.
In addition, this alleged rise of right wing elements in Japanese is also
linked to Japan's actions in the territorial disputes between the two countries.
Specifically, disputes have arisen concerning the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands,
halfway between Taiwan and Okinawa, which comprise five islands some 166 km
north-east of Taiwan. For instance, the China claims that Japan had implicitly
encouraged and tolerated right wing organisations in entering Diaoyu Islands to
infringe on China's sovereignty.' Events in 1996 such as the Japanese Youth
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Foundation building a lighthouse on Diaoyu Island and a group from Japan's
southern Okinawa-Ken putting up the Japanese flag on one of the islands have
been interpreted by Beijing as an chance for Japan "demonstrate its power to the
outside world and to test China's determination to safeguard its territory and
sovereignty"." Beijing is bound to be concerned that such events could spur the
ultranationalists in Japan.
Similarly, China was outraged when Shingo Nishimura, a member of the
Japan's Diet from the New Frontier Party, landed on one of the islands in 1997."
The Diaoyu Islands dispute is further complicated by the role of Taiwanese
activists from the opposition New Party, who challenge Japan's claim." China
sees the loss of the Diaoyu Islands as a result of Japanese past aggression, for it
was forced to cede the territory of Taiwan, which included the Diaoyu Islands to
Japan under the terms of The Treaty of Shimoneseki following the 1894-1895
war. 14 More importantly, the Diaoyu Islands are seen as important to China's
economic security, and this will be discussed later.
The most assertive statement of Chinese claims of the disputed islands
occurred in February 1992, when Beijing proclaimed a law explicitly placing
islands such as Diaoyu in Chinese territorial waters and providing China the right
to use military force to repel any foreign incursion: 5 China also goes about
asserting its claims to the Diaoyu Islands by criticising any semblance of the re-
emergence of Japanese nationalism, as well as magnifying the "Japanese threat"
to other states in the region. However, what is encouragingly curious in great
power terms about the Diaoyu Islands dispute is the way in which both countries
tried to play down the various incidents that occurred in 1996 and 1997.
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Above all, China is wary about Japan acquiring further military power.'
However, Takashi Inoguchi argues that, despite the relatively high defence budget
in Japan, its Self Defence Forces (SDF) cannot fight a war without the direct
support of United States." In addition, it must be noted that Tokyo's new National
Defence Program Outline reduces the SDF's overall strength by twenty thousand,
demobilises four army divisions, eliminates three hundred tanks, and takes ten
surface ships from the navy. The Japanese news agency Kyodo suggests that the
downsizing of the SDF forces, when compared with the military potential of
South Korea or Taiwan, should not feed the perception of Japan as a military
threat."
Nevertheless, China is aware that regional developments such as the
1993-1994 Korean nuclear crisis could move the Japanese public to accept a more
expanded role for the SDF." In addition, there is also the new Japanese "Defence
Outline" contains specific reference to a Japanese "contribution to the creation of
a more stable security environment". Beijing is wary of Japanese interpretation of
this term, as it has no wish to see Japan become more dominant in regional
security matters. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, in general, Japan's military
capabilities have so far been kept in check by its constitution and the Japanese
public's aversion to militarism.
The Chinese have also criticised the concept of a Theatre Missile Defence
(TMD) system that the United States has been trying to sell to Japan, claiming
that this will bring about mistrust and cause suspicion in states surrounding China
and destroy the security of Northeast Asia. China argues that the transfer of such
technology to Japan is a clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is
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crucial to the stability in East Asia, adding that if TMD is to serve as a protection
against the North Korean nuclear threat, then the US Patriot 2/3 missiles should
be adequate.2°
In general, it must be said that the fluidity of the post-Cold War period
seems to encourage Japan, and China as well, to strengthen their armed forces in
order to meet any possible challenges and problems that might have hitherto been
suppressed by the Cold War framework. On a wider scale, Western analysts such
as Gerald Segal argue that an economic and strategic rivalry between China and
Japan for prominence in East Asia is seen as the key feature in the post-Cold War
era.' Ironically, even if Japan itself is not drawn into the power vacuum, Tokyo
may be pushed into it by China.
From the perspective of Japanese strategic thinking, the alleged rise of
China also coincides with the growing economic importance of Asia to Japan,
following a surge in private-sector investment into Asia provoked by the rising
yen. This is an indication of the importance of economic security to Japan. In
addition, this emerging "Asianism" has been sparked off by Tokyo's lessening
economic dependence on the United States and its growing ties with to East Asia.
Beijing, for its part, is aware that Japan wants to play a dominant role in the
establishment of any Asia-Pacific order.
In some ways, Tokyo's Asian strategy is premised on the continuation of
the US-Japanese Security Treaty, as Japan still needs the alliance with the United
States to enhance Japan's diplomatic standing in Asia. 22 In addition to its
historical record of aggression, Japan's negative image is partly attributable to its
peculiar geopolitical position. Japan is situated in Asia, but it maintains only loose
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relations with its Asian neighbours, especially in political terms. It is thus unlikely
that Tokyo can claim to represent Asia in international affairs, a point of which
the Chinese will be keen to take advantage of. However, if Japan attempts to form
an Asian bloc without China, Beijing is bound to oppose such a move.
Beyond Asia, Japan's interest in becoming a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council worries China. China is bound to lose more than
any other permanent members if membership is increased in the Security Council.
Although Japan may be unacceptable as a political leader in Asia, it must be
pointed out that the burden of its imperial past weighs much less heavily at the
global level.' For example, responding to calls for greater international
responsibilities, Tokyo has tried to legislate its United Nations Peace Co-
operation bill, whereby its Self Defence Forces could be deployed abroad.
Japan's decision to take a more proactive role in both Cambodia and the Gulf, the
first overseas operations in the SDF's history, triggered a largely negative
response in China.
In general, although China is aware that Japanese participation in these
multilateral military efforts will help erode Japan's isolationism and induce Tokyo
to become more involved in multilateral security policy-making, Chinese security
analysts are still sceptical and apprehensive, fearing that a possible tension in
Sino-Japanese relations caused by the growing role of the Japanese military and in
Japan's rise in global influence. One Chinese assessment even claims that Japan is
actually seeking a new world order by manipulating by the tripolar "US-Europe-
Japan" structure in pursuit of its own interests'.
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The United States—Japan alliance
To China, the United States can still influence Japan's foreign policy in a
number of ways through the 1952 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Today, the
emphasis in the Treaty is perceived by Chinese academics as shifting from
"protecting Japan" to "controlling Japan", which includes preventing any
resurgence of militancy in Japan?' Therefore, American forces in the region are
seen as pre-empting the need for Japan to become a formidable military power -
an outcome desired by no nation in East Asia. Moreover, a continued US
presence, even if reduced in size, would reassure states in the region that Japan
would not be drawn into any power vacuum.
However, it is important to note that, in Chinese eyes, this is only a short
term policy. China will be unwilling to put its faith in the United States keeping
Japan in check as the alliance between the two may be altered in the longer term.
For instance, some American analysts question how long the United States can
"prop up an old alliance with Japan without the shared Cold War values and
commonly perceived threat that created the alliance in the first place". 26 Former
US ambassador Michael Armacost argues that Washington "can no longer
anticipate the degree of diplomatic compliance Tokyo exhibited during the Cold
War."27 Although the Hashimoto-Clinton joint declaration in April 1996 saw both
sides, especially Japan, made a renewed effort to contain their trade dispute by
stressing deep security ties, China knows that the strategic relationship between
the United States and Japan is likely to change in the long run and Beijing must
ensure that its security interests will not be compromised in the event of any
major changes.
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At the same time, notwithstanding the utility of the Mutual Security
Treaty, Beijing is also wary of a possible American-Japanese "collusion" against
its own interests. One Chinese view suggests that both the United States and Japan
are using the current dispute over the Diaoyu Islands to further their aims of
"containing" China, criticising Japan for placing the Diaoyu Islands, (attached to
Taiwan and hence part of China), under the trusteeship of the United States during
the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty; and criticising the United States for
handing the islands back to Japan via the 1971 Okinawa Treaty. 28 China argues
that the ownership of Diaoyu Islands was determined at the 1943 Cairo
Declaration and confirmed by the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation; that "all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa
(Taiwan), the Pescadores (Penghu) shall be restored to China.' On this basis, the
Chinese criticised the United States when Washington stated that it did not
recognise claims made by any countries concerning the Diaoyu Islands.3°
From the Diaoyu Islands incident, it is quite clear that Beijing wants to
deal with Tokyo on a bilateral basis.' Any other powers supporting Tokyo's
foreign polices will constitute a further potential security threat. This stance is
also evident when China asks Japan not to expand or broaden the scope of the
security treaty with the United States as that might "complicate the situation in
East Asia". 32 While stressing that as sovereign nations, the United States and
Japan are free to choose bilateral alliances to serve their interests, China points
out that "if their co-operation moves beyond the bilateral arrangement, new
complications will enter the picture", which will "undoubtedly affect stability and
development in the region and the world as a whole"." What Beijing really fears
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is that the United States and Japan might even join forces to "contain" China.34
This is, in some ways, reminiscent of the Cold War era when China perceived the
former Soviet Union and the United States as being in "collusion" against Beijing
while engaging in superpower rivalry simultaneously.
This type of thinking on China's security is expressed in an assessment by
the think-tank, China Strategy and Administration Research Society, on the 1997
"Japan-US Defence Co-operation Guidelines". The Society argues that these
"Guidelines" break through the restraints of Japan's "defence only" policy which,
forbids the exercise of "collective defence power"; adding that the "Guidelines"
aim to turn Japan-US alliance and Japan's defence situation from an "inward
type" with defence against aggression as the dominant factor to an "outward
type" with involvement in regional conflicts as the key factor.' However, another
Chinese assessment was more confident that the US-Japan ties might not
necessarily be strengthened by the "Guidelines" due to tensions caused by inward-
looking tendencies in both countries.' While one may debate the degree to which
China fear a military alliance between Japan and the United States, it is safe to say
that the US-Japan alliance is a key determinant in Chinese security thinking.
Furthermore, the Chinese are very concerned whenever they perceive
Japan as trying to get involved in the Taiwan issue. Again, this relates to the
interpretation of the new "Japan-US Defence Co-operation Guidelines" by the
China Strategy and Administration Research Society, which expresses
apprehension on Japan's definition of the "peripheral state of affairs" as actually
including the Taiwan Strait.' Similarly, China has expressed concern when
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama declared in August 1997 that
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the "surrounding areas" covered by Japan-US collaboration "should include the
Taiwan Strait"; for this is regarded as the first time that a top Japanese official had
openly "interfered in Chinese affairs" since normalisation of relations. 38 These
issues will be dealt with further in the next chapter, when we analyse the
involvement of foreign powers in the Taiwan issue.
From the above analysis, for China to pre-empt any possibility of a US—
Japan collusion, Beijing can exploit any tensions between the two sides. The
Americans resent Japan as an economic threat and unfair trader. Japan's leaders
have also faced increasing domestic pressure to stand up to United States on trade
matters since the Soviet military threat disappeared and the need for a strong
alliance with Washington diminished. China can remain ambiguous about the
future of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty. If Japan is seen as the main
danger, then a continuing American role is essential to prevent the Japanese from
becoming too powerful. Beijing's security can be enhanced by manoeuvring
between Washington and Tokyo, as it did between Washington and Moscow
during the Cold War. If the Chinese do tolerate a strong American presence in the
region at all, then it is with Japan in mind. As long as Japan is tied to the US'
security umbrella, then any potential Japanese assertiveness and militarism could
be at least kept in check until China itself becomes stronger. After all, one of
China's strategic goals is to delay Japan's advancement toward becoming a major
military power.' This is a representation of Chinese astuteness in its manoeuvres
to enhance its military and political security vis-à-vis Japan.
Having discussed Japan as a threat, it must also be pointed out that Japan
can also be an important political ally to China. When China faced the hostility of
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the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Japan was pulled into its anti-Soviet orbit.
The normalisation of relations between China and Japan was accomplished in an
atmosphere of growing Chinese perceptions of a "hegemonic" threat from the
Soviet Union at that time.' This political alliance may be less important in the
post-Cold War era, but Japan also supports China on a number of other issues.
On the issue of Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, Tokyo is
generally recognised as a supporter. Like the United States, Tokyo broke off
diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1972 in favour of Beijing. To be sure, Beijing
has always stressed that the two sides' positions on Taiwan and the "historic"
issues, discussed earlier in the chapter, form the political basis of bilateral
relations. Tokyo do, however, have an unofficial but booming economic
relationship with Taiwan and the end to a twenty-two-year freeze on cabinet level
meeting between Tokyo and Taipei was broken in 1994 when Tokyo invited
Taiwanese officials to an Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)
conference in Osaka. However, Japan has yet to totally change its "one-China"
stance. Japan's reactions to China conducting of large-scale military exercises
during the run-up to the Taiwanese presidential elections in March 1996 were
muted, in contrast to the United States', with Tokyo calling for Chinese self-
restraint, In general, it must be said that Japan's policy towards Taiwan is in line
with China's attempt to isolate Taipei in the international community, an issue to
be discussed in the next chapter.
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Japan's role in China's modernisation drive
Although military security and political security are undoubtedly
important to China, economic security is also vital. One of the main objectives of
this thesis is to emphasise China's quest for economic security, a subject much
neglected in most security literature on Sino-Japanese relations. In short, Japan's
economic relations with China need to be analysed and it would be appropriate to
begin by looking back to the period after the Second World War. China initially
responded in a cautious manner to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida's interest in
resuming economic ties in 1952 but things have vastly improved since then."
Bilateral trade increased by 30 per cent in 1993 over 1992 and then by a further 22
per cent in 1994 to reach US$46.26 billion, with a US$8.8 billion surplus on the
Chinese side; these figures mean that China rose from Japan's fifth to second
biggest trade partner in the space of three years." More recently, Japan has
become China's top trade partner and fourth largest inward investor.'
In general, Japan is a rich market for Chinese products and China's
exports to Japan are essential in accumulating foreign reserves. Japan produces
and exports many consumer and capital goods such as machinery that China
needs. Proximity adds another positive element as transportation costs are
reduced. This reinforces the notion discussed earlier that cross-border economic
ties could outpace political ones.
From Japan's perspective, China has also risen to become an important
product assembly site for Japanese exports. As Japanese companies develop new
subsidiaries in China and move existing subsidiaries in the rest of Asia to China,
the market for Japanese components move to China as well. Many Chinese
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exports to other markets are hence indirectly dependent on the importance of
Japan as a trade partner.' In short, as China and Japan are at different levels of
development, mutually beneficial economic relations can form the basis of Sino-
Japanese relations.' Such a relationship bolsters China's economic security.
In addition, as an economic great power, Japan is in a position to help
China's modernisation drive. The interplay between history and economics is
important for the analysis of China's economic security. To be more precise, we
need to tackle the issue described by Takashi Inoguchi as the "debt of history",
mentioned earlier. China initially attempted to seek compensation from the
Japanese government for its wartime actions. However, the Chinese later
abandoned their claims for war indemnities with the aim of getting informal
Japanese pledges of positive economic co-operation during the normalisation of
relations in 1972; this giving Beijing grounds later to believe that it should get the
best treatment from Japan of all the countries in the world." The Chinese have
repeatedly reminded the Japanese and the world about events such as the Nanjing
Massacre, where the Japanese military invaders had conducted atrocities against
the Chinese civilians. In truth, perhaps one may argue that other Asian countries,
notably the two Koreas, suffered just as much as China during the Japanese
Occupation.
Nevertheless, the "debt of history" has been used in many ways as a tool
by China to solicit more economic aid from Japan. Since 1972, China has become
more aggressive, exploiting "the debt of history" as an argument to elicit more
aid, trade and technology. After all, China's modernisation requires as much help
as it can get in order to achieve growth in the shortest time possible; and the logic
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is that Japan's economic, technological and financial help is in many ways
indispensable. By building up its economic base (with Japanese help), China will
then eventually be able to achieve a truly great power status. This is at the heart
of China's security interests.
Japan as a provider of foreign capital
Japan's role as China's leading trade partner is reinforced by its position
as a major provider of foreign capital. Large scale yen loans are indispensable to
Beijing for consolidating its investments in economic and social infrastructures.
China is the biggest recipient of Japanese Overseas Development Aid (ODA).
For instance, in 1988, China and Japan negotiated a huge ODA loan package for
the 1990-1995 period, with the allocation approximately US$1 billion per year for
large scale aid projects, until the Tiananmen Incident occurred. The third package
for the period from 1990 and 1995 was one of those that were suspended in 1989.
The ODA package was, however, subsequently reinstated and another bilateral
trade agreement worth US$8 million was signed. Since then, it is fair to say that
the Japanese have continued to provide capital to China.
In general, Japanese government loans to China have been given high
marks by their Chinese users because of low interest rates, the long repayment
periods, the accurate choice of projects, and good results. This is, of course, in
relation to China's other trading partners, such as the United States. A Chinese
trade journal duly acknowledges that these loans have played an active role in
China's economic construction.' However, there are also some problems. For
instance, at the time of writing, the appreciation of the Japanese yen over time has
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increased China's yen debt repayment burden. Since then, currency changes may
have dampened this effect to a certain extent, but the Chinese are clearly aware of
this type of economic interdependence problem that can impinge on their security
interests.
Economic assistance from Japan has also helped the Chinese leadership
sustain economic reform and China's opening to the Western world. Tokyo has
welcomed and supported Beijing's modernisation programme and open-door
policy since the early 1980s. At a global level, Japan is one of the major players in
international economic, financial and monetary institutions. Despite the continued
difficulty for Japan to play a political-military leadership role, Japan finds it easier
to expand its role in international organisations, in particular economic and
financial organisations." For instance, Japan is a very big contributor to aid
programmes in general and to the funding of the United Nations in particular."
The point here is that Japan can help China further its economic security, since
Tokyo has a certain level of influence in some international economic
organisations. For instance, Beijing can use Tokyo as a mediator in supporting
Chinese interests in organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Furthermore, China's dependence on Japanese capital and clout in
international economic organisations is further reinforced by the relative position
of the two countries in international banking organisations. China is the main
recipient of loans from the Asian Development Bank, which Japan now clearly
dominates. China is also one of the World Bank's biggest borrower, and the
World Bank is the single biggest source of foreign capital in China. While the
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United States probably remains the dominant force in the World Bank and has
even tried to cut off cheap loans to China before. Japan's presence is now
(officially at least) on a par with America. Specifically, the internal politics of the
World Bank may actually help China in the short run, as the extent of Japan's
interactions with the Chinese economy means that it is in Japan's own interests to
maintain the level of funding to China.' All these factors must be taken into
account in assessing China's long term economic security as Beijing continues to
open up.
Japan's influence's in the economic arena is further reinforced global trend
towards regional trading blocs, with each country perhaps more interested in its
economic activities in a particular region rather than the world as a whole. In this
light, a Chinese assessment emphasises that mutual dependence and co-operation
with Japan is becoming even more important today when the world economy is
moving toward regional trade blocs such as North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). 51 While some may dispute the claims
that regional trading blocs will become the most important form of economic
activity in the years to come, there is no question that this is a trend that
policymakers need to take into account, including those in China thinking about
economic security.
Japan's direct investment is also essential to China's development,
although this has been somewhat cautious compared to its trade relationship and
its official development assistance. To be precise, the percentage of Japan's
technology exports to China accounts for only a small proportion of total Japanese
direct investment throughout the rest of the world. This must be examined in the
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context that China needs foreign investment to develop its own resources in the
energy sector, including oil.
One Chinese assessment, for instance, questions how the Japanese can
underestimate the potential of the Chinese market, especially since other countries
look favourably on the potential market for investment that China presents, and
the European countries and the United States vie for it.' In reality, perhaps the
answer seems to lie in the fact that Beijing has problems managing its transition to
a capitalist economy, it has considerable constraints on capitalist activities, and
the uncertainty over the eventual success of the reforms have all tended to
discourage a more active participation from Japanese businessmen. China is also
interested in more technology transfer from Japan, given that science and
technology constitute a means for Beijing to achieve economic development. For
instance, Japan's refusal to transfer its more advanced technology, especially
technology that could be used to modernise China's military, raises suspicions
that Japan intends to prevent Beijing from increasing its military capability. Here,
we can detect a linkage between the economic and military aspects of China's
security.
However, more Japanese direct investment can have implications for the
security of China. When taking a long-term perspective, Beijing seems to have
mixed feelings about Japanese investment in China and other parts of Asia. The
Chinese leaders want technology and capital, but they are concerned about
Japanese domination of the Chinese and other Asian economies. This must be
understood in the light of China's aim to become an economic powerhouse,
possibly matching or even surpassing what Japan has achieved.
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The Chinese are particularly concerned that a series of economic policies,
including the careful deployment of foreign direct investment and official
development assistance, has given shape to a strategy that seeks to lay the basis
for a soft region-wide integration of economies under Japanese leadership. For
instance, Japanese firms have been successful at creating production and
distribution networks linking Asian economies and the consolidation of Japanese
corporations in other East Asian economies has made East Asia more of a single
structure, referred to by Leon Hollerman as Japan's "headquarters economy".'
This type of Japanese dominance in East Asia is likely to be perceived by most
Chinese leaders as an undesirable phenomenon. It reminds Beijing of the "East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" that the Japanese tried to impose during the Second
World War. The last thing that Beijing wants to see in Asia is Japan imposing its
economic dominance alongside possible military and political control. Although
this type of scenario is unlikely in the foreseeable future, the Chinese leaders are
nevertheless wary of any trends towards such a scenario. As explained earlier,
historical events play a huge role in shaping Chinese security thinking, none more
so than the Chinese experience of the Second World War.
In addition, China's dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands mentioned
earlier must be seen in terms of its search for economic resources. Therefore, it
appears that behind Chinese rhetoric regarding the Diaoyu Islands, the really
important issue is the legal jurisdiction over about 21,645 square kilometres of
continental shelf that is believed to hold up to 100 billion barrels of oil. China is,
after all, seeking to discover its own offshore oil to replace imports. 54 On a wider
scale, it is also likely that in the not too distant future, Japan and China may
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become competitors for economic resources in Asia." For instance, Barry Buzan
and Gerald Segal argue that Japan needs resources for its economy and its interest
in protecting "strategic waterways (oil routes) could increase the incentive to
intervene in other parts of East Asia"." The important thing for our analysis here
is that China is likely to adopt a firm posture on issues such as the Diaoyu Islands
dispute, since its economic security is apparently at stake.
In sum, the negative aspects of Japan's past have, to some extent, enable
China exploit them to its own advantage in terms of enhancing its economic
security. In order to achieve its modernisation goals, China has often attempted to
claim that Japan should give every possible kind of help in Beijing's ambitious
modernisation programme, in the light of Japan's historical debt to China.
However, this type of posture is beginning to come a full circle. It is also possible
to argue that as time progresses, a growing economic interdependence has
emerged between China and Japan, and this has, ironically, led to China curtailing
its criticism of Japan's past.'
Japan as a more "reliable" trading partner
Besides acting as a provider of loans to China, it is worth noting that Japan
is also viewed as a "more reliable" trading partner, especially when compared to
China's other major trading partner, the United States. This type of issue raises
the interplay between the economic and political dimensions of security. For
instance, unlike the United States, Japan has provided China with economic
assistance without completely linking it to human rights policies after the 1989
Tiananmen Incident. In the wake of the 1989 incident, protests from Tokyo were
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strong but brief and carefully phrased, somewhat different in tone from those of
western governments; Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu sought the understanding of
other Western leaders towards Japan's "special relationship" with China in July
1990, and soon thereafter announced the planned resumption of yen loans.' In
August 1991, Kaifu visited Beijing, the first head of state among the industrialised
nations to visit China since the Tiananmen Incident, marking the full restoration
of Sino-Japanese ties. His visit paved the way for a historic official visit by the
Japanese emperor and empress to China in October 1992, the first ever by a
Japanese monarch. President Jiang Zemin also made the first outside visit by a
top-ranking Chinese official after the Tiananmen Incident when he went to Japan
during that year. To the Chinese, the above Japanese actions suggest that trading
with Tokyo has the advantage that political considerations tend to be given less
emphasis.
Furthermore, to a certain extent, Japan's policy of engagement towards
China has also shaped the China polices of the Western industrialised states.59
Indeed, one may argue that subsequent improvement in Sino-Japanese relations
after the sanctions were lifted, as well as the improvement of relations between
China and Western Europe spurred the United States to change its sanctions
standpoint and improve relations with China. China knows that, as long as it does
not appear to threaten Tokyo's security interests directly, Japan appears willing to
support the current regime in Beijing no matter what the other western countries'
view of human rights may entail. This issue of human rights, which essentially
affects China's political security, will be given a more detailed treatment in
Chapter 7.
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To be sure, the Japanese policy regarding trade with China suits the
official line of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese leadership clearly does
not want market reforms to be followed by political reforms, in which the people
and organised interests might replace the dominant role of the party. To a certain
extent, the party leadership believes that the authoritarian political system based
on the leadership of the communist party is the only way forward, which
incidentally in some ways resembles the Japanese mode of development, with
strong state control and intervention in the economy. With regard to the Japanese
mode of development, China may be able to learn from some of Japan's
experiences in economic modernisation.
However, although Japan appears as a "reliable" trading partner, it is also
clear that Japanese sanctions can hit China severely. The notion of economic
security is a tricky one. Increasing trading links with the world economy can also
give raise to new problems for China. For example, China is bound to be more
vulnerable to economic sanctions as its economy becomes increasingly
interdependent with the Japanese economy and the world economy in general.
Given that the Chinese are among the most ardent proponents of the doctrine of
state sovereignty, the leaders will find if difficult coming to terms with the
interdependence of the modern world.' This is especially so if it means that the
Chinese leaders have to accept that Beijing's security can at least be affected by
crises in the world and regional economies, for instance. Fortunately for these
leaders, China has not really been hit by the full force of the Asian financial crisis.
At the same time, it is also true to say that interdependence in the global
economy can also give China more options in its trade strategy. By adopting the
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strategy of trading its markets for capital and technology, China hopes that the
products of the United States, Japan and all countries will compete in its huge
market. As one Chinese scholar observes, "China can use Japan as a balance to
the US investment and China is happy to see a contest between Japan and the
United States for market share" because this "creates a strategic triangle that only
gives China more choices"." China can engage Japan as a hedge against the
United States becoming too dominant. For its part, Beijing seeks to achieve a
balance between its reliance on Japanese capital and technology and its other
economic relations with countries such as the United States.
China's security in relation Japan is also mediated by a much broader
strategic economic relationship, of which the Yellow Sea Rim is a component.
For instance, there are prospects of Japan and South Korea co-operating in the
Yellow Sea Rim to develop a strategic leverage over China in the long run. At
present, this does not appear likely owing to the interests that govern the bilateral
relationship between China and South Korea, as well as China and Japan. Neither
Japan nor South Korea can currently afford to subjugate their multiple priorities
with China to the point where they would make joint demands for mutual political
or economic goals. As Gerald Segal notes, "China and its provinces have much
more leverage and opportunity to play off one partner against the other [in this
Natural Economic Territories (NET)] than in any other [of China's] NETs".'
Perhaps most importantly, China and Japan share an interest in
maintaining regional stability to promote economic growth. The Chinese realise
that both economies rely heavily on the Asia Pacific region as a whole, which in
turn needs co-operation between China and Japan.' To bolster regional security,
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Beijing even started the first ever bilateral security talks at Tokyo's initiative in
December 1993, as both sides seek arms-reduction and confidence building
measures in the region." Both sides also share an interest in a stable and peaceful
Korean peninsula and Japan has even hinted at exploiting its enormous economic
resources in inducing conciliatory changes in North Korea." As for the Chinese,
former Premier Li Peng has indicated the China would like Japan to normalise
relations with North Korea. 66 This can only contribute to stability on the Korean
peninsula, which will be conducive to China's ongoing economic growth, as
discussed in the earlier chapter. However, in beginning the process of turning the
region's stability into a closer community, China and Japan will have to "work
out their relationship's formidable security problems, just as France and Germany
did forty years ago". 67 However, it is also clear that Japan's ultimate interest is
either to avoid internal instability and chaos in China or to avoid fostering a China
that is a strong military power threatening its neighbours."
Above all, China's strong interest in Northeast Asian stability is reinforced
by Japan's alliance with the United States. This provides an indispensable basis
for stability in the region at a time of uncertainty in the strategic landscape.
Beijing's primary interest is to maintain a stable East Asia in order to sustain its
economic growth, and Japan can contribute to this by continuing Tokyo's




Japan has an important role to play in relation to China's security interests
in the post-Cold War era. On the whole, Japan seems to enhance China's security
interests more than it poses as a threat. This is partly because any potential
manifestation of an aggressive Japanese foreign policy has hitherto been kept in
check by the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In this regard, the United States
can play a role in restraining the ascendancy of Japan into a regional hegemon and
function as a check on any potential expansion of Japanese military power. Hence,
from China's perspective, the future development of the US-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty is important. In the meantime, the China seems satisfied with
manoeuvring between Japan and the United States in another "strategic triangle",
for this will give China time to develop its economy and build up its military
power.
To build up its economy and enhance its economic security, China needs
Japan's assistance. China derives economic benefits from trading with Japan,
especially in terms of capital loans. By using the "debt of history" as an
argument, China has pressed for considerable Japanese contributions to its
economic development. Furthermore, since Tokyo is less likely to link economic
issues to human rights, Japan is regarded by China as a more reliable trading
partner. Moreover, Tokyo's continuing alliance with the United States bolsters
regional stability, helping to sustain a stable regional environment that will give
China the space to build up its economic base. This will be a springboard for
China to achieve truly great power status, after which Beijing will be able to cope
with any future Japanese threats on its own.
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CHAPTER 6: THE TAIWAN ISSUE
This chapter looks at the Taiwan issue in relation to China's security
interests. At the time of writing, Taiwan remains an unresolved security issue for
China. This chapter looks at the challenge to China's military and political
security posed by the "Taiwan independence" movement, and its connection to
foreign involvement in Beijing's eyes. This is followed by an examination of
China's economic interests in relation to Taiwan, which to some extent have
gained greater prominence in recent years.
Political and military security
For China's leaders, the issue of Taiwan has been high on their security
agenda since 1949. First and foremost, Taiwan is still regarded by China as a
renegade province and more importantly, China has never renounced the use of
force to reincorporate Taiwan under its rule. This might appear strange to Western
observers, in a world where the unilateral use of force in international relations
has lost some credibility as an instrument of foreign policy. This chapter attempts
to give insights on the Taiwan issue from the perspective of China's security
interests, and it will be argued that Taiwan represents a military, political and
even economic security threat to China.
First, we need to begin by analysing China's political and military security
in relation to the growing challenge of the "Taiwan independence" movement.
The term "Taiwan independence" is a straightforward translation from the term
taidu in Mandarin. Chronologically, the ascendancy of the "Taiwan
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independence" movement roughly coincided with the end of the Cold War and it
partly resulted from the democratisation of Taiwan's domestic politics, associated
with a new generation of political leaders such as President Lee Teng-hui. For
example, in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan elections in December 1989,
independence became an issue in the contest. There is no doubt that greater
political liberalisation has encouraged the discussion of the "Taiwan
independence" issue in the island republic. Perhaps the critical moment, as far as
China is concerned, came in October 1991, when the pro-independence
opposition party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to prominence in
Taiwanese politics and adopted a resolution calling for an independent Republic
of Taiwan, which ran counter to China's goal of reunification. The legalisation of
the advocacy of Taiwan independence and gains by the DPP were interpreted by
Beijing as a security threat. As recently as November 1997, following the DPP's
resounding win in mayoral and county chief elections, Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-
bian said that the DPP would not revise its pro-independence party platform and
indicated that they would hold a referendum on the future of Taiwan".'
However, the DPP has since softened its stance on the independence issue.
The closer the DPP came to assuming political power in Taiwan, the greater the
difficulty the internal consensus towards Taiwanese independence. For example,
DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang has said that "Taiwan is already a de facto
independent sovereign country" and added that "it is far more practical to protect
Taiwan's current independent status than to advocate the establishment a de jure
independent Taiwan republic"! Although he will not revise the DPP commitment
to "promoting Taiwan independence", which is enshrined in the party platform, he
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has said that this principle will serve only as a symbol of the party's basic stance.
This appears to be a departure from the outright pro-independence stance adopted
by the DPP when it first emerged as a force in Taiwan politics. This has led to the
party splitting on the issue. Most recently, a new party, the Independence Party,
was formed by ex-DPP members who favour outright independence. Hence, the
concept of Taiwan independence itself is incoherent and can mean different things
to different people at different times.
As for President Lee Teng-hui of the ruling Kuomintang, it is worth noting
that Beijing initially did not regard him as an advocate of "Taiwan independence".
Lee, who became president in 1990, has generally adopted a centralist position
between the extremes of independence advocated by the DPP and unification
preached by the right- wing New Party, attempting to manoeuvre between the two
extremes by maintaining the status quo and promoting peaceful coexistence. It
was his actions in recent years, in particular those linked to the involvement of the
United States, that led the Chinese leaders to associate him with the "Taiwan
independence" movement. The involvement of the United States is extremely
important and will be analysed in a later section. As for President Lee Teng-hui,
China accused him and his party of encouraging the "fallacy of Taiwan
independence":
the Taiwan authorities have, in effect, abetted this fallacy with their own
policy of rejecting peace negotiations, restricting interchanges across the
strait and lobbying for "dual recognition" or "two Chinas" in the
international arena.'
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More specifically, China's People's Liberation Army has stated that it will
not "sit idle" over the "Taiwan independence" threat and has, in all aspects,
indicated its preparedness and willingness to reunify China and complete what it
regards as the "the final phase of the Chinese Civil War.' On the Taiwanese side,
according to the Ministry of Defence in Taipei, there are six possible situations in
which Beijing may invade the island; namely:
if and when the island declares itself "independent";
if and when an internal upheaval occurs on the island;
- if and when Taiwan's armed forces become comparatively weaker;
- if and when any foreign powers interfere in Taiwan's internal affairs;
- if and when Taiwan protractedly refuses to talk with Beijing about the
issue of unification; and
- if and when Taiwan goes nuclear.'
From the above analysis, it is clear that the "Taiwanese independence"
movement, whether which interpretation one adopts, is regarded as an affront to
China's security policymakers. At the same time, one must be aware that outside
Taiwan, the largest pressure group seeking to influence Taiwan's internal political
development is the Chinese leadership.' By its threat to use force to reunify
Taiwan, Beijing has inevitably limited Taiwan's options for future policies, while
it seeks to achieve its security goal of incorporating Taiwan under its rule. In
short, the "Taiwan independence" challenge is generated by the evolution of
168
Taiwanese politics as much as it is constrained or accelerated by the foreign
policy of China. Having outlined the concept of "Taiwan independence" we can
now turn to the challenges this movement has posed to the political security of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Political legitimacy
In terms of issues relating to the political security of the Chinese
Communist Party, Taiwan is critical. The fact that the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has done much damage to the legitimacy of
the Chinese Communist Party has already been discussed in Chapter 3. Since the
demise of communism has seriously crippled one of the moral-philosophical
bases of organising Chinese society, Chinese leaders need to compensate for the
erosion of their political legitimacy. The Chinese leaders may look to nationalism
as a possible solution and the Taiwan issue is a suitable arena for this to be
expressed. Nationalism over Taiwan, especially linked with anti-imperialism, is
summed up best by the term "reunification of the motherland" and could be used
to unite the masses in China, especially since the United States is embroiled in
this issue.
Moreover, nationalism is a sentiment shared by Chinese on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait, given past Japanese occupation on the island. China's leaders
are aware that nationalism is a political resource that can be used to arouse
Taiwan's masses as well. For instance, on the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of
Shimoneseki, China reacted strongly to the claims by certain sections of the
Democratic Progressive Party that China had "betrayed" the Taiwanese in 1895
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when Taiwan was ceded to the victorious Japanese after 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese
War. An article in Renmin Ribao accused the proponents of Taiwan independence
of "distorting history" as the theoretical basis for advocating independence, and
criticised them for praising Japanese colonial rule, adding that they were a
disgrace to the Taiwanese people'. By praising the Taiwanese resistance to
Japanese occupation, Beijing hoped to arouse the nationalistic feelings of the
Taiwanese people and weaken support for the "Taiwan independence" advocates.
Perhaps equally important, Chinese leaders aim to heighten the awareness of a
rising Japan in East Asia, which may pose a threat to its security, as the previous
chapter had detailed. Therefore, the importance of the Taiwan issue is that this is
related to nationalism, which in turn is linked to China's political security.
Nationalism in its anti-imperialist mode is particularly useful in its function as the
glue holding the Chinese state together and appealing to the Taiwanese masses.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise when China, in its efforts to push
forward its concept of "one country, two systems", has adopted a more moderate
stance since January 1979. Specifically, Beijing has sought to appeal to the
Taiwanese people, as part of its plan to bolster its political security in relation to
the masses at home, as well as the masses in Taiwan. Included under this new
stance is the notion of Taiwan as a special administration region of China. Taiwan
will be able to preserve its own social and economic system and maintain a more
democratic form of government than the rest of the China; a degree of autonomy
would be provided in internal affairs and Taiwan could even have the right to
maintain its own armed forces.
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In this vein, China is also very careful to point out that the advocates of
"Taiwan independence" constitute only a minority of the Taiwanese people.
Beijing has in fact stated:
It should be affirmed that the desire of Taiwan compatriots to run their own
affairs of the island as masters of their own house is reasonable and
justified. This should by no means be construed as advocating "Taiwan
independence". They are radically distinct from a handful of people who
follow the road towards "Taiwan independence".8
Beijing has stressed that this "handful" does not represent the majority of the
Taiwanese people, and is very careful to note the difference between people in
Taiwan and the "handful" who advocate independence. President Jiang Zemin
himself assured the Taiwanese people that "reunification does not mean that the
mainland will swallow up Taiwan". 9
 Similarly, the former premier, Li Peng,
assured the Taiwanese masses that "China's right to the use of force" is not
directed at the Taiwanese people but at foreign forces interfering in China's
reunification and at the forces of "Taiwanese independence".'
China is careful to present itself as a tolerant and benign government to the
Taiwanese as it hopes to take over the country eventually. It wants to win the
hearts and minds of the Taiwanese masses and present itself as a good
government. This is an indication of the importance of political security, for the
ruling party on the mainland wants to enhance its political legitimacy, and this
policy is also being applied to Chinese across the Taiwan Strait as well. During
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the 1996 presidential elections, when China conducted military exercises in the
waters close to Taiwan, Vice Premier Qian Qichen told the Taiwanese people not
to "panic over military exercises" and should, instead, worry about the fact that
"independence-seekers, with support from some international forces bent on
splitting China", will "continue on their wrong path"."
Furthermore, in its bid to undermine Taiwan's political security, Beijing
has also cast doubt on the political legitimacy of the Kuomintang. For example,
China is keen to remind the Taiwanese people of the brutal actions of the
Kuomintang on February 28, 1947 when it first imposed its rule on the island.
Chiang Kai-shek's troops launched a brutal crackdown on the native Taiwanese
protesters who demanded political reforms to root out autocracy and corruption in
the Kuomintang government. In 1996, on the 49th anniversary of that incident, a
commentary in the Renmin Ribao viewed the incident in that year as the
expression of the democratic political movement of the Taiwanese people and
criticised the Kuomintang for its violent suppression: 2 In addition Beijing will be
keen to remind the Taiwanese people that the Chinese Communist Party came to
power in 1949 as an advocate of human rights over the corrupt dictatorship of the
Kuomintang: 3 It is clear this is an attempt by China to exploit remaining
suspicions between the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders, who came to
Taiwan in the 1940s. In its bid to discredit the legitimacy of the Kuomintang, the
Chinese Communist Party is seeking to enhance its own political security in the
process. From the above analysis, it is safe to say that the importance of political
security to China, as far as Taiwan is concerned, should not be underestimated.
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Apart from the Kuomintang, the current opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) has also been targeted as China seeks to bolster its
political security and undermine Taiwan's at the same time. For instance, China
accused the DPP of attempts to disrupt the Ku-Wang talks, an unofficial
consultation between China and Taiwan first held in Singapore in 1993. A Xinhua
new agency commentary said that the DPP's activities fundamentally ran "counter
to the will of the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots" and could not enjoy
popular support.' It criticised the DPP for attempting to become "closed-door
emperors", that is, gaining power by sowing dissension between the Taiwanese.
Beijing aimed to show the self-interests of the Democratic Progressive Party in
pursuing independence, with the aim of discrediting the Taiwanese opposition
because which China deemed it might become a major political and perhaps
eventually military threat.
Isolating Taiwan
At a global level, China has sought to discredit Taiwan's leaders by
adopting measures aimed at isolating the island republic. Of course, all these are
done with the objective of bolstering Beijing's political security and undermining
Taipei's. As for negating Taiwan's political legitimacy in the international arena,
Beijing has systematically sought to eliminate attempts by Taiwan to present itself
as an independent state. This is in line with China's strict adherence to the
principle of state sovereignty in international relations, which were enunciated in
its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference into each other's internal
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affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It can be further
argued that nowhere are these Five Principles more emphasised than in the case of
Taiwan. Beijing has always insisted that most countries have recognised Beijing,
not Taipei since 1972 after the switch of recognition by the United States. Beijing
has also referred to formal agreements such as the Cairo Declaration and the
Potsdam Proclamation made by the major powers during the Second World War,
which stated that Taiwan should be "restored to China". 15 (see previous chapter)
China knows that in international relations, recognition of a state or
government has been commonly regarded as crucial for the entity's legitimacy
and status. Since the concept of external sovereignty means that independent
states are treated as equals in the international arena, Taiwan must therefore be
denied the status of an independent state. To a certain extent, Beijing has achieved
this goal of strengthening its political security on the international front, vis-à-vis
Taiwan. From 1972, Taiwan's diplomatic status in the world declined
accordingly. For all intents and purposes, Taiwan was marginalised in world
politics and reduced to the status of a pariah state from 1972 to the end of the
1980s. China has thus enhanced its political security at the expense of Taiwan.
China also rejects any comparison between the reunification with Taiwan
and German reunification or Korean reunification, arguing that each of the two
Germany's and the two Koreas have been independent and sovereign states. In
Beijing's eyes, Taiwan never existed as an independent and sovereign state.
Furthermore, Beijing is against giving Taiwan "any international living space"
such as representations in international organisations. Asserting that Taiwan has
no legitimacy, Beijing argues that Taipei should not be permitted to join the
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United Nations.' In this regard, Taiwan was criticised for engaging in "dollar
diplomacy" in the attempt to buy votes in the United Nations, as a Xinhua news
agency commentary accused President Lee Teng-hui of offering other states
portions of Taiwan's one billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves in exchange
for their support."
However, it must be noted that, in contrast to the China, Taiwan has
pressed its claims to legitimacy in the world community by stressing its
identification with global trends towards democratisation and capitalism, as noted
by George Yu and David Longenecker.' Today, Taiwan has moved away from
its Kuomintang-dominated authoritarian political system and has adopted
democracy. It is also worth noting that the United States, has played a role in
Taiwan's democratisation.' For example, the US Congress conducted hearings
on the Kuomintang's human rights abuses in Taiwan and the continuance of
martial law in the 1980s. The former president, Chiang Ching-kuo, eventually
lifted martial law in July 1987 and removed the ban on the formation of new
political parties. Recently, President Lee Teng-hui has maintained that China will
continue to undergo "peaceful evolution" because of the democratisation of
Taiwan, emphasising that "what communist China fears most is the
democratisation of Taiwan".' This type of linkage is seen by the Chinese as
more threatening, as Chapter 7 on "peaceful evolution" will argue. A more
democratic Taiwan gains more recognition in international relations and
simultaneously undermines China's seemingly illiberal political system.
For our purposes here, Taiwan's move toward democracy means that it is
bound to gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of the international community,
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particularly in the West. Clearly, this constitutes another basis that can be used by
the "Taiwan independence" advocates to further their cause, a danger that has to
be stopped as far as China's security is concerned. After all, the Tiananmen
Incident in 1989 had brought out the contrast between the two political systems
across the Taiwan Strait. China is bound to have growing fears of the gradual
acceptance of Taiwan as an independent state by the international community.
That will definitely be a setback to Beijing's objective of reincorporating Taiwan
under its rule.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Beijing has adopted a tough stance
against countries that recognise Taiwan. For example, between July 1989 and July
1991, Taiwan gained recognition by Grenada, Liberia, Belize, Lesotho, Guinea-
Bissau, Nicaragua and the Central African Republic; and China withdrew its
embassies in these countries within weeks of each event.' The latest achievement
for Beijing in its attempt to isolate Taiwan politically took place on January 1,
1998 when South African severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and
normalised its ties with China.' Perhaps most importantly, in Northeast Asia,
Beijing has succeeded in making Taiwan lose an important friend when it
established relations with South Korea in 1992 (as Chapter 4 has stated). This was
a huge blow to Taipei, which lost its biggest remaining ally in the region. From
the above, the consistency in its approach shows the uncompromising attitude
China in denying Taiwan external political legitimacy. By negating Taiwan's
external political legitimacy, China is enhancing its own, which is vital to
Beijing's political security.
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Therefore, adhering to the strict notion of sovereignty, China is only
willing to accept ties with Taiwan on an "unofficial" basis, such as in the form of
the Ku-Wang talks held in April 1993. President Jiang Zemin himself described
these talks as representing "an important, historic step forward in the relations
between the two sides", facilitating the quasi-official framework for further cross-
strait exchanges.' Wang Daohan of China's Association for Relations across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Ku Chenfu of Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation
(SEF) met in Singapore and three limited agreements were reached.24
Nevertheless, the "unofficial" nature of the meeting reflects Beijing's refusal to
treat Taiwan as an equal sovereign state. An interesting point to note is that,
recently, China has also stressed that communication channels between Beijing
and Taiwan need not be necessarily limited to the ARATS and SEF." China
wants to achieve reunification, but not at the expense of giving up its sovereignty.
To Beijing, Taiwan is still regarded as part of China, and Taiwan must never be
treated as a sovereign state by other nations.
China wants to see the return of Taiwan under its rule, just as the British
colony of Hong Kong did in July 1997, and the Portuguese of Macao will in 1999.
This is in line with the rationale between the "one country, two systems"
approach. The latter concept was indeed invented in the context of the Taiwan
issue. China is adamant to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, lest the stable
environment is threatened or any foreign powers might take the opportunity to
interfere in Taiwan in the post-Cold War era. The most important foreign power
in question is none other than the United States, which will also occupy our
attention in the next two chapters.
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Foreign involvement: The United States
Of Taiwan's relations with other states, none is as important as that with the
United States. The Taiwan-US linkage is an important determinant of China's
foreign policies in general and those pertaining bilaterally to Taiwan and the
United States in particular. With the Soviet threat diminished and the American
commitment in East Asia seemingly reduced, it is plausible to argue that this is
the best time for China to incorporate Taiwan under its rule. However, the counter
argument could be made that in the post-Cold War world, the United States can
now be more accommodating to Taiwan's interests, as noted by Harry Harding.'
This line of argument posits that China is needed less a strategic ally by the
United States against Russia, for instance. At the same time, it appears that
Taiwan is equally confident the United States can be more supportive of its
policies.
As noted previously, the ascendancy of the "Taiwan independence"
challenge coincided with the end of the Cold War and the concomitant American
dominance in the post-Cold War era. Given China's concern with US
involvement in Taiwan, the Renmin Ribao has accused the "Taiwan
independence" protagonists of soliciting foreign support, claiming that these
people "vilely rely on foreign patronage in a vain attempt to detach Taiwan from
China":
Certain foreign forces that do not want to see reunified China have gone out
of their way to meddle in China's internal affairs. They support the anti-
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Communist stance of the Taiwan authorities of rejecting peace talks and
abet the secessionists on the island, thereby erecting barriers to China's
peaceful reunification and seriously wounding the national feelings of the
Chinese people.'
Similarly, an editorial by Renmin Ribao in March 1996 warned "some foreign
meddlers not in interfere in China's internal affairs". 28 While the tone may appear
propagandistic, there is no doubt that Beijing is warning the Chinese people of
possible foreign intervention in its internal affairs. The call to oppose "certain
foreign forces" has a nationalist tone that will accord with many Chinese who are
keen to erase the painful memories of China's "century of humiliation". It is also
an indication that the fear of foreign involvement is present among the Chinese
leaders, lest Beijing's political and military security is threatened.
Of course, among the "foreign forces", the United States is seen as the key
supporter aiding the cause of "Taiwan independence". To be sure, the Chinese
regards this as a continuation of American involvement in Taiwan, which dates
back to the 1945-1949 Chinese Civil War. The Chinese communists had been
prevented from gaining control over Taiwan. The outbreak of the Korean War
was in many ways the catalyst for American support to the Taiwanese under the
Kuomintang, and the support was later further extended when the United States
sustained Taiwan's existence by the 1954 Mutual Security Pact, which placed
"China's Taiwan province under US protection". 29 Till this day, most of the
Chinese leaders still regard this as an infringement on China's security and
sovereignty.
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Although the Mutual Security Pact was subsequently abrogated following
Sino-American rapprochement, it was replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) of April 1979, which assured a continuing American interest in Taiwan's
security. Since then, the TRA has remained a thorn in China's flesh, for it
included the US commitment to sell "defensive arms" to Taiwan. This is viewed
by Beijing as a threat to its military security.
Therefore, is came as no surprise, when in February 1996, Beijing stated
that US arms sales to Taiwan were a "most sensitive area" of Sino-American
relations.' In the recent past, Chinese leaders were outraged in September 1992,
when the Bush administration approved the sale of up to one hundred and fifty F-
1 6s fighter planes to Taiwan. The Chinese claimed that his actions contradicted
the 1972 Sino-American agreement limiting arms sale to Taiwan. More
generally, China has always reiterated that the 1972 Shanghai communiqués form
the basis of Sino-American relations. The Chinese are keen to point out that the
United States, in 1972, had acknowledged:
All Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but
one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The US government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in
mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces
and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will
progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the
tension in the area diminishes.'
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Hence, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu has stated that the US arm sales
to Taiwan in 1992 amount to an interference in China's internal affairs that
"obstructs and undermines the great cause of China's peaceful reunification".32
The Renmin Ribao was stronger in its accusation, describing the US actions as "a
concrete manifestation of hegemonism and power politics", accusing Washington
of wanting to separate Taiwan from China once and for all and take Taiwan as an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" against China." As far as military security is
concerned, any strengthening of Taiwan's military capabilities is regarded by
Beijing as a threat. Besides enhancing the military capabilities of Taiwan, the US
arm sales is also seen as an encouragement to the "Taiwan independence"
movement.
In addition, former president George Bush's actions appeared to have
shattered the international taboo on major arms sales to the island republic.
Washington's move was followed shortly by the decision of French companies to
sell sixty Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters to Taiwan. The Xinhua news agency
described the move as having "seriously encroached on China's sovereignty" and
"undermined China's great cause - peaceful reunification". 34 From the Western
perspective, one likely explanation could be defence contracts were shrinking in
the Western countries at that time and wealthy Taiwan had become one of the
major potential markets for Western defence industries. To the Chinese, the
Taiwanese will become more confident to pursue independence with continuing
arms supplies from the West. Therefore, it is evident, in Chinese eyes, that any
foreign involvement in Taiwan, in addition to that of the lone superpower, is
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regarded as an acute security concern. China's leaders are bound to view foreign
arms sales to Taiwan as a serious political and, perhaps, military threat.
Furthermore, in relation to China's military security, a Xinhua news
agency commentary actually accused President Lee Teng-hui of using military
build-ups to support independence moves, alleging that Lee had sent his followers
to foreign countries to purchase arms, while noting that "Taiwan still maintains a
wartime military structure and its annual military spending accounts for a very
high percentage of its total budget". 35 In Beijing's eyes, Taiwan's increasing
military capabilities have emboldened the advocates of "Taiwan independence".
Although one may argue that the possibilities of Taiwan actually attacking China
are remote, it is safe to say that a Taiwan with stronger military capabilities is
bound to act in a bolder manner and could in this way threaten China's political
security.
China is also concerned about President Lee's overtures to Washington. A
key event was the Taiwanese president's visit to the United States in June 1995.
President Lee Teng-hui's unofficial visit to his alma mater, Cornell University,
with US permission, caused concern among Chinese leaders. Although the signals
emanating from Beijing to Taipei before the visits were apparently quite
ambiguous, Beijing on the whole perceived that the United States had implicitly
encouraged this move. An article in the Renmin Ribao has warned the United
States that the Taiwan issue is "a barrel of explosive gunpowder" and concluded
that "whether it is the United States or Lee Teng-hui, beyond a certain limit, those
playing with fire will be burned". 36 Equating the Taiwan issue with national
unification and territorial integrity, China has added that the "safeguarding of
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national unification and territorial integrity is more important than anything else,
far more important than Sino-US relations"?' While some Western analysts may
dismiss these strong words as mere rhetoric, it is important to note that President
Lee's policy, which Beijing interpreted as a drift towards independence, does not
seem to give the Chinese much room for manoeuvre. China had to respond in
some way because Taiwan is a prime security concern. Despite the importance of
its relations with the last remaining superpower, Beijing did not hesitate to
maintain a firm stance on the Taiwan issue.
Another article in the Renmin Ribao even regarded President Lee as the
"puppet" of the US "double-dealing policy", which consists of "active exchanges"
in a bid to open China's market and to influence China's future development; and
"multiple aspect obstructions" in order to build up rivalries around China's
borders and to "stir up" China's internal affairs. In short, Lee's visit to America
was seen as an "inevitable move on the US strategic chessboard"?' It was viewed
by Beijing as part of the US strategy to cope with a rising China in the post-Cold
War era. Taiwan is intricately linked and entwined to China's perception of the
United States. This is linked to the alleged attempt by the United States to
"contain" China, a subject further explored in Chapter 8.
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui himself suffered a string of verbal
attacks from the Chinese. His speech in the United States, which was interpreted
as implicitly suggesting that Taiwan should become an independent sovereign
state, was strongly criticised by Beijing. Renmin Ribao denounced this as a
manifestation of "Taiwan independence" by publishing four commentaries on
successive days criticising him. The first commentary accused him of driving a
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wedge in Sino-American relations and thus playing into the hands of certain
people in the United States. President Lee's desire to enhance relations between
Taiwan and United States was cited as appealing to these people in America who
disregarded the Shanghai communiqués in an attempt to turn Taiwan into an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" against China." The second commentary warned that
there would be no "international living space" for Taiwan independence, adding
that Lee's purpose to present Taiwan as a sovereign state to the international
community would only lead Taiwan down a "blind alley'''. The third
commentary accused him of using the concept of popular sovereignty as a
"political hallucinogen" and charged him with misusing this concept to justify the
theoretical basis for Taiwan independence. 4I The fourth commentary outrightly
condemned Lee Teng-hui as guilty of causing the retrogression in relations
between China and Taiwan that had become more relaxed.' While one may
dismiss the propaganda tones of these articles, it is important to view them in the
context of wider security issues faced by China.
Linking to wider security issues, Lee Teng-hui's visit in 1995 seemed to
indicate that nature of American intentions towards China and the potential
damage these intentions could cause to China's security in the long run. There
were those in China who opposed the Americans and those who favoured
continuing relations with the US but to "reserve differences while seeking
common ground". 43 From the above, it is clear that even a "private visit" by the
Taiwanese president to America is perceived by the Chinese as an acute security
concern. President Lee's visit appears to signify a certain degree of acceptance
184
and recognition of Taiwan by the United States, and Beijing is worried that the
rest of the world may eventually follow suit.
Having analysed Beijing's underlying apprehension to this visit, it
therefore comes as no surprise that the Chinese responded to event of June 1995
with a show of force. From July 21-26, 1995, the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) launched six guided surface-to-surface missiles at targets in the East China
Sea. These military exercises was apparently aimed at demonstrating that the
PLA was determined and capable of "guarding national sovereignty and territorial
integrity" and "defending the unity of China".' They indicated China's
determination to deter any independence tendencies in Taiwan in the aftermath of
President Lee's US visit. These military manoeuvres also amounted to telling the
Americans not to interfere in China's internal affairs, that is, Taiwan. They were,
above all, a symbolic demonstration of military force to vindicate China's security
interests in relation to the Taiwan issue.
A further indications of what some might call sabre rattling was also
evident in the run-up to the Taiwanese presidential elections in March 1996.
China conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Although Beijing
asserted that the exercises were routine, it was widely regarded as an indication
that China was worried over the result of the election, and more specifically that
this might entail a more daring policy on Taiwan independence. China's military
security also appeared to be directly at stake at that time when the United States
sent its aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in a bid to counter Beijing's bullying
tactics. One of the top leaders, Li Peng, characterised the tense situation "as a
serious consequence resulting from the activities of some leaders of the Taiwan
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authorities who go for 'Taiwan independence' overtly and frequently on the island
and in the international arena"." Although some may argue that the United States
was merely showing its "commitment" to Taiwan and China's military security
was not directly in danger, it is worth noting that such incidents have often acted
catalysts for actual conflicts. Hence, knowing that the Chinese have always
regarded Taiwan as a major security issue, such incidents are actually more
serious than they look.
To be sure, the Chinese foreign ministry further condemned the resolution
passed by the House of Representatives, which stated that "the United States
should help to defend Taiwan"." Specifically, China warned that sending aircraft
carriers to the Taiwan Strait would be dangerous if the "Taiwan authorities
interpret the US government's actions as its support and encouragement for their
activities to split China".47
As for the Taiwanese presidential candidates, it came as no surprise when
China criticised them harshly, allegedly for pursuing Taiwan independence in
different ways and to different extents. For instance, an article in the Renmin
Ribao argued that the political views of President Lee Teng-hui and his views on
Taiwan's future actually derived from Peng Ming-min, presidential candidate of
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, who was once exiled from Taiwan
for openly preaching Taiwan independence." Essentially, China viewed the entire
election process as a platform for "Taiwan independence" and thus severely
criticised the Taiwanese politicians of all parties. Underneath it all, China was
extremely concerned about what this might mean to its security interests.
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Although, in 1996, China could not deter voters in Taiwan from
supporting the eventual winner President Lee Teng-hui, Beijing once again
demonstrated its determination to undermine the "Taiwan independence" process
by a military show of force and verbal attacks on Taiwanese politicians, in order
to counter what it perceives as a threat to its military and political security.
China's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a reaffirmation its stance, stressing that
"changing the way Taiwan leaders are chosen and the results of this change
cannot alter the fact that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory".' While this reaction
is to be expected from the Chinese, it is also important to note that Beijing is
concerned about whether any new political leadership in Taiwan might further
threaten its security interests.
In addition, one important ramification resulting from the military
exercises was that it gave an actual indication of China's military capabilities. In
reality, China's armed forces did not perform particularly well in their military
exercises, for they had problems operating in bad weather. It became quite
obvious just how far still China is behind the United States' in terms of military
capabilities. This type of feedback is bound to raise some military security
concerns for Chinese defence planners, in addition to the political security
concerns often associated with the "Taiwan independence" challenge.
Apart from the United States, Japan's alleged involvement in the Taiwan
issue has also come under China's scrutiny. For instance, the Chinese were very
concerned when, in August 1997, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku
Kajiyama declared that the "surrounding areas" covered by Japan-US
collaboration "should include the Taiwan Strait"; this was regarded by the
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Chinese as the first time that a top Japanese official had openly interfered in
Chinese affairs since normalisation of relations. 5° China was very wary of any
deviation from Tokyo's pledge to honour its "one China" policy. Later, during his
visit to Japan in November 1997, Chinese leader Li Peng commented on the new
"Japan-US Defence Co-operation Guidelines", saying that he accepted the
Japanese interpretation but thought that the explanation would have been more
satisfactory if Prime Minister Hashimoto had added that the Japan-US security
pact did not include Taiwan.' On his part, Hashimoto then sought to calm
Chinese nerves by assuring that the Japan-US security pact would not conflict the
Sino—Japanese joint statement and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in
1972.
Perhaps a more important Chinese interpretation of the new "Guidelines"
was published on September 23, 1997 by the think-tank, China Strategy and
Administration Research Society. It was pointed out that Taiwan was the most
controversial concept of "periphery" among the countries mentioned in the
"Guidelines", , for the Chinese interpreted the "peripheral state of affairs" as
actually including the Taiwan Strait.' It was argued that Japan and the United
States had intentionally done this with the purpose of forming a strategic line of
deterrence joining South Korea, Taiwan and Nansha Islands (Spratlys) and they
were also scheming "to leave leeway for expanding the scope of military actions
in the future".
From the analysis above, it is quite evident that the Chinese are concerned
about the increasing role Japan might play in the US-Japan alliance in the future,
specifically if this is to be linked to the Taiwan issue. In Chinese eyes, Japanese
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involvement in Taiwan will invariably magnify the threat Taiwan already
supposedly poses to China's security.
As for the Chinese leaders, on the whole, one might argue that active
military pressures on the "Taiwan independence" movement, as distinct from
threats, do not appear to be a very promising option. A major international crisis
will almost certainly erupt and possible American military intervention may
follow. Most important of all, an unstable political environment would have
catastrophic consequences for China's economic modernisation drive, thereby
hindering its drive to global power status in the twenty-first century. We can now
turn explore China's economic interests in relation to Taiwan in greater detail.
Economic security and Taiwan
In general, major arguments against China initiating a conflict over
Taiwan lie in Beijing's economic interests in relation to Taipei. As argued in the
previous chapters, the top priorities of China's leaders are to feed its continuing
economic growth and raise the people's standard of living. In order to do, China
needs resources and capital. To a certain extent, capital-rich Taiwan can enhance
the economic interests of Beijing. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
chairman, Hsu Hsin-liang, has suggested that the three direct links of postal, trade
and transport services between Taiwan and China constitute the best approach to
improving relations with Beijing.' Further evidence of the importance of China-
Taiwan economic relations can be found in President Jiang Zemin's speech on
January 30, 1995 when he stated that "political differences should not affect or
interfere with the economic co-operation between the two sides".' China knows
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that Taiwan can enhance its economic security, and hence it has indicated a
willingness to let bilateral economic ties grow.
To be precise, Taiwan has played a critical role not only as Beijing's trading
partner, but also as a source of investment capital, technology and management
skills. President Lee Teng-hui's policies have encouraged greater contact, trade
and commerce between both sides, and economic ties between China and Taiwan
have been expanding. The investment and business talent flowing into China
from Taiwan have already made a major contribution to Beijing's economic
development goals. Taiwan has provided China with both technology and
financial resources that are a major contribution to the remarkable economic
expansion in South China.
The "Natural Economic Territory (NET)", first outlined in Chapter 2,
consists of the economic linkages between the southern province of Fujian with
Taiwan. Such cross border trade and investment mitigates even the political
hostility across the Taiwan Strait, and demonstrates the possible effects of leaders
in both China and Taiwan actively co-operating for mutual economic benefits.
However, it is worth noting that the current government in Taiwan is advocating a
cautious approach, better known as the "no haste, be patient" policy. In addition,
an opposition party member, former Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, said in
November 1997 that he would support the government's "no haste, be patient"
policy towards economic ties with Beijing, adding that business executives should
put overall national interests above their corporate interests. 55
 In contrast to the
cautious stance adopted by the politicians, Taiwanese businessman have shown
readiness to invest in China, in their bids to make profits in China's huge market.
190
This type of phenomenon suggests that mutually beneficial economic ties and
economics in general may overshadow political rivalries in the future
international system.
Hence, China appears to be more accommodating towards Taiwan's
participation in regional economic organisations such as Asian Development
Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation. Of course, such a stance is
taken by China with bolstering its economic security in mind. China does not
wish to jeopardise its role in these economic organisations by adopting hard-line
policies against Taipei's membership.
These economic organisations are useful to fuel Beijing's own economic
modernisation drive. For the sake of its own economic goals, China has tolerated,
to a certain extent, Taiwanese participation in regional economic organisations.
Nevertheless, it is equally important to point out that Beijing still insists that
Taiwanese participation constitute only "ad-hoc arrangements and cannot
constitute a 'model' applicable to other inter-governmental organisations or
international gatherings". 56 In the interests of China's political security, which
include negating Taiwan's existence as a sovereign state in the international
system, Taiwan must never be allowed to gain further political recognition by
other states.
Furthermore, one can also argue that China might see reunification, which
could possibly include the appropriation of Taiwan's resources, as part of the
solution to sustain its economic growth. Economic integration with Taiwan and a
larger economy can certainly boost Beijing's economic security. This provides
another incentive for Beijing to achieve reunification with Taiwan. In short,
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Beijing hopes to reap economic benefits from integration with the Taiwanese
economy and that, in turn, helps to justify the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party. It is felt that these types of economic and political security
issues have been underplayed in most Western literature on this subject.
At a wider level, Beijing has concluded that the reunification of China will
not only bolster the stability and development of the country itself, but also
contribute to the further enhancement of the co-operation between China and
other countries, as well as to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region
and the world as a whole". 57 China has thus linked the reunification with Taiwan
as inducing a more stable environment in the Asia-Pacific for Beijing to carry out
its economic development programmes.
As for the Taiwanese, they realise that "economic strength", which forms
part of China's security agenda, will be a major determinant in the outcome of
cross strait rivalry. 58 In short, economics has become too important for states to
ignore in international relations and in the case of the China-Taiwan rivalry, it
might even decide the outcome.
However, it is clear that China realises that economic integration cannot be
achieved by the use of force. Beijing will seek to avoid any damage to the stability
in the region. China's leaders perceive regional stability and the continuation of the
region's economic health as essential for its economic development. This is at the
heart of China's deepest security interests. Major disturbance of the international
system, especially if close to home, will seriously undermine the long-term
development goals upon which China's future lies. Therefore, it is unlikely that
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Beijing will use force to achieve reunification with Taiwan, for its economic
security is at stake.
Conclusion
In the quest to enhance its security interests, China is determined to
eliminate the "Taiwan independence" challenge as a step forward to achieving
national reunification. In this process, it has associated the United States directly
or indirectly with the issue of "Taiwan independence" and linked this issue to
Chinese nationalism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has also tried to
isolate Taiwan in the international arena and discredit the government of President
Lee Teng-hui. These manoeuvres have been aimed at bolstering China's political
security and undermining Taiwan's.
Above all, we must always bear in mind that China seeks economic
modernisation, and this will require a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. A
stable environment, in relation to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, is vital to
China's economic security. Therefore, analysing security through the prism of
economics has shown that China is unlikely to resort to the use of force in
bolstering its security vis-à-vis Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 7: "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" AS A SECURITY
THREAT
As mentioned in the introduction and evident in the preceding chapters,
the United States is perceived as a major factor affecting China's security. To be
more precise, Beijing views a principal goal of US foreign policy in the post-Cold
War era as seeking to subvert the few remaining "socialist" states of the world
through a process of "peaceful evolution". This threat to China's political security
has become even more pronounced in that, as the major remaining communist
power, China sees itself in a position of providing the ideological bedrock in a
international system that is increasingly abandoning communism. This chapter
begins by discussing the "peaceful evolution" concept as perceived by the
Chinese. Then the issue of human rights as a means to subvert the Chinese system
is analysed. The chapter then goes on to explain the dilemma in China's quest to
modernise its economy, which means it will encounter "peaceful evolution".
The concept and its potential dangers
In general, it can be stated that the alleged threat of "peaceful evolution"
comes across as primarily a political security threat, rather than a military one.
This threat relates to the Chinese allegation that aim of Western capitalist nations
is to subvert the Beijing regime by non-military means. To the Chinese, the
concept of "peaceful evolution" is seen as a specific challenge to the political
security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For example, referring to
international relations, the late Deng Xiaoping once referred to this as an
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indication that "Western nations are waging World War Three, a war without the
smoke of gunpowder".' Chinese academics have also noted that the "imperialist
nations, backed by the threat of a mighty military machine" are using non-military
means, including the international mass media, to convert the socio-economic
system, culture and thought in socialist nations to capitalism, ultimately
incorporating these nations into the capitalist orbit.'
In general, the Chinese perceive that this strategy has been adopted by
Western nations towards socialist countries after the Second World War. To be
more precise, the origins of this concept were traced by one Chinese source to an
alleged statement by the former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the
1950s during the Korean War. In this source, the "peaceful evolution" strategy of
the "international monopoly bourgeoisie" formally came into existence when
Dulles explicitly proposed in a speech "the use of peaceful means" to "accelerate
the evolution of government policies within the Sino-Soviet bloc" and "shorten
the expected life span of communism"? Western scholars such as Paul Godwin
have commented that, in the Chinese view, "peaceful evolution" seeks to
undermine the values of socialism through the political, economic, cultural
penetration of socialist states that accompanies Western assistance and
commerce". 4 The main components of this strategy include .the transformation of
socialist systems by urging the introduction of private ownership, free-markets
and parliamentary democracy, which would eventually lead to the end of
Marxism-Leninism as an official ideology and the Chinese Communist Party's
political leadership. The provision of economic assistance as a "bait" was
mentioned as this can induce socialist countries to abandon Marxism. The aim, it
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appears, is the gradual undermining of a communist system through interactions
with the outside world, in particular the most advanced industrial capitalist
nations. The United States certainly represents the threat most clearly, in the eyes
of some leaders and academics in China.
However, Western academics such as Michael Yahuda have noted that the
term "peaceful evolution" used by the Chinese is vague and all embracing; its
meaning ranges from dark conspiracies involving the alleged plotters of the
counter revolutionary rebellion (the official term for the Tiananmen events) to the
broad spectrum of cultural, social and economic exchanges with the outside
world". 5 The vagueness and comprehensiveness of the "peaceful evolution"
concept has on many occasions allowed Chinese leaders to denounce threats to
the Beijing regime as manifestations of bourgeois liberalisation. While one may
debate the coherence of the "peaceful evolution" concept, there is no mistaking
that it is taken very seriously by the Chinese leadership. This perceived threat has
been further magnified by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese government perceives
itself as being the next target of the "peaceful evolution" strategy. After all,
according to one Chinese view, the Soviet collapse was attributed to the West and
America issuing "propaganda about the inferiority of socialism"; US statesmen
denying "the worth of the Soviet Communist Party" and highlighting that
economic difficulties had "come about because of the implementation of
socialism by the Soviet leadership". 6 Once Russia has succumbed to this non-
military strategy, China appears to be the next target. China has now become the
sole significant socialist power, alongside countries such as North Korea, Cuba
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and Vietnam, surrounded by capitalist nations. One may argue that this leaves
China in a precarious position, for the socialist ideology that has sustained the
Chinese Communist Party since 1949 is being undermined. In short, the political
security of China is deemed to be at stake.
Moreover, with the use of military force seemingly unfeasible now, it
appears to Beijing that most viable option for Western powers is to use "peaceful
evolution" as an instrument of foreign policy. For example, an article in
Guangming Ribao noted that instead of using force, it is more effective for
powers such as the United States to spread "bourgeois ideas and way of life
through educational, cultural and intellectual exchanges". 7 Therefore, in this vein,
Western media are seen as threatening to socialist ideology at various levels. For
example, Western radio, television, newspapers and magazines are seen as
capable of influencing social psychology, social opinion and social thinking in
non-capitalist countries while cultural exchanges and academic publications on
the other hand are usually used to propagate the capitalist ideology and theories.
The Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation and other Western
media are alleged to have contributed to the "corruption" of the Chinese people
with "bourgeois spiritual pollution"; and this clearly reflects China's fears of
attempts to "subvert the socialist system through media propaganda" by confusing
the people's minds and weakening their "ideological commitment to
communism".8
Furthermore, one Chinese academic noted that on Mar 27, 1990, Radio
Marti under the Voice of America stole the frequencies of Cuban Television
Broadcasting in violation of the regulation of the International
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Telecommunication Organisation in order to air programmes aimed at subverting
the current regime in Cuba.' China fears that such subversion tactics may
culminate in a challenge to the communist party's orthodoxy and China's political
security. The latest form of "peaceful evolution", known as "constructive
engagement" enunciated by the Clinton administration, is seen as equally
threatening to Beijing. Although most Westerners see Chinese criticisms of the
United States and the West as propagandistic, non-military means can have
negative effects on regime security in China, and the Chinese leadership has quite
rightly taken this type of threat very seriously.
In short, it is true to say that the strategy of "peaceful evolution" has
become more pertinent against the background of communism's demise in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This type of conclusion has been expressed
in the Renmin Ribao, which warns that China may have to "bear greater pressure
than before".' Of course, one can denounce, as many Western scholars have
indeed done, the concept of "peaceful evolution" as ambiguous and value-laden.
While not professing to delve too deep into the semantics surrounding the term,
the usefulness of employing this term is that it gives us a convenient way of
analysing the political security threat perceived by the Chinese. This political
security threat has been largely associated with the United States' China policy.
The United States and "peaceful evolution"
Above all, one main reason why "peaceful evolution" appears so
threatening is because China regards it as part of post-Cold War American foreign
policy. This type of argument can also found in the writings of some Western
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China analysts. For example, David Shambaugh has argued that Beijing is not
incorrect in charging Washington with pursuing the "peaceful evolution" strategy
as this has been the "underlying premise -if not the active policy guide -for
America's policy towards China since 1979" when China adopted reforms in its
efforts to modernise." As a post-revolutionary society, the United States is often
seen by China as exporting its ideas and institutions abroad and China is a prime
target. Harry Harding has also put forward the proposition that the United States
is attempting "to remake China in its own image", this time by exporting a secular
philosophy rather than by religious teachings in the previous era."
David Shambaugh further argues that America's agenda is to change
China, as evident in the century-long American "missionary complex" underlying
policy towards Beijing; and this clearly indicates a strong "American paternalism
towards China" that has been present since at least the 1920s." Therefore, it
comes as no surprise that Chinese conservatives see the growing American
economic and cultural presence in China as a dangerous interference in their
internal affairs. An American-led coalition of Western industrialised states
unfettered by a counterweight seems to be the most threatening component of the
"peaceful evolution" strategy. The above analysis therefore highlights that
"peaceful evolution" represents a threat to the political security of China, and the
Chinese Communist Party in particular.
Today, in Beijing's eyes, the American espousal of political liberalisation
is seen as a concerted campaign to subvert the socialist system in China by
peaceful means. This is accentuated by that fact the United States, as the most
powerful democracy in the world, had "defeated" its principal ideological rival,
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the former Soviet Union. For example, an article in Beijing Review argued that in
the ideological sphere, "the United States is trying to sell American-style
democracy, human rights and free market to countries in Asia".' 4 This type of
perception is also evident in the case of the former British colony of Hong Kong,
which reverted to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997. The Chinese news agency,
Xinhua has noted that the United States' Hong Kong Policy Act of October 5,
1992 contains provisions requiring regular reports to Congress by the US
Secretary of State on conditions in Hong Kong, including the "development of
democratic institutions"; and this indicates that Hong Kong may be "a possible
vehicle of 'peaceful evolution'". 15 It must be noted that this type of thinking still
remains entrenched, despite the fact that Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese
sovereignty had largely developed in accordance with Beijing's wishes. In short,
the Chinese take the political security threat posed by "peaceful evolution" very
seriously.
In addition, the Chinese are confounded by American commitment to
pluralism in domestic politics. As noted by David Shambaugh, the coexistence of
various channels of political participation in the United States is often interpreted
as "a sign of the disintegration of the social order rather than as an expression of
the internal dynamics of the system". 16 This is fundamentally different from the
traditional Chinese desire for social order, mostly achieved by an authoritarian
political system. It is precisely this type of aforementioned political expression
that Beijing sought to suppress in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In this sense,
Beijing sees the American political system as inferior and as one that should not
be imported into China. More importantly, the communist regime is worried that
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its political monopoly will be challenged if American political values become
widely circulated among the Chinese masses. This will put the regime's political
security at stake.
The perceived challenge of liberal democracy was taken seriously by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) throughout the 1980s. David Goodman argues
that the CCP has countered such trends towards liberal democracy adopting a very
high profile of authoritarianism and nationalism in order to bolster political
security. 17 In this sense, liberal democracy has been portrayed as a "Western
pollutant" ill-suited for China's needs. Beijing is convinced that China's needs
can be best met by an authoritarian political system and the absence of organised
challenges to continued communist rule. At a time when the communist party's
legitimacy is increasingly being undermined, charging the West, especially the
United States, with political subversion may be one way to deflect attention from
issues of domestic legitimacy. The notion of liberal governance, which provides a
space for societal autonomy, is less accepted by China. For centuries, China has
taken the stance that the state should be privileged over society and American
efforts to stress the latter's legitimacy are seen as domestic political interference.
Hence, as far as the political security of the Chinese Communist Party is
concerned, it is quite clear that the authorities in Beijing will be horrified by the
prospect of a devolution of power. This will almost certainly invoke a challenge
to the party's position, such as another Tiananmen or resistance to the state that
includes demonstrations by students, workers, the urban middle classes, or in the
most threatening case, splinter groups of the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
People's Armed Police or other state security organs. Hence, siege mentality of
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the Chinese leaders is bound to intensify as these leaders come to the conclusion
that radical political reform is out of the question for this must surely represent a
slippery slope to extinction of the party itself.
However, despite the rejection of Western-style democracy, it must be
noted that China does not reject democracy per se. In fact, Beijing is keen to
correct misperceptions of "Chinese democracy". The Chinese argue that
"democracy for every country in the world is always relative and specific" and "it
must conform to and be compatible with the national conditions of every
country"." The aim, for China, therefore, is to carry out political reform for the
purpose of developing a "socialist democracy suited to its national conditions".
This type of argument serves to reinforce the role of the communist party, while at
the same seeking to reject Western—style liberal democracy as of little use to
China's status as a developing country. Of course, one may point out the flaws in
this type of argument, but for our purposes here, the crucial point is that Chinese
leaders have never rejected democracy entirely, but they reject democracy
imported from abroad, which is perceived as a threat to Beijing's political
security. The same can also be said for the Western concept of human rights.
Human rights as a political threat
Of the various forms that the alleged "peaceful evolution" strategies may
take, human rights issues are perceived to be extremely dangerous in recent years,
as far as Beijing's political security is concerned. This is accentuated by the fact
that, in general, with the end of superpower rivalry, human rights issues have
increasingly come to greater prominence on the agenda of international relations
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in the post-Cold war era. To a certain extent, it is also possible to argue that the
end of the US-Soviet-China "strategic triangle" means that human rights issues
have come under closer scrutiny, occupying a more prominent place in
international relations, in particular Sino-American relations. For instance, during
the strategic Sino-American alignment to counter the Soviet threat in the 1970s
and the 1980s, moral issues such as human rights received less attention. The
strategic alignment between China and the United States also accounted for the
fact that China did not face severe criticism compared to other communist states
such as the Soviet Union and those in Eastern Europe. Moreover, many of the
Third World countries with which Washington had close relations were right-
wing dictatorships and human rights issues were largely not raised by mutual tacit
agreements.
In the 1990s, China suddenly finds that most of the countries it wants to
deal with are democracies and human rights issues are mostly on the agenda.
Non-governmental organisations have also become an important international
lobby, obliging Western governments to take up the issue of human rights in
China. For example, enjoying greater access to US Congress and the media,
groups such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International have succeeded in placing
political repression, imprisonment for political activities, torture and prison labour
exports on the agenda of Sino-American relations.
Above all, for China, the catalyst of human rights issues was the June 4,
1989 Tiananmen Incident. Therefore, it is important to analyse the implications
of this event for China's political security. Many in the West view this event as
the antithesis of the liberating events during the same year in Eastern Europe, as
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repressive communist regimes toppled one after another. The brutal suppression
of the pro-democracy movement in China has shattered, to a large extent, the
positive image of China as a reform-minded socialist country. It also means that
Chinese leaders have come to realise that human rights issues do pose a threat to
the political security of the communist party.
Equating human rights with state sovereignty
This perceived threat engendered by the Tiananmen Incident is given
further prominence because the Chinese regard human rights issues as an issue of
sovereignty. The Chinese are among the most ardent advocates of sovereignty in
international relations, largely due its experience of Western and Japanese
imperialism in the recent past. For example, one of the top leaders, Li Peng, has
stressed that human rights issues fall "within the sovereignty of each country".19
Undoubtedly, at the heart of this huge debate is the compatibility of the
Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the concept of human rights enunciated
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The former has fused with
China's acute concern with state sovereignty and strict non-interference in its
internal affairs.
It is also important to bear in mind that the concept of sovereignty
actually came to China relatively late in the nineteenth century. As a victim of
Western imperialism, China was subjected to the forceful "opening" to the West
through the Opium Wars (1840-1842 and 1856-1860) and the defeat of the Boxer
Uprising in 1900-1901. It is not surprising, therefore, as Hedley Bull has noted,
countries such as China, which have experienced imperialism and suffered human
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rights abuses themselves, "cling to the rhetoric of sovereignty as one of the means
available to them of defending it".2° Hence it is only natural that Chinese
communists later embraced the concept of sovereignty with a vengeance after
taking power in 1949. Once human rights are equated with sovereignty, any
attempts by external powers to impose a certain standard on China are viewed as
threats to Beijing's political security and sovereignty.
To the Chinese, state sovereignty and political security must come before
human rights. This type of reasoning has been expressed a Beijing Review article,
which argues that "state sovereignty is the basis for the realisation of human
rights, and if a state is not safeguarded, the human rights of its citizens cannot be
protected"21 . Placing sovereignty over human rights in its hierarchy of values,
China is, therefore, against linking the United Nations Security Council to human
rights.' President Jiang Zemin has said that China remains "opposed to
interference in the internal affairs of other countries on the ground of protecting
human rights". 23
 China has also argued that to preclude human rights as a state's
internal affairs is contrary to international law."' While such statements may
seem untenable to Western human rights experts, it is true to say that when
viewed from China's modern experience as a victim of Western and Japan
imperialism, one can see why the Chinese are so adamant that no foreign power
should intervene in Chinese affairs again, be it in the name of human rights or any
other issues.
Specifically, China has blamed the United States for practising hegemony
when advocating human rights as part of its strategy of "peaceful evolution". A
Chinese commentary has questioned the status of Washington to be the "global
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judge of human rights", which implies that America is "empowered to place itself
above all countries of the world". 25 Hence, China has criticised US laws that
instruct American representatives in intergovernmental lending organisations,
such as the World Bank, to oppose loans to countries guilty of human rights
abuses. In addition, China sees this as a potential stumbling block to its quest for
economic modernisation. There are those in China who believe that the human
rights issue is a weapon used by foreign governments attempting to weaken and
control China. An extreme view is that defending China's human rights practices
is part of larger battle against Western imperialism, led by the Americans. In this
view, defending human rights records is equal to defending China's nationalist
pride and the survival of the Chinese Communist Party.
Moreover, Beijing has pointed out that China and the United States have
different social systems, values, levels of development and historical traditions. It
is inevitable that both countries will adopt different approaches to human rights.
China tends to view the concept of human rights as a "Western package" thrust
upon it by foreigners. An extreme Chinese view sees the attack on Chinese
human rights as "merely the latest statement in the 150-year history of intrusions
into China's internal affairs in the name of international standards".26
To a certain extent, China is right when it points out the West has violated
the concept of human rights and sovereignty when they colonised the world. It is
with history in mind that the Chinese see human rights as an instrument used by
the West to pursue its own foreign policy objectives. The Chinese government
views human rights not as a legitimate issue for Sino-American dialogue but as a
means used by Americans to subvert its political system. However, the
211
conventional Western view is that linking human rights issues to state sovereignty
is merely an attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to stave off any challenges
to its political monopoly, specifically challenges to its authoritarian way of
governing China.
With regards to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, which represented a real
challenge to the security of the Chinese regime, the United States is held partially
responsible for fomenting the demonstrations and contributing to their sustenance.
An article in the Guangming Ribao has accused "leading political figures of the
US monopoly capitalist class" of training "some so-called fighters for democracy"
and giving "economic aid" to them so that they can to "play an important role for
the US government's strategy of 'peaceful evolution' on various occasions". 27 The
late Deng Xiaoping himself had identified the "counterrevolutionaries" as "agents
of Western subversion".28 It was reported that, at that time, Chinese students in
Tiananman Square quoted Jefferson, Paine, Nathan Hale and other American
revolutionaries. Not surprisingly, at that time when the survival of Communism in
other parts of the world was under threat, the political liberalisation that
accompanied the opening up to the West was seen as part of the plot by the
capitalist states to undermine China's political security.
China's response to the Tiananmen Incident was predictable. To avoid
being further isolated in the international community. Beijing sought to cultivate
the hard-line East European states with high level visits, which produced joint
statements warning of the need to guard against the Western strategy of "peaceful
evolution".' The few governments that supported China included hard-line
Communist states such as North Korea, Romania, East Germany and Bulgaria
212
although most of these communist states were soon to disintegrate." It is clearly
evident that the Tiananmen Incident emphasises China's concern for its political
security and has led Beijing to seek allies in its crusade against the capitalist
democracies.
On their part, Western governments, led by the United States, imposed
sanctions on China immediately after the June 1989 events. At that point in time,
China felt being cornered and its security being threatened. Among other
measures, Washington cancelled all high-level exchanges with China, cut off
arms transfers and military-related sales, suspended financial credits and
economic assistance, and conditioned their restoration on substantial evidence of
Chinese progress toward political reform?' Much to China's dismay, the US State
Department's annual human rights report also took the Chinese government to
task over the post-1989 political persecution. 32 China's response to these Western
actions was rather forceful because it deemed that its security interests were being
undermined. For instance, the Chinese National People's Congress, meeting in
February 1990, condemned America imposing sanctions after the June 4 event,
criticising "the short-sighted anti-China act of certain members of the US
Congress" as an "interference in the internal affairs of other countries"?'
It is worth noting that the United States adopted a tougher stance against
China compared to other Western nations. For instance, David Shambaugh has
argued that the United States, to a certain extent, pursued a China policy at
extreme variance with its allies in the G-7 (now G-8), embarking on "peaceful
evolution" while its partners have tried to distance themselves from this policy
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and instead opted for a policy of "peaceful coexistence". 34 What the actions of the
United States did was to trigger a strong reaction from the Chinese leaders.
As a result, China took pains not to give the impression that it had bowed
to foreign pressures in managing its internal affairs, for doing so would have
severely undermined the party's legitimacy and authority both at home and
abroad. Domestically, the crackdown put a stop to the impetus of political reform
in China, in the name of political security. For the rest of 1989 and the first half of
the 1990, the door to the outside world was mostly closed, primarily due to the
fear of Western and, in particular, American political and cultural influence.
Later, the demise of the Communism in the former Soviet bloc further confirmed
the view of Chinese hard-liners that their forceful responses represented the
correct way to deal with threats to the party's political security, irrespective of
American or world opinion.
Apart from the charges against political repression in China, many
Americans also took a sympathetic view of Tibet, regarded by Beijing as a part of
China itself. The Chinese have been accused of violating human rights in Tibet,
and this is compounded by the fact that the US Congress had on previous
occasions passed resolutions affirming that Tibet is an "occupied country". To be
sure, the Tibet issue has historical roots. In the 1950s, Beijing blamed the
Americans, in particular the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for assisting the
Tibetan separatists in the 1959 armed rebellion. These allegations have constituted
an important component of China's security thinking on Tibet. Although US
policy towards Tibet had changed during the Nixon administration, with the
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recognition that Tibet is now part of China, the issue has still remained a thorn in
China's flesh, and more importantly, a threat to its security.
In addition, apart from the United States, Western countries such as
Germany recently provided strong support for resolutions in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in Geneva that are sharply critical of China's record
in Tibet. China has responded to these criticisms by highlighting "the dark,
savage and cruel feudal serfdom" existing in Tibet before communist rule, stating
that the Tibetan people had been deprived of all human rights by the serf-
owners?' Emphasising the principle of non-interference in a state's internal
affairs, China has rejected the Dalai Lama's 1988 "Strasbourg proposal", which
suggested China-Tibet relationship as one "between a suzerain and a vassal state",
and "between a protector and a protected state". 36 Beijing sees the Dalai Lama's
move as a denial of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. On the issue of Tibetan
independence, which is in many ways similar to the Taiwan issue, Beijing is
fearful of foreign involvement. For instance, the 1992 White Paper has noted that
Britain and Russia interfered in Tibet by signing a convention in 1907 that
changed China's sovereignty over Tibet into "suzerainty"?' Beijing has attributed
the problem of Tibet to the work of imperialists, and at the same time played up
the fear of "foreign forces" in order to trigger nationalist feelings at home. China
is fearful of any foreign forces using the pretext of human rights to interfere in
Tibet because this will threaten its political security.
In general, as Denny Roy has pointed out, it is clear that human rights
issues represent a threat to "regime security, for they represent attack on the
Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and monopolisation of political power". 38
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What is more debatable is whether the human rights threat pertains to the entire
Chinese nation rather than the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, the
Chinese Communist Party may be more secure but at the same time, a more
liberal regime with more political representation can actually help China in its
economic development. While not needing to delve too much into this debate
since it is not the subject of this thesis, it is fair to say that the distinction between
the Chinese regime and the Chinese state has not yet developed to the extent that
we need to distinguish them in great detail. This is one of the fundamental
assumptions of this thesis, which was outlined in Chapter 1. While some Western
academics may beg to differ, it is fair to say that most Chinese equate the Chinese
Communist Party with the birth or rather, re-birth of modern China.
On a positive note, one can see that Beijing has not rejected the idea of an
international human rights regime altogether. China has stressed the progress it
made in advancing economic, social and cultural rights. It is possible that foreign
pressures, such as those arising from Western nations and international human
rights organisations, may have indirectly induced the publication of the 1991
White Paper.' The White Paper, despite not adding much substantial evidence of
human rights progress in China, is seminal in that it amounts to an implicit
acknowledgement that human rights issues have become too important in
international relations for China to ignore.
Emphasising positive rights to enhance political security
For our purpose, China's overall response to the West's criticism of its
human rights record is worth analysing, since it relates to Beijing's political
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security. Beijing has distinguished between different categories of human rights in
order to bolster the communist party's political security. As James Seymour has
pointed out, China responded to the attack on its political security by
distinguishing between "positive rights" (economic, social and cultural rights);
and civil, political rights.' While there is no need for us to delve into the theory
of human rights, it is important to note that, whereas civil and political rights
require governments to refrain from taking actions that violate them, "positive
rights" require government to make provision for citizens. China is definitely
more comfortable doing the latter.
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged by Western experts that "positive
rights" are less subject to theoretical controversy. Predictably, the 1991 White
Paper has stated that "the human rights advocated by China encompass not only
include the right to subsistence, civil and political rights, but also economic,
cultural and social rights". 41 Jiang Zemin has gone even further by linking the
issue of human rights to China's current economic reform and political system,
stressing that social stability is a prerequisite for achieving economic
development; which in turn provides the opportunity to enhance human rights in
China.' Such statements indicate that, in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the
practice of human rights have to be compatible with Beijing's needs and must be
in line with its political security requirements.
To be precise, separating rights into the two categories of "positive rights"
and civil, political rights raises the question of their relative priority. Clearly,
China does not treat political rights as equally important as social and economic
rights. Being concerned about its economic well-being, which in turn provides
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legitimacy for the regime, Beijing has stressed this point, as argued in previous
chapters. In the past, the communists' social contract with the people was that the
peasantry surrendered their political power to the party, who would use this power
to serve and protect the masses. This is similar to Rosseau's social contract theory
in the West. As a consequence, the Chinese Communist Party has since assumed
that it acted on the behalf of the people, aiming to achieve the goal of generating
economic prosperity for all.
Therefore, it is only natural that, as Denny Roy has pointed out, the broad
view of human rights that Beijing subscribes to is extremely suitable for
authoritarian states experiencing high growth rates as this serves as a way to
emphasise a regime's achievement in terms of raising living standards and de-
emphasising its defects such as lack of political liberties.' These states have even
argued that increasing political liberties impede socio-economic progress,
although the Asian financial crisis has in some ways expose the flaws of this
argument, as political events in Indonesia have shown. Human rights issues do
represent a challenge to the current successful status quo in the eyes of the current
regime in China, as the communists seek to hold on power and strengthen its
political security.
In terms of concrete action, China did try to show the world that it was not
isolated by the Western sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Beijing
sought the tacit support of other Third World countries. Capitalising on the
relative silence from the Third World after the 1989 event, China stepped up its
diplomatic contacts with these countries and in some cases even repaired ties." It
was a policy of necessity at that point in time, as China faced a closed door from
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the West. Interestingly, one of the side effects of the Tiananmen Incident was that
China now turned to its Asian neighbours to avoid being isolated. In order to
counter the human rights threat to its security, China sought support from other
states that supported it on human rights issues. For instance, China received
support from Third World states in opposing a draft resolution against Beijing at
the 51st session of the United Nations Commission of Human Rights.' One
Chinese leader, Li Peng, stressed that the difference between developed and
developing countries, stating that "the rights to independence, subsistence and
development are of paramount importance to the large of number of developing
countries"." This is bound to strike a chord with most developing states while
indirectly serving as a means to bolster China's political security. We can now
come to the question of what constitute the actual avenues for "peaceful
evolution" and how these might impinge on China's political security.
The actual basis for "peaceful evolution"
The question of why "peaceful evolution" was allowed to filter into China,
given its perceived destructive potential to China's political security, is a critical
one in this thesis. Fundamentally, the reason lies in the interaction between the
political and economic dimensions of China's security. In actual fact, the
"peaceful evolution" strategy is able to threaten the Chinese Communist Party
precisely because China needs to open up its economy and trade with the West.
Beijing is driven by the conditions of its economy to continue the policy of
soliciting foreign loans, technology and expertise; and it also requires access to
markets in the industrialised states. China needs Western economic inputs to
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develop its economy in order to enhance its economic security. Despite its current
rapid economic progress, China's educated manpower base remains small and its
scientific and technological levels are generally still below world standards. China's
economic growth must rely on science and technology as an "equaliser" to catch
up with the West, and one way of solving its problem is to import Western
technology in order to strengthen the economy..
The Chinese are equally aware that such economic relations with the West
will eventually constitute avenues of subversion. It is inescapable that in the
process, trade contacts with the West will serve as a conduit for "bourgeois"
influence and all the dangers of "peaceful evolution" will accompany such
contacts. As noted by Michael Yahuda, this reflects the wider dilemma all
Chinese leaders face in striking a balance between the two extremes of opening up
to the West or relying on themselves.' To be sure, this dilemma has existed
before this century. Since the mid-nineteenth century, there have been debates
among Chinese leaders over the degree to which modernisation requires China to
import technology, institutions and values from abroad. As Harry Harding has
pointed out, some leaders see relations with the outside world as necessary for
China to strengthen itself while others fear that these foreign influences will
contaminate Chinese society and reduce China's independence and sovereignty."
Today, this dilemma still exists and there is no doubt that China's political
security is at stake in this dilemma.
What Beijing wants is to adopt the "positive" aspects of Western science
and technology while keeping it populace free from Western "bourgeois
influence". China will not allow an uncritical acceptance of foreign values. All
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foreign imports must be tailored to suit Chinese conditions. As David Goodman
has pointed out, the pressure today is to achieve a "Chinese" modernisation, not
simply the "transplant of the Atlantic culture".' At the global level, China needs a
continued relatively open international economy and most-favoured trading nation
status with all the major trading partners in order to continue to grow rapidly. To
facilitate these economic exchanges with the developed world, China will need to
continue remodifying its internal institutions in order to become attractive to
foreigners. In the process of trading with foreigners, China is bound to be
subjected to significant external influences, thereby inadvertently putting its
political security at some degree of risk.
However, one can also argue that tyranny of the markets poses little risk to
China's political security. The international markets are known to be quite
comfortable dealing with authoritarian regimes and financial markets are keener
on the credit worthiness of a particular regime rather than the internal politics of a
debtor state. For instance, James Shinn has pointed out that China's premium on
long term sovereign debt (measured in terms of its pricing over the United States
Treasury debt of comparable maturity) it sill less than 100 basis points, or one
percent, adding that that there is some evidence that this risk premium widens in
response to external tensions between China and its trading partners rather than in
response to internal political repression, apart from the Tiananmen Incident.' In
fact, it may be argued that financial institutions such as the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank are relatively unconcerned with China's internal
political behaviour. For the Chinese leaders, what they must determine is how to
maintain close economic ties with the United States and the West while at the
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same time not allowing them to "wantonly interfere with China's internal affairs
and violate its sovereignty".51
In today's Information Age, with information flows being disseminated
more easily and on a wider scale than before, it clear that foreign ideas can
penetrate into China more readily. It is true to say that organising ideologies of the
Chinese state are now more likely be penetrated, distorted, corrupted and eventually
undermined by contacts with foreign ideas. Hence, to counter the threat of "peaceful
evolution", China can adopt the same approach as other communist governments
did in the past, defending themselves by restricting the circulation of contrary
political ideas. This type of reaction will entail making the Chinese state secure by
returning to isolationism, as China did during the Cultural Revolution era to keep
out undesired foreign influence.
However, this type of isolationist policy is difficult to put into practice in the
Information Age. Today, governments around the world, especially authoritarian
ones, can no longer easily control the flow of information across their borders.
This has led some analysts, such as William Overholt, to point out that "the
Chinese have bitterly denounced 'peaceful evolution' but has in fact evolved
peacefully at rates that have revolutionised the society in only 17 years (1979-
1996) . 52
 China has to cope with using Western inputs to its economic
development goals while remaining free from the spread of Western values and
concepts, which it deems as unsuitable for Beijing and potentially threatening to
its political security.
Beijing clearly does not want market reforms to be followed by political
reforms in which the people or organised interests may replace the dominant role of
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the Chinese Communist Party. While maintaining a large public sector, the Chinese
Communist Party wants to orchestrate the creation of a private economic sector. The
energy of the people can be channelled into supporting new private enterprises. To
the communist party, a China that creates a larger space for private activity in
commercial affairs and social life must not lead to Western-style democracy. This
is at the heart of Beijing's deepest security interests. China does not tolerate
political change that may come with economic liberalisation. Most Chinese leaders
still believe that the authoritarian political system based on the leadership of the
communist party is the only way forward. They are perfectly happy to see it side by
side with the market reforms, as long as China's political security remains intact.
In addition, China's leaders insist that in an era of rapid social change, a
strong government will be required to maintain domestic order. In opposition to
those advocating democracy, defenders of the communist regime have even
argued that "an anarchical China would pose a genuine threat to the outside
world".' In its search for economic security, partly through trade, China has to
deal with the US "constructive engagement" strategy. It is also worth noting that
the uncertainties about the extent and nature of the engagement are often most
acute among China's conservative forces. They are most concerned that the
engagement is really a form of "peaceful evolution" intended to transform
Chinese society and politics. American "constructive engagement" is deemed to
be predicated on the assumption that spill-over effects from economic
interdependence will moderate and then modify the Beijing regime. This is seen
as a danger to China's security policymakers, who are learning to cope with the
ramifications of economic interdependence.
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Coping with dependence and interdependence
As David Shambaugh has pointed out, the Chinese are among the most
ardent proponents of the doctrine of state sovereignty and they have difficulty in
coming to terms with the interdependence of the modern world. 54 However, it is
clear that, today, autonomy carries the risk of costly isolation for China in all
aspects - diplomatic, economic and technological. For example, it is generally
acknowledged that during Mao Zedong's reign when autarky was the goal, as
exemplified by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; autarkic
policies have actually set the country backwards economically, until the policy
reversal by the late Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Given that China has placed top priority
on economic development, an isolationist policy is unlikely to be put in place today.
To be precise, withdrawing from international financial systems and the pursuing
an autarkic path of development is no longer an option. China knows it has to
come to terms with the realities of global interdependence in the 1990s.
The Chinese leadership wants to reap the benefits of interdependence or
dependence but avoid the costs. While knowing that dependency will be too high a
price to pay for foreign assistance, Beijing has drawn the conclusion that the way
forward is to extract whatever it can from the outside world for the objective of
building itself up economically. Beijing hopes to find a way of resolving the
costs-benefits dilemma, that is, maximising the benefits of interdependence while
minimising the risks associated with being more closely integrated with the world
economy and bolstering its economic and political security in the process.
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From the above analysis, one thing seems certain. Irrespective of the
potential risks, China is set continue its open-door policy. This type of thinking is
evident in an article published in the Beijing Review, which concludes that no
nation can close its doors to the world and hope to survive. 55 Since 1979, China's
economic policies represent a departure from those enunciated in the past during
Mao Zedong's reign. Self-reliance still remains an important principle but it must
take second place to using foreign trade, technology, loans, grants and
investments in order for China to achieve its modernisation goals and bolster its
economic and political security in the long term.
Conclusion
Today, China still perceives itself as facing political security threats when
Beijing analyses the objectives of the "peaceful evolution" strategy. China's
leaders want to open up their society to stimulate economic growth. In the
process, Beijing is bound to be increasingly confronted with the influx of
democratic ideas, which are largely incompatible with the rule of the Chinese
Communist Party. In addition, China's human rights practices have also come
under criticism from the West. In order to bolster its political security, China has
identified the United States as the chief threat. By stressing the dangers of foreign
interference in its internal affairs, Beijing is able to charge the West with trying to
impose the "peaceful evolution" of China, while at the same time drumming
support for the communists' legitimacy from the masses. However, the real crux
of the matter is that Beijing must determine how to maintain close economic ties
with the United States and the West while at the same time not allowing the
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Chinese political system to be subverted and China's political security be
threatened. To all intents and purposes, therefore, it is inevitable that Chinese
leaders will continue to regard "peaceful evolution" as a real political security threat
in the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER 8: PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
In addition to the alleged American-led strategy of "peaceful evolution"
discussed in the previous chapter, China is also apprehensive of US hegemony in
Northeast Asia, and in the international system in general. With a major military
threat to China's security essentially removed by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Beijing's perception of the future Asian security environment has been focused on
US security policy in the region. US security policy in Northeast Asia is also of
fundamental concern to Beijing, primarily because of Washington's links to and
influence over the future role of Japan in the region and developments on the
Korean peninsula. The objective of this chapter is to explore the United States as a
perceived threat to the political, military and economic dimensions of China's
security.
Military and political security; and the "new world order"
After the end of the Cold War, China, like all the other states, now faces
new security challenges. Of particular interest for our analysis here is the fact that
China has to come to terms with what may be termed as a unipolar world,
specifically, an American inspired "new world order" as declared in former
President George Bush's speech in the aftermath an American "victory" in the
Cold War and the Gulf War.' The United States is now a lone superpower, with
the capacity to structure a world order potentially detrimental to China's security
interests.
232
China needs to reassess the cost and benefits of dealing with the United
States in the new international environment. China now does not face the classical
balance of power which it had sought to manipulate for the previous two decades,
but instead finds itself in a new situation where the United States stands as the
only superpower in the world and as well as in Northeast Asia. It is also important
to put this in historical perspective, for China's past perceptions of the United
States are bound to shed light on its current security policy towards the United
States.
Overall, since the Second World War, China's perceptions of the United
States have been somewhat ambivalent, containing both positive and negative
attitudes. Chronologically, China had viewed the United States largely in a
negative light until the 1969 move toward Beijing by the Nixon administration.
Since the Second World War, China had viewed the United States in the context
of an international system largely defined by the global rivalry of the
superpowers, with Beijing's military and political security considerably entwined
to this rivalry. To be sure, the Chinese have always viewed the United States as a
threat dating from the onset of the Cold War. In Northeast Asia, China had fought
in the Korean War in order to keep the United States away from its border and
sustain the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a buffer against
the American-backed Republic of Korea (ROK). The American threat had also
been real in the Taiwan Strait, when Harry Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet
to protect the survival of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In all these cases, Chinese
leaders were fearful of an American presence in close geographical proximity to
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China's heartland and there were indications that the United States had the
capability to encroach on China's military security.
However, it is equally important to note that China tilted to the United
States as the Cold War unfolded. In the early 1970s, parallel concerns about the
rise of Soviet global power led the Chinese to align itself with the United States.
At this time, as Michael Yahuda rightly pointed out, Beijing regarded the Soviet
Union as the more dangerous and aggressive of the two superpowers and there
was an urgent need to deter the threat of "social imperialism" posed by the Soviet
Union.' The hostility between China and the Soviet Union at that time provided
an opportunity for rapprochement between China and the United States, giving
the two sides a chance to reassess their relations in terms of mutual military
security interests.
Notwithstanding this change in Chinese military threat perception, it must
still be emphasised that even then, leaders in Beijing defined Sino-US security
relations in terms of a coalition, not an alliance. China would undertake parallel
mutually supportive action with the United States to counter the Soviet threat.
Harry Harding has noted that Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai's overture to the
United States reflected classical balance of power calculations, which in fact sat
uneasily with the ideological pronouncements on Third World revolutions that
Beijing issued during the 1960s.3 From the Chinese perspective, co-operation
with the Americans was largely tactical. As noted by Jonathan Pollack, China
never sought a permanent alliance with the United States; formal ties would
perhaps be seen as too binding, and would restrict China's room for manoeuvre in
international affairs.' Today, Sino-US relations is in seen in terms of a
234
"constructive strategic partnership" (fianshexing zhanlue huoban guarva),
following President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in October 1997.5
General Fu Quanyou, chief of general staff of the Chinese army, also met Admiral
Joseph Prueher, commander in chief of the US Pacific Command, in 1997; and
this helped to further military relations between the two nations.'
China, like other nations, had grown accustomed to the Cold War power
structures and patterns of relations. For instance, in his study of Chinese foreign
policy, Jonathan Pollack has argued that the China's relationship to the Cold War
global political system is pivotal.' China had learned how to manoeuvre to its
advantage. It was adept at manipulating the situation to secure its own military
security, which is a reflection of the ancient policy of playing one barbarian off
against another. However, China now has to adapt to a new set of security
relations and arrangements in the post-Cold War era.
In fact, by the late 1980s, relations between China, the Soviet Union and
the United States had evolved to the point where it was no longer feasible for
Beijing to sustain the Sino-American strategic alignment against the Soviet
Union. Changes in the leadership of both the Soviet Union and the United States,
combined with changes in China's interpretation of the global balance of power,
led to yet another permutation in China's basic security strategy. Gorbachev's
ascension to power in the Soviet Union brought in a new Soviet foreign policy.
At the same time, China itself had already started opening up to the outside world,
as a result of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. China moved from tilting
toward the United States to a position emphasising self-reliance and independence
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in the late 1980s, which is a foreign policy that Beijing has always wanted to
pursue when circumstances allow.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the bipolar
international system finally collapsed and along with it China's strategic
importance in global affairs. As détente between the superpowers progressed in
the 1980s, China became increasingly marginal in global strategic relations. For
instance, Michael Yahuda has argued that China had been marginalised in world
politics even before the Soviet collapse, since the strategic triangle effectively
ended in 1987 with the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (NF) arms
control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.' As China
declined as a major player on the world stage largely because its room for
manoeuvre between the two superpowers had shrunk, Beijing had become aware
that important changes on the global scene would reduce its strategic importance
in the eyes of the Americans. These dramatic events, taken together with the 1991
Gulf War, left China in a precarious international position. From China's
perspective, in the 1990s, because the United States has fewer occasions when it
needs China's co-operation on strategic issues and regional issues, it has adopted
a more hard-line policy towards Beijing.' It is therefore only normal for the
Chinese to be constantly worried that a more "ideologically-dominated" US
foreign policy, such as adoption of the "peaceful evolution" strategy, is potentially
capable of triggering a new Cold War".'°
In concrete terms, the reduction of Russian power in the post-Cold War
era meant that China now faces the might of the United States on its own, without
any counterweight. For instance, as Lowell Dittmer argues, the Soviet Union had
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in the past been strategically important as it provided extended nuclear deterrence
in the face of Western hostility during the early years of the People's Republic of
China (PRC)." The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union
finally dissolved the "strategic triangle", which had been losing its relevance since
the late 1980s. Taken together with China's economic reforms, this has created
the urgency for China to rethink its policy towards the United States: 2 In general,
from Beijing's perspective, these post-Cold War changes mean that the United
States has subsequently been needed more as a partner in trade and China's
economic development rather than for strategic reasons.
China's "new world order"
Apart from China's perceptions of the American-inspired "new world
order", it is important for us to be aware that China has its own conception of a
"new world order", and this is a revealing reflection of its security agenda. First
and foremost, one of the central Chinese assertions about the "new world order" is
that it should be multipolar rather than unipolar. One official proclamation came
when former Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen put forward four principles on
the establishment of a new international order, these being "seek common ground
while putting aside differences"; "mutual respect", "non-interference in the
internal affairs of various nations" and "equality and mutual benefit". 12 These
principles were later expressed in greater detail by Qian Qichen at the 46th
General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1991, when he stated that a
new international order should be established on the basis of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence:
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Facts have proven that the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty
and territory integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence comprise the most fundamental norms governing international
relations; they are in keeping with the purposes and principles of the UN
Charter and reflect the characteristics essential to a new type of
international relations."
These statements, apart from portraying China's vision of what the twenty-first
century international order ought to be, also reveal the security concerns of
China's leaders.
In fact, the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" had already been
enunciated by Chinese leaders in a number of bilateral and multilateral
agreements, including at the end of the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian
states. One Chinese assessment, stressing the construction of a new international
order to be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, has added that it
will be fundamentally different from the old Cold War order characterised by
"hegemony of big powers". It appears that China's greatest concern is that it
may become marginalised by the emergence of a united Europe and Japan as new
global powers. This indicates the desire for China not only to ensure its security in
any new structures that may emerge, but also the desire to play a greater role in
regional and perhaps even global security issues. The latter would be explored in
greater detail in the next chapter.
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Hence, the Chinese have their own views, with the prevailing one arguing
that so long as states abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
friendly relations can be developed between them. 16 Hu Sheng, the president of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has also argued that a new world order
should be based on the Five Principles of Coexistence because these can best
promote peace and development, which are the "trends of history" in the post-
Cold War era. 17 To the Chinese, these Five Principles were intended to serve as
minimum rules of coexistence in the relations among sovereign states who
acknowledged few common interests beyond safeguarding their own sovereignty.
While these statements do not add very much to what China had officially
proclaimed in the past, it does show that China do have an ambition to play
greater role in the new post-Cold War security structure, even if this is partly
triggered by the need to counter the threat supposedly posed by the lone
superpower, the United States.
It is also important to note that China wants the principle of sovereignty,
which is one of the set of rules declared by the West and that has been universally
binding in international relations, to be fully applied to China: 8 The principle of
sovereignty is clearly enshrined in China's "new world order" and, in fact, also an
extension of China's security outlook. As noted by Gerrit Gong, China's
acceptance of principles such as sovereignty in European international society can
be found in the evolution of its perceptions of "unequal treaties", as it began to
join international society: 9 For example, in the 1940s, China had argued for the
revision of the "unequal treaties" and extra-territoriality on the grounds of formal
legal terms; that these treaties were signed under duress or were an encroachment
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on sovereignty. This stands in sharp contrast to attitudes held in the previous
century, when China maintained a "Middle Kingdom" posture and refused to deal
with the "barbarians". Such types of argument lend support to the case that
Beijing's "new world order" must not be dismissed entirely as rhetoric or
propaganda, it indicates that China seeks to uphold the principle of sovereignty in
international relations, to bolster its security and to counter US hegemony in the
post-Cold War era.
Fear of US hegemony
Above all, China is very suspicious of the US hegemonist tendencies in
the post-Cold War era. The Chinese concept of hegemony actually dates back to
ancient times. As David Shambaugh points out, Chinese character ba, the term
from which ha quan zhu yi (hegemony) is derived, can be found in historical
Chinese political thought and has appeared in a variety of ancient historical
records. 2° Usage of the hegemony concept as a key element in Chinese theory of
international relations is in many ways directly linked to the history of modern
China and the portrayal of the West. Today, China is adamant that its sovereignty
must never be encroached upon by any foreign powers such as the United States,
and this is foremost on its security agenda. Without doubt, "the century of
humiliation" has been impaled in the minds of China's security policy-makers
and left an indelible mark on the Chinese masses. Today, opposing any form of
international hegemonism is regarded as an important principle and a key to
ensure China's security in the post-Cold War era.
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To the Chinese, the first indication of US dominance in post-Cold war
global affairs took place in the Gulf War. China, traditionally apprehensive about
superpower intervention in Third World states, saw the conflict as a "conflict
between a little hegemonist in Baghdad and a bigger one in Washington". 21 One
of the leaders, Li Peng, described the 1990 Gulf crisis as "an indication of the
unbalanced global pattern of relations between states following the relaxation of
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union". 22 Furthermore, when
Iraqis attack the Kurds in September 1996, China still opposes US threats to
launch new military attacks against Iraq.' This opposition was also reiterated in
the 1998 weapons inspection crisis in Iraq, when American-led forces launched
missiles on Iraqi military sites. Beneath criticisms of US military actions against
Iraq, the underlying Chinese concern appears to be the realisation that American
military might and political clout have become a lethal combination that China
needs to contend with in the coming years.
Moreover, the easy American victory over the Iraqis in the Gulf War,
which demonstrated the military prowess of the US war machinery, was a source
of concern for the Chinese, especially those directly involved in Beijing's military
security apparatus. The United States and its multilateral coalition of Arab and
Western powers crushed the armed forces of Iraq in a brief and successful
campaign. The Chinese became concerned about the technological gaps between
their armed forces and their principal threats from the West, in particular the
United States. For instance, Major General Wang Pufeng, deputy director of the
Department of Research on Strategy in the Chinese Academy of Military Science,
concludes that "high-tech weapons will have a great bearing on the world's future
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military situation" and foresees that "whoever possesses high-tech weapons will
have a bigger say in world military affairs, which in turn will promote those
countries' political and economic development".' Here, we can detect a clear
linkage between the military, political and economic aspects of security; for
military superiority is perceived as necessary to bolster China's political and
economic interests.
Furthermore, Washington's success in mobilising a broad international
coalition during the Gulf War suggested that Beijing simply could not afford to
oppose the United States directly in the global arena, without risking international
isolation or marginalisation. To be sure, international pressure was the key to
China's public pledge to cease arms transfers to Iraq and China's positive vote on
the first UN Security Council resolution intended to force Iraq's withdrawal from
Kuwait.' In addition to the objective of defeating the Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein, China perceives that another objective of American foreign policy is to
create a coalition of Western powers dominated by the United States that will be
capable of controlling the international system. To the Chinese, the Gulf War
must certainly epitomised this post-Cold War trend to a large extent, for the
waging of a victorious war in Chinese eyes, brought together the four major
power centres, the United States, Russia, Japan and Europe. Of particular
importance is Japan's role in the overall American strategy for this new world
order. In the view of one Chinese analyst, the United States was attempting to
structure a tripartite coalition with Japan and Europe to create "new world
order".26 This means that in Northeast Asia, China has to face the Americans
backed by an economically powerful Japan, as discussed in an earlier chapter.
242
These type of issues are bound to affect China's security thinkers for some time to
come as they try come up with a security policy appropriate for the post-Cold war
world.
Chinese concerns over American desire to dominate the world are also
evident in one classified Chinese analysis, which states that "the United States
may be running out of energy, but it has never abandoned its ambition to rule the
world, and its military interventionism is becoming more open".27 The US-led
coalition that defeated Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War also provided an example of
what American military intervention in the 1990s would be like, with specific
implications for China. Other Chinese security analysts fear that China will
replace the Soviet Union as the justification for a continued US military presence
in Asia.' China is clearly concerned that the existence of a single superpower
seeking an alignment with the advanced industrialised democratic states is part of
a global strategy designed to replace the East-West bipolar system with an
American-led unipolar structure. Entering into the 1990s, China faces a strategic
environment where the United States and its coalition of industrialised Western
democracies, including Japan, are pre-eminent in the international system. Hence,
referring to the American invasion of Panama to capture General Noreiga in 1989
as "a glaring act of hegemonism", an article in Beijing Review criticised the
United States for "openly violating the norms governing international relations".'
In essence, the Chinese sees such American actions as nothing but a smokescreen
for pursuing hegemony.
Therefore, Chinese leaders are unwilling to give unqualified endorsement
to American-led military interventions in other parts of the world. Fortunately for
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them, during the Gulf War, the United States resorted to the United Nations to
provide international legitimacy for the campaign against Iraq. As one of the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council, China was in a position to deny
Washington the United Nations umbrella by vetoing the resolution authorising the
use of force against Iraq. China's ambassador to the United States stressed that
China was "not in favour of using force in the name of the United Nations in
handling the Gulf crisis"?' By abstaining on the critical UN vote, Beijing
succeeded in maintaining an independent stance in its foreign policy. At the same
time, it also appeared that China did not exercise it UN veto as that would have
tarnished its image in the international community; for Beijing realised that, with
world opinion on the Americans' side, China would be the odd one out.
China itself had, after all, been the target of UN military action in the
Korean War. In both Korea and the Gulf, the military actions were led by the
United States. China clearly fears a US "new world order", especially when this is
linked with a global security organisation, the United Nations. An article in
Beijing Review has even noted that the United States attempted its "superpower
status" in the United Nations by threatening to use its veto power if necessary to
block the UN Secretary—General at that time, Boutros-Ghali, from securing a
second term?' To the Chinese, an attempt to impose American political values on
the world, including a strong element of American leadership in international
politics, undesirable. One Chinese source argues that the American "new world
order" pays more attention to "the role of big and developed countries, avoiding
the North-South problem" and dismisses this as an attempt to "create a structure
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and world order that can maintain the US dominant position and promote US
interests in the world"?2
It is clear that the important element of the US "new world order" that
Beijing fears is hegemony. In the light of this, the late Deng Xiaoping's 1974
"Three Worlds Theory" has not totally lost its importance?' During the Cold
War, China viewed itself as a leader of the Third World against an imperialist
West and a "social-imperialist" Soviet Union, concluding that the "contradiction"
between the superpowers is "irreconcilable" and either they will fight each other
or the people in the Third World will rise in revolution?4 Today, Beijing appears
to retain a remote hope that the US "new world order" may cause resentment
among the international community, in particular the developing countries, but
also possibly America's Western allies. Hence, to a certain extent, China's "good
neighbourliness" towards the Asian countries, particularly in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen Incident, has been "globalised into an instrument to fight what was
perceived as the American attempt to vilify it as a pariah regime"?'
In one of the strongest criticism of US China policy after the end of the
Cold War, former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, speaking at the 48th General
Assembly of the United Nations, stated that China opposed "the all too frequent
arbitrary use of sanctions by one country to bring pressure to bear on another" and
"the hegemony conduct of a self-style 'world cop' who tramples upon
international law and norms of international relations"?' It is evident that Qian's
analysis had a nationalistic undertone, with possibly the domestic audiences in
mind as well; this "anti-hegemonism" reveals China's concern about its security
interests.
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In geographical terms, China is particularly worried about the prospect of
US hegemony in Northeast Asia, her "backyard". Some writers such as
Xiaoxiong Yi have argued that "a contrast exists between the entire international
system, dominated by the sole remaining superpower, the United States; and a
relatively peaceful and stable regional environment where the United States is
only one of the several major players in the region"." More importantly, removal
of the East-West confrontation dimension from both historical and incipient
conflict in Northeast Asia is often interpreted by Beijing as causing more
instability. Once the "superpower overlay" has been lifted, regional conflicts
might resurface.' The absence of superpower conflict may engender local
conflicts, such as those between China and Japan, which had previously been
suppressed by the dominant superpower rivalry. However, China will still be
determined to keep the United States at bay in its "backyard", Northeast Asia. In
the long run, Beijing's ultimate aim is to stand up to the United States globally.
Therefore, in interpreting Beijing's security environment, Chinese
strategists continue to pay attention to the balance of power, hoping it will move
toward multipolarity rather unipolarity. Beijing hopes that there will be a
transition to a multipolar world system, in which regional powers such as itself
can play defining roles in their regions and are able to resist external intervention
and interference in its internal affairs. Many Chinese leaders continue to view the
United States' post-Cold War foreign policy as a significant political, if not direct
military, threat to Beijing's security and its future role in Northeast Asia. Beijing
also feels that the United States is out to "contain" China, in the so-called "China
Threat Theory" to be discussed later.
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Currently, China has no alternatives but to work within the existing
international order, for it is impossible to return to a Sino-centric conception of a
world order. In the past, as a vast political entity forced unwillingly to take part in
the world of modern states, China has struggled to find out how to use modern
institutions to work to preserve its traditional integrity. The situation today
remains the same. This time, China has to adapt to the emerging US-led
international order, primarily to ensure that its economic security is not being
compromised.
Economic Security
The importance of economic security to China has already been discussed
in the preceding chapters, and it is a dominant theme in this thesis. As a global
economic power, the United States and its trade policies are bound to affect
China's economic security. American interests remain considerable in Northeast
Asia, for this region has increasingly become a significant market and supplier for
the US economy.
Since the late 1980s, the United States has been the largest market for
Chinese exports. To the Chinese, one main focus of contemporary Sino-American
economic relations is on America as a market for their goods. A natural
complementarity existed between the world's most powerful state and the largest
developing economy. China also wants access to the vast American market,
advanced technology, and American financial investment and capital. On the
American side, Harry Harding has rightly observed that American interest in
promoting Chinese economic modernisation appeared to have replaced strategic
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co-operation as a mutually acceptable basis for Sino-American relations."
Moreover, since 1979, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms have transformed
China from a typical state socialist economy with minimal foreign trade to a
mixed economy in which foreign trade is growing in importance, and economic
and trade relations between China and the United States have developed swiftly.
To be sure, trade frictions have existed between China and America for
quite a while. By the late 1980s, the growth of China's exports to the United
States, which had followed the earlier path taken by Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan, began to elicit accusations of unfair trading practices similar to those
which Americans regularly voice against its other Asian trading partners. The
Chinese export surge turned a positive American trade balance with China into a
growing trade deficit in the mid-1990s. 4° China's huge trade surplus has led to
charges that this resulted from unfair trade practices such as bureaucratic
practices, closed markets, dumping, evasion of quotas, violation of copyrights and
currency manipulation. In the early 1990s, the United States had even threatened
to impose exorbitant tariffs. For instance, a trade war was averted in 1995 when
China reached an agreement with the United States to protect intellectual property
rights in order to counter piracy in products such as computer software. 4 ' This
represented a major step made by both Beijing and Washington in avoiding a
trade war that could threaten the larger bilateral relationship between the two
powers.
China has also identified that the United States is becoming more
aggressive in its current trade policy, as Western countries in general are seeking
to reinvigorate their economies in the 1990s. The Clinton administration has, after
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all, made economic security a priority of its foreign policy and even proposed the
establishment of a "New Pacific Community" for trade in 1993. 42 In order to speed
the opening of Asian markets and increase the vitality of its own Asia policy, the
United States took numerous major diplomatic actions in 1994, and formulated
strategic plans that emphasised the opening of new Asian markets, including China,
as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong. In Chinese eyes, Bill Clinton's proposal to
establish a "New Pacific Community" is largely attributed to that fact that the
Asian-Pacific region is now becoming increasingly important to US economic
interests".' Economic interests are vital to China who see Asia as its domain in
which United States is attempting to intrude in a bid to further strengthen the
American economy.
Moreover, China sees the aggressive American policy of "free trade" as a
form of pressure on the Asian states to accept US traders' unfair advantages.44 An
article in Beijing Review has also pointed to the "large gap in economic strength
between developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the United States and
Japan", and warned Asian countries that the Washington might "indulge in
economic expansionism in the name of liberalisation of trade and investment, to
the detriment of the interests of the developing nations"." The United States had
also previously been perceived by China as attempting to sabotage regional
economic associations that exclude Washington. For instance, while
acknowledging that US "oxygen" facilitated the East Asia economic boom during
the Cold War era, one Chinese assessment warns that the current economic crisis
in Asia presented Washington an opportunity "to hit Asian economies". 46 From
the above analysis, it is clear that China is worried that its economic security
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might be jeopardised; and economic issues will continue to dominate its security
agenda into the twenty-first century.
Perhaps what is reassuring for the Chinese is that, despite the recent
recovery in the US economy, one Chinese assessment still reckons that growth
rates in the developing world will be greater than that of the United States in the
long run. 47 The relative decline of American economic power, especially in
comparison to Germany, is apparently reassuring to the Chinese, for this means
that although the United States remains the only superpower, it may not have the
full range of economic resources required to play a larger role globally." A
similar view was echoed in another article in Beijing Review, which argues that
"the United States dreams of a unipolar hegemony, but it cannot afford it
economically"." We can extrapolate from here that in to be able to maintain a
strong military posture, that United States must strengthen its economy. This type
of analysis is also applicable to China when it emerges as a truly global power in
the future; further giving support to the thesis that economic strength leads to a
state's ascendancy in the international hierarchy.
However, it is equally true that the decline of the US economy implies that
Americans may take an increasingly hard-line position on trade issues with China.
For example, domestic budget deficits have limited the United States' ability to
give Beijing economic assistance or even to help finance American firms
exporting to China. Moreover, as Harry Harding argues, a United States that
suffers from an international balance of payments deficit will be less willing to
tolerate an increase in Chinese imports, barriers to American exports and the
250
growing Chinese trade surplus.' Perhaps more pressing though, for China, is the
issue of the Most-Favoured Nation status.
Most-Favoured Nation status
First and foremost, it is important to note that the Most-Favoured Nation
(MFN) status issue is intricately linked with the human rights issue, which was
discussed in the previous chapter. To be precise, the United States president has
the right to decide each year whether to renew the status to China and non-market
economies; and the Jackson-Vanik amendment stipulated that the president must
consider how much freedom of emigration citizens in those countries enjoyed.
Specifically, the US president must certify that the Chinese government permits
free emigration of its citizens or a renewal of the MFN status will substantially
promote freedom of emigration. Needless to say, China has always viewed this
issue as an obstacle to the furtherance of its economic interests.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, referring to the Jackson-Vanik
Act, an article in Beijing Review argues that "the annual examination of China's
MFN status is discriminatory" and "the laws the current practice is based on were
enacted during the Cold War years"; adding that "the issues examined by the US
president and Congress on China's MFN status are not only related to trade and
economy, but also to security matters and ideological differences, which are
largely China's internal affairs". 5 ' Hence, the United States is often seen the
Chinese n as "using trade relations to impose its own will upon China and meddle
in China's internal affairs". Such strong statements attest to the fact that China is
seriously concerned when its economic security is at stake.
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More importantly, a critical element that transformed this ordinary trade
dispute into an explosive political issue between the two countries was the change
in American public perception of China that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident
evoked. Until 1990, the renewal of MFN status was on the whole a routine event.
Since then, mutual economic relations have become more closely intertwined with
political considerations and the annual question whether to renew China's MFN
status has become a central issue in the eyes of the American public. In the recent
past, American presidents such as George Bush had supported the unconditional
extension of the status, arguing that trade was mutually beneficial to both and
would indirectly helped China to the path toward reforms by the growth of its
non-state sectors. Advocates of this "open door" policy of "constructive
engagement" in the United States also argue that isolating Beijing will be
counterproductive in bringing political change in China. Linked to this fact is that
the prosperity of Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan is dependent on Sino-
American trade.
On the other hand, "closed door" constituencies argue for hard-line
policies to pressurise China to change. While the debate in the US Congress is not
the subject matter of this thesis, it is important to note that the "open door" policy
advocated by some US officials provides a better framework for China to enhance
its economic security. However, this policy also means China's political system,
amongst other things, will become more susceptible to undesirable US influence
as economic exchanges take place. The key for China's leaders, therefore, is how
to balance its economic security objectives without jeopardising its political
security.
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With its economic security in mind, it is clear that China does not wish to
suffer the severe and long-term consequences of international sanctions, which
were imposed after the Tiananmen Incident. As a direct consequence of China's
"co-operation" in the Gulf Crisis, these European, Japanese and American
economic sanctions were rescinded and a major obstacle to China's desire to
pursue economic development had been removed. Interestingly, in return for
China's tacit co-operation, the United States worked to end the moratorium on
further World Bank loans to China that had been in place since the Tiananmen
Incident. Therefore, there is a linkage in both events. Beijing now realises it has
to learn how to deal with this type of complicated interconnection in international
relations if it is to cope successfully with the sole remaining superpower. The
major short-term challenge facing China's foreign policy-makers is how to
accommodate to American power without totally submitting to it.
Most important of all to China, the MFN issue pressed upon a sensitive
national issue. It is regarded as interference in China's internal affairs. Hence, the
Clinton administration's decision in 1996 to delink the MFN status from human
rights issues and renew it, despite acknowledging that the Chinese had failed to
make the necessary progress in human rights, was welcomed by the Chinese. The
reversal of policy was due in part to pressure from American business lobbies, but
it was also due to President Clinton's recognition that the United States could not
subordinate all dealings with a country of China's significance to the human
rights factor alone. Economic interests have become too important for states to
totally ignore in the post-Cold War era.
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Moreover, according to Denny Roy, the US "surrender" on the MFN issue
indicated the power of the economic imperative and the decline of American
economic power, especially when other nations stand to take over the market
should the United States pull out." In fact, China is already using its rising global
economic influence to punish the nations that criticise it and reward those that
support it. For example, former premier Li Peng has stated clearly in an interview
with the Financial Times that China will turn to European and Japanese firms if
the United States continue to criticise Chinese policies." This means that China
can seek to enhance its economic security by trading with other states, apart from
the world's strongest economic power.
The US and the international economic system
In order to explore the importance of the United States to China's
economic interests, we need to look at the US role in the international economic
system. Given that the international trading system is very much dominated by the
Americans, it will be useful to look at the wider historical perspective. During the
1970s, it was generally recognised that China's delegates to the United Nations
strongly supported the Third World calls for in New International Economic Order
(NIE0), backing the view put forth by the Third World that the industrialised and
richer countries should provide more aid and better terms of trade and finance. By
the 1980s, as Samuel Kim correctly points out, Beijing appears to seeking to
become part of the global economic system rather than challenge the system.'
Deng Xiaoping's polices mean that, instead of rejecting or seeking to reform
international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International
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Monetary Fund (IMF) or the former General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) (now the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China should join these
organisations to extract whatever resources it needs. China also realises that it is
more cost-effective to absorb foreign investment to hasten its modernisation than to
try to pursue an autarkic development program, as it did during Mao Zedong's
reign. Basically, China's strategy has become "if you cannot beat them, join
them".
Therefore, in Chinese eyes, the IMF and the World Bank are viewed as
valuable sources of international funding. Beijing also needs to remain on good
terms with the world at large and its Asian neighbours in particular, as far as
economic relations are concerned, for it has to keep the door open to absorb more
investment and technology from abroad. To be sure, China is already a member of
many of the most important international trade and political institutions, the WTO
being the major exception. China had participated as a non-voting observer in the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which started in 1986 and
ended in December 1993. Beijing sees membership of the WTO as a logical step
in its efforts to participate fully in the global market economy and also to help
China reduce bilateral threats of trade restrictions.
However, it is important to point out that, although China is eager to join
the WTO, it still has not entirely accepted certain entry criteria, especially when
this might have ramifications on its political security. For instance, Minister of
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation Wu Yi stresses that China will "never
sacrifice the fundamental interests of our country for the sake of re-entering
GATT [WTO] and will not "barter away principles" despite "external pressure"."
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In reality, it must be said that Beijing's application to enter the WTO has been
held up by China's unwillingness to pledge to complete the transition to a full
market economy and, in particular, reform certain trading practices that currently
failed to meet WTO trade and membership rules. The United States is, in
Beijing's eyes, often seen as the country maintaining certain trade principles that
make China's desire to join the WTO unachievable. In fact, the WTO issue was
high on Premier Zhu Rongji's agenda when he visited the United States in 1999.
In addition, it is interesting to note that while China rejects any
multilateral approach to security in the region, it is more willing to agree to
multilateral economic co-operation and accordingly more interested in playing a
larger role in various economic organisations. The reason, as argued in Chapter 2,
lies in China's need to sustain its economic growth. Beijing believes that it will
benefit from these organisations because as China develops economically, it will
be able to exercise greater leverage in international investment, finance and trade.
China's policy is to rely on bilateral trade arrangements while at the same seeking
to participate in a global market system through membership in the WTO. This
represents one way for Beijing to enhance its economic security.
To date, China has gained entry to several major international economic
organisations. Beijing joined the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund in 1980, the Asian Development Bank and the Pacific Economic Co-
operation Conference (PECC) in 1986 and became a member of the Asia Pacific
Economic Co-operation (APEC) process at the APEC III meeting in November
1991. Although China is not yet a member of the less formal but perhaps more
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important international grouping, the Group of Eight (G-8), which consists of the
United States, Canada, Japan United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Russia.
However, international institutions such as the G-8 will almost certainly
require China to satisfy various membership criteria. China will then be subjected
to international pressures to alter its internal and external arrangements and policies
to keep in line with most of the developed world. This is a price that China will
have to pay for extracting resources and benefits from the international system for
its own growth. Beijing will have to balance the needs for economic modernisation
with perhaps a partial abdication of its much-treasured sovereignty. It will also have
to deal with any unintended consequences that may affect the communist party's
political security, as a result of membership in certain international economic
institutions.
More importantly, China knows that the leading Western trading nation,
the United States, is the key to a more general acceptance of China into the
prosperous world of capitalism and international trade. China's accession to most
international economic organisations will need American support, overt or tacit.
However, it must be said that the world capitalist economic system is not
without its problems. One good example is the Great Depression in the 1930s. Of
great relevance to our analysis here is the fact that growth rates in the developed
world have stagnated in the early 1990s, and trade imbalances are creating
protectionist sentiments as the emerging potential trade blocs in Europe and North
America threaten the expansion of free trade, which is an essential element of the
capitalist system. A combination of recession and protection in world trade can
paralyse Chinese export growth while domestic demands for employment and
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higher living standards continue to rise; and the leaders in China may find it
increasingly difficult to satisfy the demands of the population.
In short, China needs to reassess the benefits and cost of interdependence,
in an international economic system dominated by its perceived political opponent,
the United States. China will tolerate interdependence with America for the sake of
its own economic goals because at present, this appears as the best way forward
rather than pursuing autarkic policies. China has always been interested in
international trade but only as a means to build up its economic power. In short, as
Xiaoxiong Yi has pointed out, in an era of economic interdependence, growth is
best seen not as an end in itself but as a necessary tactic to develop to truly great
power status.56
However, what must be reassuring for China's leaders is that Beijing is not
currently dependent on any particular imports or sets of imports for its economic
well being, and it has in fact become a leading exporting nation. However, China
needs outside assistance to modernise, particularly in the areas of technology and
management skills, and to overcome the overall shortage of capital for investment.
China has also relied on external sources, using foreign actors to serve its own
needs. World Bank and Japanese government assistance to build China's
infrastructure is one example, and Hong Kong investment in building highway
networks in South China is another. The use of international capital markets, sale of
shares abroad and other sources of international finance will increase, primarily as a
means to enhance Beijing's economic security.
For the foreseeable future, Beijing will continue to seek concessional loans
from financial institutions dominated by the West, in particular by the United
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States. It will attempt to attract venture capital and technology transfers. In order
to do that, China will have to repay loans and finance the purchase of advanced
technology. Chinese industry must meet the international standards of price and
quality control measures as well as personnel policies. Management expertise
will become necessary if China's products are to find a market share in the
increasingly competitive global market place. China's economic growth and
modernisation have, to a large extent, become dependent on the world economy for
trade and technology. Hence, there is no doubt that China's leaders perceive
regional stability and the continuation of the economic dynamism in the Asia-
Pacific region as essential for its economic development. This is at the heart of
China's deepest security interests.
Conclusion
After the Cold War ended, China has to come to terms with an unipolar
international system with the United States being the lone superpower. This raises
new concerns for China's security planners. From China's perspective, in the
1990s, because the United States has fewer occasions when it needs China's co-
operation on strategic and regional issues, there are possibilities that Washington
may adopt a more hard-line policy towards Beijing, thereby perhaps threatening
its political and military security directly or indirectly. There is no doubt that
China is clearly apprehensive about a US "new world order", which is likely to
include an American-led coalition of Western industrialised states and Japan
unchecked by a counterweight.
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In the economic sphere, relations between China and the United States
have been strained as well, with controversy over renewal of the Most-Favoured
Nation status being a case in point. Nonetheless, China has tried to enhance its
economic security by extracting whatever resources it can from the international
economic system dominated by the United States. On the whole, it plausible to
argue that future China perceptions of its own security, encompassing the
military, political and economic aspects, will to a large extent depend on its
perceptions of the American threat. Ultimately, China hopes that it can achieve
great power status through a strong economic base, which will bolster its security.
This subject will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9: DRIVE TO GREAT POWER STATUS
As alluded in the previous chapters, it has become clear that the ultimate
goal for Chinese security planners is to achieve great power status in the next
century. Achieving this will no doubt mean that China will then enhance its
security in a more comprehensive marmer. However, this is bound to raise doubts
about whether China's search for security might ultimately impinge on the
security of others. There is currently a plethora of writings on this debate, which
in the view adopted here, has grown out of proportion to the more critical task of
assessing China's security agenda. Nevertheless, for our purposes here, we can
conveniently sum up the debate by using the term "China Threat Theory" in order
to explore this notion in greater detail.
This penultimate chapter examines the implications of China's drive to
great power status. In its search for ultimate security, China does raise some
concerns for the security of other states. We first look at China as a great power.
Then we assess the "China Threat Theory" and China's contribution to regional
stability. It must also be noted from the outset that this chapter will not assess the
China threat from the perspectives of its individual neighbours. What this chapter
aims to achieve is to highlight China's longer-term security agenda and what this
might mean for the region as a whole. We first turn to China's security interests as
a great power, as a thorough analysis is likely to shed light on China's current
concerns.
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Security of a great power
Historically, China sees itself as a regional power, if not a global power,
partly due to the Sino-centric order Beijing used to impose on vast areas of
eastern Asia. China is the world's most populous country and it has a long
civilisation that can be traced back more than two thousand years. This is further
reinforced by China's rise as a communist giant that even rivalled the Soviet
Union at certain periods in the past. Therefore, writers such as Michael Yahuda
states that it may be possible to argue that China's "weight" or perceived
importance in world affairs is that of a major power.' According to this line of
argument, China is therefore regarded as of greater significance than "middle
powers" such as Great Britain or France in international affairs. During the Cold
War era, although significantly weaker than either of the two superpowers, China
was adept at playing its role in the great power triangle, even managing to extend
its influence considerably in global affairs. The above indicates China's great
power ambitions and these will to be held continue in the post-Cold War era.
However, it must also be pointed out that China, at various points in time,
does not want to be seen as a great power. For example, during the Cold War,
China viewed itself as the champion of the Third World in the struggle against the
hegemonism of the two superpowers, rather than as a great power. This is also
relevant to the fact that top leader Li Peng has noted that the rise of Asia would
led to the end of Western domination.' Although China may relish the prospect of
sharing permanent membership in the Security Council with other Third World
states, it is plausible that in the longer term, China may eventually seek leadership
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of the Third World. Such issues are likely to form part of China's security
agenda.
Yet, today, at a time when the power vacuum associated by the decline of
American military forces in Northeast Asia is regarded an incentive for regional
powers such as China to assert themselves, Beijing has repeatedly denied its plans
to fill up the power vacuum in the region created by the ending of the Cold War.
In addition, China states that it will not seek hegemony even when it becomes
"economically developed."' The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is
that Chinese leaders do wish to restore China's dominance once again, but they
feel that, at the moment, they do not want China to be seen as a rising hegemon,
especially since China has yet to build a solid economic base.
Moreover, it is generally recognised in a world of sovereign states with no
central political authority, states will defend their territories with the use of force
if necessary, often irrespective of what one's views on the use of force may be. In
this respect, China is no different from any other states, as it seeks to maintain its
sovereignty and bolster its security. As writers such as Rex Li and David
Shambaugh have noted, this is hardly surprising given that the Chinese had been
the victim of foreign aggression in the recent past, and they tend to adopts what
one may label as a realist approach to international relations. 4 As far as the use of
force is concerned, John Baylis points out that China has traditionally used its
military forces largely in Clausewitzian, political terms, and above all, in a
defensive manner.' For example, China had participated in the Korean War and
supported the North Vietnamese to guard its frontiers. Beijing "punished"
Vietnam in 1979 for its invasion of Cambodia, an action indirectly aimed at the
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Soviet threat building up at Cam Ranh Bay. It was above all, a demonstration that
China would no longer be weak as it had been during the first half of this century,
and an indication of its security agenda as a great power.
In addition, the acquisition of nuclear weapons can be seen as an
indication that China has emerged as great power, a supreme symbol of self-
reliance as a means to elevate its status in the world and defend its sovereignty,
and as the means to pursue an independent foreign policy. Moreover, as Robert
Norris points out, the Chinese hope to catch up in marginal weapons
improvements was the rationale for the Chinese testing in 1995 during the
moratorium by the other powers and in the face of widespread global
disapproval.'
Interestingly, although China has been regarded by many as a great power or
potential great power, there are those that regard China as a weak state at the same
time. Analysts such as Barry Buzan have distinguished between the terms "state"
and "power"! The term "power" is used to refer to the relations among states,
which are largely seen in terms of their military strength, although criteria such as
political cohesion within a state and the level of economic development, are also
important. The term "state" specifically refers to issues such as the degree of social
cohesion and it is a view from inside the state. The political security of China, or
more specifically that of the Chinese Communist Party, was dealt with earlier; there
is still a question mark over the fate of the party although it is safe to say that
China's economic and military strength is growing by the day.
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The "China Threat Theory" (Zhongguo Weixie Lun)
To China's leaders, one unintended consequence of its search for security
must be the "China Threat Theory", as developed by Western observers. The term
itself, Zhongguo Weixie Lun, is used here as a convenient heuristic device to look
at the alleged threats that China's rise might pose to its neighbours and perhaps
even to the wider world. The Chinese "threat" is a term used widely by Western
analysts and policymakers when they debate on ways to keep a rising China in
check. While debates on the value-laden nature and conceptual problems of this
term need not bother us here, it is worth noting that Chinese academics and
policymakers have often put forth counter arguments in a rather vehement
manner. As Paul Kennedy argues, since military power stems from economic
power, economic growth will enhance China military power projection in the
region.' This will undoubtedly give Beijing a wider choice in the pursuit of its
national security interests. Furthermore, in Robert Gilpin's formulation, a state
dissatisfied with the status quo will seek changes through territorial, political and
economic expansion until the marginal costs of further changes are equal to or
greater than the marginal benefits.' In many ways, China appears to be such a
state, especially when one takes into account its past support for Third World
revolutions that challenged the international status quo.
However, it is equally plausible that revolutionary states can be in a
process of what J.D. Armstrong describes as "socialisation" into international
society.' A supporting example for this argument appeared in a joint statement
issued by President Jiang Zemin and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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(ASEAN) at the China-ASEAN informal leaders' meetings in December 1997,
which the Renmin Ribao, described as having "profound significance for the
future development of East Asia and China-ASEAN friendly co-operative ties"."
Nevertheless, at this point in time, it is true to say that China has been fully
socialised into international society, although this process is steadily gaining
momentum as China seeks to bolster its security simultaneously.
More importantly, China has also attributed its negative image as a
potential regional hegemon to US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. For
instance, an article in Beijing Review states that the end of the Cold War deprive
many countries of their most specific strategic aim, and many potential threats,
such as the so-called "China threat", were soon brought to the fore in order to "fill
the vacuum of the strategic structure".' The article further argues that this type of
thinking is well rehearsed in some American academic and policy circles. From
the above, it is true to say that this type of thinking in America has been given a
further impetus by the flux in the current international system.
To the some Chinese, the perception is that there is a foreign attempt to
"line up the different fractions of American society, an even the whole West, to
fight an imaginary enemy".' Furthermore, a Renmin Ribao commentary argues
that this foreign attempt aims to "sow discord" between China and its
neighbouring countries so that benefits, such as those through arms sales, can be
reaped, and China's development can be "restricted and obstructed".14
Interestingly, this Chinese statement has come amidst some Western analysts such
as Samuel Huntingdon predicting a neo-Confucianism ideological challenge to
the West.' While there may be a "clash of civilisations" in the future, one must
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question the coherence of an unified Confucian challenge. For example, one can
point out differences in the economic cultures that existed among the Japanese,
Koreans and the Chinese. At present, no semblance of an unified Confucian
challenge has appeared in real terms yet, apart from the so-called "Asian values",
which are better seen as a justification for the continuation of specific strands in
Asian political culture rather than as a stern challenge to the West. One Chinese
assessment suggests that the "clash of civilisations" analysis is in actual fact a
reflection of "growing uncertainty and lack of confidence about the future of
Western civilisation" and is "an attempt to explain the dilemma facing the West";
considering it "will be dangerous if the clash theory finds its way into policy
making" and concluding that "the notion of a 'China threat' is based on
assumptions similar to Huntingdon's".' Another Chinese assessment compares
US "containment" policy with McCarthysim of the 1950s, dismissing claims of
the chairman of the US Senate Governmental Affairs committee, Fred Thompson,
that the Chinese government used money to influence the 1996 US presidential
and congressional elections." Such statements shed light on the thoughts of
China's security policymakers, in particular how the United States is being
perceived.
To a certain extent, the Chinese sees the West as trying to "contain" China
from developing into a great power and Western analysts such as Gerald Segal
have also warned the Western world against treating China like the Soviet Union
during the Cold Wan t ' Interestingly, one of the Chinese leaders, Li Peng, claims
that the "China Threat Theory" is, in fact, an "U-turn" from suggestions of
China's "collapse", arguing that "the two extreme ideas reflect some people's
272
ignorance about China's real situation". 19 In this sense, the "China Threat Theory"
appears to stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of an imminent collapse.
There is, of course, another way of interpreting the above analysis, for a China on
the point of collapse will try to use an aggressive nationalistic foreign policy as a
form of internal cement. In short, a situation whereby China is facing a collapse
can also magnify a China threat. While we need not really delve into this debate,
what we can say is that the "China Threat Theory" does have the utility giving
policymakers in the West a convenient framework for formulating their China
policies.
Above all, China's drive to great power status is influenced by anti-
imperialism and fears of the hegemonist potential of America, as discussed in the
earlier chapter. Indeed, as noted by Robert Scalapino, China's efforts to sustain
growth in the economy in order to continue its ascendancy to great power status is
in many ways reminiscent of certain aspects of the policy that Japan's Meiji
reformers adopted for the goal of "a rich country, strong soldiery". 2° Although it
was Japan's rise in the early part of this century that encroached on China's
sovereignty, it is an open secret that China does want to emulate Japan's rise in
Asia. Unfortunately for Beijing, this posture has often been misinterpreted by
smaller Asian states as the rise of a hegemonic China that harbours expansionist
objectives. It is true to say that, currently, the end of the Cold War has provided a
relatively peaceful environment for China to redefine its military strategy and
modernise its weapons systems. Indeed, the 1990s can be seen as the "take off'
phase in a military build-up that will enable China to challenge for supreme
leadership in Asia in the next century.'
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It is also important to note that China's defence modernisation is affected
by the increase in defence spending in the region as a whole. At present, there is
an arms build-up in East Asia closely linked to regional concerns that an
American military and perhaps even political retrenchment from the region may
expose East Asian states to various tensions and confrontations. 	 Anticipating
such challenges, in the 1990s, most countries in the region embarked on arms
spending, which is often veiled under the explanation of "catching up" or
"ongoing modernisation" of the their forces. In addition, there are also other
factors driving the arms race, such as the need to police the extra-territorial
economic zones and sea lines of communications as well as to defend offshore
territorial claims. In some cases the additional factor is prestige conferred by the
possession of certain advanced weapon systems. Also, the arms race is fanned by
the growing wealth of these countries, at least before the financial crisis. China is
affected by this process and, in turn, is increasing its military spending in reaction
to this trend. As noted by Weixing Hu, keeping up with the regional arms build-
up has influenced the thinking of China's military leaders.'
Another point to note is that while the imperatives of the regional and global
market place have helped to forge improved relations among the nations of East
Asia, their occasionally competing political and security agendas limit the degree of
economic co-operation and raise the potential for new conflicts as they may pursue
joint endeavours with different (and often potentially conflicting) long term
objectives. In fact, history shows that at least to date, increased economic co-
operation and interdependence, in themselves, provide no guarantee against
conflicts. True, they can increase the stakes and thus raise the consequences to the
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point where a potential aggressor will have to think twice before choosing a
military option in order to achieve its aspirations, but they can also create a false
sense of confidence which may cause states to push too hard or too fast.
For example Paul Dibb has pointed out that there is "no evidence to
support the theory that economic interdependence leads to peace". 23 In addition,
reviewing China's military actions in the Spratly Islands, Gerald Segal concludes
that economic interdependence is not enough to make China moderate its
behaviour, hence its "neighbours and powers farther afield" must use "elements
from a strategy of engagement as well as the balance of power" in order to
"constrain" China from expansionism.' Interestingly, Dale Copeland posits that a
state's expectations of future trade are crucial determinants of whether
interdependence causes war. 25 This may be China's agenda, as its trade problems
with the United States remain unresolved, drawing similarities to the suggestion
that Japan and the United States may one day even be involved in a conflict over
trade disputes.
In terms of its status as a nuclear power, China's testing of its nuclear
weapons has often been misinterpreted as a sign of its increasing aggressiveness.
It is important to note that China became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in March 1992, and also reached a tacit agreement in 1991 to abide
by the Missiles Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 26 China was among the
first Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) signatories in September 1996 at
the fifty-first United Nations meeting. 27 However, in the eyes of many, China does
not go far enough in its commitment to the NPT; for although China no longer
openly opposes these non-proliferation regimes, it does not yet seem to have taken
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effective steps to prevent the export of missile and nuclear technology to countries
such as Pakistan.'
Perhaps more importantly, the Chinese argue that strategic independence
is still required because "hegemonism and power politics still exist" and because
"the two major powers [United States and Russia] still possess the largest
[nuclear] arsenals with the most sophisticated weapons". 29 This attests to China's
desire to maintain nuclear weapons primarily as a means to maintain its military
security. Former foreign minister Qian Qichen has reiterated that the nuclear
weapons developed by China are solely for self-defence, and Beijing never meant
to pose a threat to any specific country.3°
For the ultimate goals of its drive for great power status, China needs to
have a modern and strong military establishment, including nuclear capabilities,
in order to achieve its political objectives. Samuel Kim argues that, above all, the
real driving force for Beijing's current military expansion has little to do with any
current military threats, but stems from "a century of humiliation" by the Western
powers and the need to become a great power in world politics?' China's military
and political security had been violated in the past by foreign powers. Therefore,
Beijing is determined to ensure this must never happen again.
Economic power house
As noted by Vincent Cable and Peter Ferdinand, the fear that China's
economic success is likely to be translated into an offensive military capability
has fuelled much of the debate on the "China Threat Theory". 32 In China itself, it
is quite clear that the leaders want Beijing to emerge as an economic powerhouse.
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In concrete terms, China is now a major player in many commodities markets, for
both agricultural and mineral products, and also for industrial intermediate
products. For example, in the December 1995 issue of its World Commodity
Forecasts, the Economist Intelligence Unit lists China's presence as one of the
factors most affecting, or likely to affect, price trends in all but one (zinc) of the
industrial raw materials it covers, and in virtually all food, foodstuffs and
beverages markets (the exceptions are coffee, cocoa and copra/coconut oil).33
China was mentioned in most cases as a major producer, consumer and trader and
often as having a destabilising effect on world markets because its non-market
practices means its involvement is often determined by arbitrary and non-market
based administrative decision making. Moreover, as the World Bank points out,
restructuring of the economies of developed countries that are necessary to
accommodate China will involve some difficulties, although, these are small
relative to the enormous changes happening in China anyway.'
In addition, the leaders in China are aware that other countries need
Beijing as a trading partner. For instance, although most countries remain
displeased with much of the Chinese government's domestic and international
behaviour, companies throughout the Asia-Pacific region are rushing to trade with
and invest in China. After an interval in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident,
trade with China has largely returned to a more normal level. Part of the reason
why states do not restrict their investors is the fear of losing out in profiting from
China's economic growth. Since foreigners benefit from doing business with
China, the incentive is for more investment. Moreover, the fact that one
government refuses to do business with China does not stop other countries from
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grabbing their share of the huge Chinese market.' This, of course, serves China's
long term security objectives. CU-la's leaders believe that western investors prefer
investing in countries that offer political stability as long as they get a good return
on their investment.' In addition, China offers cheap labour and a large consumer
market for Western goods. Ironically, it is thus the trade and investment of
Western capitalist countries that constitutes one of the main reasons why China is
expected to achieve high growth, enhancing Beijing's economic security in the
process.
As for the wider implications, in the search for resources to sustain its
economic growth, China has shown its assertiveness over claims to potential
energy resources, such as in the Nansha Islands (Spratlys). As Michael Leifer
points out, China is seeking for the prospect of discovering oil, which Beijing
must now import.' In addition, energy needs of the rapidly growing Northeast
Asian region means that other rival nations such as Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan are likely to become rival importers of oil. Therefore, writers such as Kent
Caldor have argued that the United States needs to take the lead in assisting the
development of energy reserves in the region with the aim of reducing regional
tensions.' The latter might stem from clashes of requirements for economic
development. At the same time, it is equally likely that the China will continue to
choose a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship with its neighbours.
The fear of China is also evident in the concept of Greater China,
described by Harry Harding in geographical terms as comprising China, Taiwan
and Hong Kong." To many Asians, the usage of "Greater" connotes hegemonist
tendencies and might evoke memories of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity
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Sphere, the Japanese-imposed regional order in the 1940s. In reality, this concept
of Greater China emanates from the economic realm rather than the political. The
growing economic integration of Hong Kong, South China and Taiwan can be
expected to affect the international political economy and more importantly serve
China's security interests. This will enable China to gain technology and capital
from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and in the long term help China's economic
development drive. Indeed, the overseas Chinese, including those in Southeast
Asia, through their investments, are propelling China's economic revolution.'
Common ancestry and ties of kinship origin form the world's oldest civilisation
and the economic impact of the overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) is most evident here,
all of which can play a role in enhancing China's security interests.
However, although economic integration is moving at a faster pace, it is
true to say that the political emergence of a Greater China is still in its infancy.
Political tensions between Beijing and Taiwan remain far from resolved. As
Michael Yahuda points out, the Greater China concept is "based on looser
informal ties rather than within strict legal or political frameworks and would
above all, depend very much on the course of domestic politics in China and
Taiwan and Hong Kong". 4 ' What is unquestionable is that the emergence of
Greater China in any form is likely to help China further its economic security
interests and thereby its drive to great power status in the region.
In Asia and around the world, China's growing economic, political and
military strength is the focus of much interest and some anxiety. From a negative
viewpoint, it is contended that China's continuing emergence from political and
economic isolation is likely to be marked by increasing and potentially dangerous
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friction with its near neighbours, with trading partners and others, and with
international institutions. More hopefully, it is held that China's large and
growing market and productive capacity offer enormous opportunities to add to
the sum of world prosperity, and that it is also partly the job of the international
system to find ways to accommodate China that accord with the importance
which Beijing thinks it deserves and will increasingly demand.
An analogy can be made to Japan, which has recently risen to be a major
power while accepting the constraints of the international system, primarily due
to the restraint encapsulated in the American-Japanese alliance. In previous
century, the rise of the United States as a global power took place largely within
the existing rules and was accompanied by a willingness to work within those
constraints with the objectives of changing the international order from the inside.
For China, as Edward Friedman quite rightly noted, the current challenge to
enhance state security and achieve global power status is to make itself anti-
imperialist, not through self-reliance and mobilisation for wars but through
economic growth.' To do that, China will need a stable environment.
Quest for a stable environment
As discussed in the previous chapter, China frequently argues that it needs
"to maintain a peaceful international environment so that its limited resources and
energies can be concentrated on construction and development"." Following this
line of argument means that "it is hard to imagine that China would harm the
existence of a peaceful international environment at the risk of its own
development program". " This is, of course, not only a refutation of the "China
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Threat Theory" but also an indication of China's desire to carry out its economic
development. The Chinese are not doing this out of altruism. It is the central
argument in this thesis that economics play an increasing role in the formulation
of a state's security agenda. In other words, China wants a stable regional
environment to sustain its economic growth, above all else. 45 Therefore, one can
say that China needs an international environment of co-operation rather than
confrontation.
Furthermore, history shows that, as China progressed through the years, it
had to abandon the inevitability-of-war thesis in its strategy in order to use the world
capitalist system to achieve internal economic growth. On the whole, the concept of
global interdependence appears to have replaced the Leninist theory of
imperialism, constituting the theoretical justification for China's growing
dependence on the world capitalist system. At the end of the 1990s, the use of
force, if ever applied, is likely to be rational, calculated and limited in scope.
Chinese military thinkers are still influenced by ancient military thought; as the
famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote around 400 B.C. that the
supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. To most Chinese,
winning a war, be it economic conflict or a total war, is best achieved by
manoeuvres and deception, without bloodshed. In the foreseeable future,
therefore, it is unlikely that China will embark on all-out war to achieve its
security objectives. China will not want to be seen as the first to initiate a large-
scale conflict because this will risk hurting its economic ties with its neighbours.
These economic ties and a stable environment in Northeast Asia are too important
for its economic modernisation and its domestic stability.
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In addition, it is worth noting that the Chinese military has done its part to
calm the nerves of its foreign counterparts. For example, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) has stepped up its exchanges with foreign forces. In 1992, the PLA
received an unprecedented one hundred and ten visiting military delegations.'
Such moves will in the long run foster a better understanding with other countries
and bring about greater transparency of the intentions of the PLA. In addition, it
has also been argued by writers such as Chong-pin Lin that modernisation, as
advocated by the late Deng Xiaoping, will increase general interdependence with
the outside world and a strong PLA may become a regionally stabilising force."
Therefore, former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen emphasised to the
ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in August 1995 that Beijing's decision to cut
its military strength by one million was a significant step taken unilaterally by the
Chinese government as the scope and volume of this cut was rarely seen in the
international arms control and disarmament arena." In the past, the Chinese had
refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, which they viewed as
Soviet-US agreement in collusion to prevent erosion of their dominant positions
as the world's nuclear powers. Beijing had interpreted both the Test Ban Treaty
and NPT as attempts by the two superpowers to prevent other states from
acquiring nuclear weapons. China's defensive attitude to nuclear matters was
largely due to its vulnerable position in relation to the United States and the
Soviet Union in the 1960s." The end of the Cold War has to a certain extent
altered China's threat perception, which resulted in a more positive attitude to
nuclear arms control.
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Above all, China's political economy and domestic reform program have
profoundly shaped its involvement in the international economic system. Economic
interdependence with the outside world has restricted Chinese behaviour.
Complying with a set of international norms and standards in the realm of
economics is to a certain extent a way of restraining Chinese political behaviour
and may, in the long-term, be an influence on the political liberalisation of the
country itself. For example, to be able to obtain developmental loans from
Europe, Japan, the United States and international institutions, China will need to
gain a degree of acceptance in the eyes of the developed nations.
If China is enmeshed in a network of international ties, it will fear its
losing major trading partners. As Keohane and Nye put it, "as a result of increased
communications, movement of people across international borders, foreign
investments and changes in export and import practices", significant changes in
attitudes and conduct of states, such as those of China, can take place without the
Chinese realising it. 5° China might, therefore, become more constrained in its
actions in the political realm, conducting itself in a manner more acceptable to
the international community. In such circumstances, an aggressive foreign policy
will be less likely. Therefore, it is in the interests of the outside world and in
particular China's immediate neighbours to attempt "tying China into the
international system" based on China's reliance on the world economic capitalist
order; and this is even more important because China "remains unique among the
great powers in having little experience of genuine multilateral interaction with
the international community".' In addition, one Chinese academic insists that
"the absorption of foreign investment, technologies, management skills,
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entrepreneurship and other market mechanisms nurtures a new generation of
officials and professionals with more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic outlooks".52
All these mean that China can, ironically, in actual fact play a constructive role in
regional security.'
Role in regional security
In discussions on regional order, one must take note of the constructive
roles of great powers can have in a regional system. China can, for example, play
a great power role in Northeast Asia. As for the specific definition of a great
power, Hedley Bull argues:
Great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by
their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties.
Great powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to
play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the
international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and are thought by
others to have the duty, or modifying their policies in the light of the
managerial responsibilities they bear.'
It can be argued that the role of great powers is more crucial as the structure of
"international society" in Northeast Asia, where no effective multilateralism
exists, is still relatively weak compared to Europe. At the same time, it is
interesting to note that Chinese scholars in discussing international relations have
increasingly used the concept of "international society"."
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Following Hedley Bull and Adam Watson's distinction between an
international "system" and an international "society"?' one may argue that that
Northeast Asia still represents only an international "system". This argument is
further supported by the fact that there exists a diversity of political systems
operating in Northeast Asia, with the totalitarian state of North Korea still holding
out on one side and Japan, a "Westernised" democracy on the other. In the
middle of the spectrum are Russia and China themselves, whose fates in
democracy still hang in the balance. The diversity of political systems certainly
makes it difficult to institute some form of collective defence structure such as the
likes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Europe. Moreover,
the lack of a common cultural homogeneity and commonality weakens the
attempt to institute some security structures along the lines of Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In the economic domain, the Asia
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) is the most developed and China is a
member. Economic interdependence is advancing in Northeast Asia, but is still
relatively underdeveloped. For example, trade between Japan and Russia, and
between Russia and China is limited. Grand schemes of multilateral co-operation
are not a realistic option in Northeast Asia, and it must be pointed out that the
development of powerful international institutions in Europe took many years.
Given this context, for any attempts at confidence building measures or
forming security regimes to have any chance of success, they must involve the
great powers such as China. It is worth noting that collective security had failed
in the past as not all the great powers were involved, a good example being the
case of the League of Nations where the United States was not actively involved?'
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It is therefore plausible to say that China's role in Asia will be crucial to the
security of the region. In fact, China's outlook on regional security issues is
bound to shape the post-Cold War strategic landscape in Asia.
On its part, it is interesting to note that China has acknowledged that the
founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1994, which, in many
ways, marked the beginning of security co-operation the region.' In December
1996, China joined the non-governmental Council for Security Co-operation in
the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), a multilateral grouping of regional research institutes,
security specialists and former and current government officials. As Gerald Segal
points out, China apparently sees a virtue in regional multilaterialism as a way to
exert counter-pressure against the United States."
In addition, in July 1996, China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, which must surely represent a willingness on its part to get more involved
in security issues on the basis of a global consensus. Furthermore, the Chinese
have largely accepted that problems such as the Korean issue, discussed in
Chapter 4, must be resolved through dialogue. Nevertheless, as Michael Yahuda
points out, China still prefers to deal with security issues on a case-by case,
bilateral basis before embarking on multilateral dialogues.' Western analysts
such as Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser argue that one reason for China's
reservations in multilateral schemes is that Beijing fears they will simply serve to
single out China for criticism, in particular for its military build-up, and
internationalise the Spratly disputes.' In the Asia-Pacific region, China
anticipates the gradual establishment of "bilateral, sub-regional and regional
multi-layered, multi-channel security-ensuring dialogue mechanisms".62
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However, China's general unwillingness to subordinate its security
interests to regional organisations, especially those initiated by the United States,
has also contributed to fears of China being a threat to the region. In this sense,
general Chinese suspicion of the Western goal of "peaceful evolution" has carried
over into regional security discussions. For example, Beijing is intent on limiting
any interference by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in China's military
development. China is particularly reticent about publicising its military
doctrines and order of battle to accommodate ARF transparency requests,
implying that such demands are really "thinly disguised quests for intelligence".63
However China cannot remain completely aloof from these regional activities. At
this moment, it appears that China's agreement to participate in certain dialogues
is to ensure that any solution to regional issues will be to its advantage. In the
future, it is possible that China will play a leading role in Northeast Asian
security, as its participation in the talks on the Korean issue indicate. Furthermore,
China certainly has an important role to play in international affairs. In many
ways, its co-operation in international sanctions against Iraq has already marked a
new beginning in China's integration into the world community.
Conclusion
It is clear that in the search for its own security, China, even without
expansionist ambitions, might encroach on the security interests of its neighbours.
This is primarily due to China's sheer size and potential for global power status.
Essentially, this thesis would argue that the appearance of the "China Threat
Theory" is best regarded as a consequence of its rapid economic growth, as China
287
seeks to bolster its economic security. Most important of all, it accords with
China's aspiration to be a great power as accorded by its economic strength and
size. This definition of Chinese search for its ultimate security- the drive for great
power status - is in many ways, reinforced by anti-imperialism and what Beijing
perceives as the hegemonist ambitions of the United States. There is a need to
avenge "the century of humiliation" and Chinese leaders believe that building up
sufficient economic strength and military might to counter the perceived
American threat is of paramount importance. Hence, the "China Threat Theory"
has become inevitably linked to United States containment policy in the eyes of
China's security policy makers.
It must also be emphasised that in the anarchical international system,
China also needs to be competitive with the other great powers in the uncertain
post-Cold War era. In doing so, China has to rely on its economic base and
control of economic resources. It would not serve the interest of the Chinese
leaders to alter or damage the environment in Northeast Asia in any dramatic
fashion. That would only hinder its economic development objectives and the
drive to truly great power status in the twenty-first century, which is foremost on
China's security agenda.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION
This chapter will summarise the conclusions drawn from the study of
China's security interests in the post-Cold War era. I shall first recapitulate the
security situation that China faces in this period. Then I move on to look at the
political and economic aspects of China's security, restating the salience of
economics in China's security agenda. Next, I shall look at the role of China in
regional security. Lastly, I shall look at the wider theoretical implications arising
from this thesis.
China in the post-Cold War era
Today, it is quite clear that Beijing cannot enhance its security interests on
the basis of manoeuvring between superpowers in a state of continued
confrontation. China's leverage was lost as a consequence of Soviet and now
Russo-American rapprochement after the Cold War. The collapse of communism
in the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which had structured
China's relations with the states in Northeast Asia since 1949, has spurred policy-
makers in China to re-examine their existing international relationships. Old
enmities have evaporated and time-tested friendship dissolved as Chinese leaders
struggle to come to terms with the fluid and dynamic regional environment in the
post-Cold War world. China's leaders must now learn to adapt to emerging
security structures.
In one way, the end of the Cold War brought about a situation in which the
Chinese leaders can address regional problems in Northeast Asia without having
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to subordinate them to the larger strategic context of meeting the potential threats
of both the superpowers. As noted by Steven Levine, the relationship with Russia
is less central to China than in the past because of the altered international
environment in the region. 1 For Beijing, the decline of the Russian threat is
definitely a major gain in the military realm. A northern border secure from any
major military threat has long been a primary security objective of Beijing. This
goal has been achieved, however, within a rapidly changing and unanticipated
international security environment. Today, Beijing can point to what it considers
the best security environment since the Chinese communists took power in 1949.
Chinese leaders now face a security environment in Northeast Asia that is less
likely to be disrupted by a major international power than at any time in the past.
Moreover, regional security trends have been generally compatible with China's
primary focus on internal economic modernisation and political stability.
For China, what now seems the most important factor in the post-Cold
War era is its security is relationship with the extra-regional power, the United
States. The United States is perhaps the only country in the world that has the
combination of military capabilities and political will to constitute a threat to the
state security of China. Japan has the economic and technological potential to do
so, but, at present, Beijing is protected from that possibility by the Japanese
Constitution and the continued strategic subordination of Japan under the
provisions of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Beijing believes that restraining
Japan's potential military is likely to require the continuation of Washington's
security ties with Tokyo. Similarly, American co-operation will be essential for a
peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, which China wishes to support, not only
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to sustain stability in Northeast Asia but more importantly, to demonstrate its
intentions toward its own reunification with Taiwan. China fears that the end of
East-West conflict may permit the United States to be more supportive of Taiwan,
now that the need for a strategic alignment with Beijing to counter Russia has
evaporated.
At a wider level, it is worth noting that, if the objective situation in the
external world - contradictions, configurations and balance - is in a perpetual
motion, China does not see the need to keep certain permanent alignments. In
Chinese eyes, "adjustments" in domestic and foreign policies are only natural as
along as principles and goals remain unchanged. 2 Due to external circumstances
over which they have no control, Chinese leaders believe that those who can
"adroitly guide action according to circumstance are great leaders'''. They still
look for differences among the major powers that can be exploited to advance
China's interests. Some American analysts suggest that as the relations between
Washington and Beijing continue to unravel, China may see Russia or Japan as a
viable partner if it finds itself at odds with US policy in the region".4 There is a
possibility of some form of Sino-Russian or Sino-Japanese alliance emerging in
the twenty-first century.
More importantly, while Chinese leaders today are frequently able to
determine their country's strategic direction, they have much less control over the
country's economic affairs. As China seeks greater trading links with the outside
world, it must come to terms with the concept of economic interdependence.
Economic strategies are in general much more difficult to ascertain in an
increasingly interdependent world, and quite often not as clear-cut as geopolitical
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strategic initiatives. This is what this thesis hopes to highlight, in the hope that
future research will give more focus on China's economic security.
The political aspect of China's security
However, as evident throughout this thesis, economic issues will also
affect the political security of the Chinese government. In fact, most of these
internal political security threats are directly or indirectly related to the issue of
economic development. The volatility of China's international relationships is in
many ways a product of considerable ambivalence over a cost-benefit analysis of
its interaction with foreigners. While the Chinese need to absorb economic inputs
from the outside world, at the same time, they are increasingly apprehensive of
interdependence and submitting their national interests to those of the
international system.
More importantly, political threats engendered by Western-style
capitalism and democracy are perceived to be linked with the United States.
Hence, US actions, such as the response to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, led to
Beijing interpreting that America's "new world order" threatens the Chinese
leadership's core values. In Beijing's eyes, American efforts appear to be directed
against the very stability of the Chinese government. In the process of opening up
its economy, China will be subjected to the infusion of Western ideas that could
have negative influences on its political system. Ironically, as Robert Scalapino
put it, "the economic imperatives upon which the Marxist creed rests now threaten
the political edifice that the Marxist-Leninists constructed."'
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On the whole, the end of the Cold War is seen as the triumph of Western
values such as democracy, human rights and the market economy. The contrary
organising ideology is so deeply ingrained in China that any drastic changes would
have catastrophic consequences, as the collapse of the Soviet Union has indicated.
The ideas underpinning the Chinese state are now themselves subject to "peaceful
evolution." Hence, when the United States condemns China for abusing human
rights, Beijing responds by charging Washington with interfering in its internal
affairs and attempting to subvert its socialist system. Whereas threats in the earlier
era took a military dimension, today, threats to China's security have taken a more
political dimension. Chinese leaders feel that they have to cope with what they see
as a continuous attack on their political system by the US-led Western
democracies. In fact, equated with anti-imperialism, nationalism has served as the
most fundamental of all factors in the Chinese view of the world and has guided
their analyses of international relations.
This perceived attack by the Americans is also linked to tendencies towards
decentralisation, leadership issues and a possible split between the military and the
party which all points to the existence of a "weak state." 6 According to Barry
Buzan, the defining feature of a "weak state" is the high level of internal threats
faced by the government. This certainly becomes more obvious when one considers
the fact that the Chinese communists face a legitimacy crisis as their ideological
basis has been eroded by the collapse of communism across the world. Such
political issues have been explored in great detail in this thesis, as it is felt that they
have not been given sufficient attention in traditional writings on China's security.
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As with most communist regimes, the prime goal of the Chinese
Communist Party is to hold on to the reins of power. The current regime's central
problem is how to run a closely controlled political system in concert with an
open economy while ensuring that there is no spill-over effects from the open
economy, in the direction of political pluralism, which will challenge the regime's
monopoly of political power. To a certain extent, therefore, it appears that the
most serious threat to China's security is not an external military challenge (there
are none at the time of writing) but Western schemes to promote "peaceful
evolution", a coded phrase denoting the subversion of the communist party
leadership by political and cultural infiltration designed ultimately to make China
a Western dependency. Having outlined the importance of political security to
China's overall agenda, we can now turn to look at an equally important aspect,
the economic.
The economic security agenda
In addition to the military and political aspects, economic dimensions
are also important to China's security, as stated in various points in this thesis.
Indeed, the transition to being an economic power has become increasingly
important in defining China's national security agenda. Chinese leaders now give
prominence to national well being by taking economic construction as the central
line, persisting in reform and opening up.
Without having to subordinate to the larger strategic context of
meeting potential threats of both the superpowers, the termination of the Cold
War has also brought about a situation long desired by the Chinese who can now
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concentrate on economic development. China's security agenda has become
increasingly economically driven, as exemplified by its growing economic ties
with countries such as Japan, South Korea and the Untied States. For instance,
China and Japan are now being pulled in to each other's economic and political
orbits. China wants to engage Japan's economic muscle in its development and
Japan endeavours to help China develop as a "responsible power" in the region
through the course of bilateral economic relations. Therefore, Chinese foreign
policy has inevitably become somewhat more driven by economic relations with
other states than in the past.
Above all, Beijing's philosophy on achieving of comprehensive national
security is based upon the notion of a powerful state underpinned by economic,
technological and military strength. In many ways, economic power is regarded as
the crucial element in achieving comprehensive national security because it is
essential to provide the necessary industrial base to support a military
establishment sufficiently robust to deter would-be aggressors. This has been the
guiding force behind Chinese foreign policy in recent years and is likely to
continue being so in the foreseeable future. Beijing has therefore sought a
peaceful external environment in which it can pursue domestic reforms and
expand trading and investment opportunities with as many states as possible.
China understands the urgent need for economic development and the
strengthening of its own military might, the alternative being vulnerability from
potential aggressors. Therefore, China has put forward a plan for "seizing
opportunities, and developing itself'. In a world where world market
competitiveness seems to define success, economic success is vital for national
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survival. Moreover, China's leaders need to guarantee material success to keep its
large population satisfied.
These Chinese leaders also believe that the security agenda in the 1990s
calls for certain changes in Beijing's economic development strategy. The
economy must serve domestic priorities and work for China's modernisation
programmes. Beijing is relying on the growth of the economy as a basis for the
Chinese Communist Party to rule over the long term. Beijing realises that the
future security of its country requires cultivation of close relations with Northeast
Asian neighbours and indeed Asia as a whole. This does not mean that China's
leaders have ceased to conceptualise their country in global terms, but it is a
recognition of the importance of the region to China's economy in particular.
Moreover, since Asia is still widely regarded as the engine of growth for the
world economy, despite the current financial crisis, China's growing strength
within the region will also serve to enhance Beijing's global significance, and
help it achieve great power status in the twenty-first century.
Furthermore, like their counterparts in the West, Chinese realists also see
the world in terms of power politics. In the most systematic account of national
interests, the criteria for judging them are said to include the international
environment, national capabilities, technological development and the subjective
assessment of these factors; the first three factors essentially refer to world power
configurations and China's position therein, the last refers to the "objective"
assessment of China's position in that power distribution.' It appears that Chinese
realists differ slightly from classical realists in the West with respect to the
hierarchy of issues. While the traditional Anglo-American realists consider
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military security as "high politics" and social economic issues as the domain of
"low politics", Chinese contemporary realists tend to place greater emphasis on
economic and technological development. This difference is attributable largely to
China's recent conviction that international politics is now characterised by "the
competition for comprehensive power" (zonghe guoli de jiaoliang) on a wide
range of battle grounds in, inter alia, military, political and economic areas.' It is
true to say that most Chinese analysts believe that with the end of the Cold War,
"bloc politics" and ideological difference are less important; instead national
interests, especially economic interests, will rise to prominence.
At a conceptual level, one can raise questions regarding the extent to
which economic and security issues were truly divorced in the past, and China's
security is also subject to such questions. This thesis seeks to provide a
comprehensive account of China's security agenda in the post-Cold War era. In the
world in general and Asia in particular, it is practically impossible and may even be
dangerously naïve to try to separate economic, political and military security issues.
Almost all political or military security decisions have some economic implications,
and economic considerations are increasingly influencing political and military
security decisions.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that by no means does this thesis
imply that various aspects of state security should be analysed distinctly from one
another. One must recognise the inter-linkages among the various aspects of
security. These various aspects of security can be regarded as constituting some
sort of cost-benefit analysis. Enhancing one aspect could mean diminishing
another. The task for Chinese leaders is to balance and weigh the importance of
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security concerns on a case by case basis rather than adopt a straightforward
approach. China's leaders need to enhance Beijing's comprehensive national
strength constantly and this involves bolstering military, political and economic
security simultaneously. In the process of doing so, China is bound to have a
significant impact on regional security issues.
China's role in regional security
On a wider arena, an important implication reached in this thesis is that in
its search for comprehensive security, China is likely to bolster regional security
since it seeks a peaceful environment to pursue its modernisation goals. 9 If the
environment in Northeast Asia becomes turbulent, Beijing's drive for economic
development and to truly great power status in the next century will be hindered.
It is clear that the Chinese need a stable international environment in which they
can expand their commerce and maintain access to technological and financial
resources. These resources will come largely from the industrialised powers and
international financial institutions as China seeks to reap the benefits from the
world economy without becoming overly dependent on it.
Studying China's security interests is also important because China shapes
the security environment in Northeast Asia. At the same time, the regional system
also constrains Chinese foreign policy objectives. No state makes its foreign
policy in a vacuum: foreign policies are at least as reactive as they are proactive.
The questions of how China relates to the countries in Northeast Asia in the post-
Cold War era; and to what extent, and in what specific ways has the nexus
304
between China and Northeast Asia remain constant will also have implications for
China's security interest pertaining to the world at large.
One consistency in Beijing's security agenda compared to earlier periods
in its history is the quest to restore China to its "rightful" place in the world as a
great power. China's security agenda is shaped by modern China's historical
experience and its approach to international relations, which is in many ways
derived from a mixture of Marxist doctrines, its identification with the Third
World and its historic Sino-centricism.
China's policies are characterised first by stability and second by practical
realism. China's economic development requires a stable and peaceful
international environment, and Northeast Asia is an important part of that
environment. China needs to sustain good relations with both the countries in
Northeast Asia and the United States in order to avoid disruptions around Beijing
that can complicate its drive towards modernisation.
For those with an interest in thinking strategically about the modern
international relations of the Asia-Pacific region and indeed international relations
in general, there is no more important challenge than to understand the nature and
implications of a rising China's search for comprehensive security. As this reality
dawns on the public policy community, the debate has often been simplistic. The
exchange seems to be between those who assert that China will soon rise to be the
world's largest economy and those who argue that it cannot sustain current levels
of growth. Some suggest that China will "muddle through" difficulties in
developing its economy, while others suggest it will face a major crisis of
governance. On the policy towards China, some argue that China can only be
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wrapped in the arm embrace of "engagement" whereas others stress the need to
contain Chinese power. While the issues raised by these questions are
undoubtedly important, the debates about their accuracy have rarely been
sufficiently sophisticated. Various participants have made references to a range of
deep uncertainties about the basics of continued growth and stability. It is fair to
say that no one has any great confidence in the reliability of the judgements made
about this very fluid society.
To be sure, there are more numerous debates embedded in this thesis,
which will not be resolved in the near future. It is clear that these debates are
maturing and that they will take place in a number of different contexts. The
evidence needed to make progress in these debates will come from both China's
internal affairs, especially its economic interests and development, and also the
way it behaves and is being treated in the international system. It is hoped that
this thesis, using the concept of comprehensive security, can provide the platform
for further research and debate on this topic. Through analysing China's search
for comprehensive security, it is hoped that this study can also offer some clues on
the security of the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. We can now turn to the
theoretical implications that arise from this thesis.
Theoretical concepts of security
On the whole, theoretical implications for the discipline of Security
Studies/Strategic Studies arising from this thesis are well worth noting.
Specifically, a wider implication stemming from this thesis is that security cannot
be conceived in narrow military terms any more. A more comprehensive
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definition must be adopted by security analysts in order to enhance our
understanding of a state's security interests in the post-Cold War era. Military
power combined with a vibrant economy is viewed as indispensable for China to
regain its status as a great power and to defend its sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
To be precise, the economics-security interrelationship is one of the
wider implications of this thesis and it is hoped that more research will be done on
this by scholars who analyse the security agenda of states in the post-Cold War
era. It is clear from the literature survey, especially in Chapter 2, that the
relationship between economic and security interests has already engendered
considerable debate in academic circles. On one hand, it is sometimes argued that
economic interactions exist only as a result of a nation-state's security interests.
Certainly, while markets may ease the ways towards a state's relations with others,
these caimot be sustained without governments agreeing to the bargain. Some, such
as Louis Paul, argue that global financial flows ultimately do not undermine a
state's decision-making authority, since "if a crisis increases their willingness to
bear the consequences, states can still defy the markets".'
On the other hand, governments that attempt economic co-operation
based solely on political motivations are bound to fail, if that co-operation is not
grounded in economic rationality and cost-benefit analysis. While not getting into
the extremes of this debate, what this does mean is that the salience of economic
security has become all too important for analysts to ignore. As economic
interdependence increases over time, domestic economic policy decisions will
become more interconnected and the need for states to co-ordinate an array of fiscal
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and monetary policies alongside political considerations will become more
important.
The above analysis is also in line with the concept that in international
politics, foreign policy is very intertwined with internal factors. As former Chinese
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's has pronounced, "foreign policy is an extension
of China's domestic policies"." The concept of Chinese security does not,
however, come across as being entirely internally generated, it is also influenced
and shaped by the evolving dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the wider
world in general. The conventional wisdom in International Relations is that foreign
policy analysis does not take place in a vacuum. Hence, future developments in
China's security policy will to a large extent depend on the evolution of Chinese
economic priorities and Beijing's interactions with the international system.
To the extent that economics are regarded as part of the domestic
agenda, in the post-Cold War world, we can detect a closer link between domestic
stability and external threats in China's security thinking. It is evident that states
like China need to employ both traditional military defence and non-military
actions in order to safeguard their territorial integrity. The linkage between the
economic, political and military aspects of a state's security policy also leads to
the problem of where to place the emphasis. To concentrate on one aspect at the
expense of the others will be misleading and unrealistic. The three aspects are
intricately linked. For instance, to insist on the separation of economics from
politics in a state's relations with other countries or vice versa would be
untenable. Therefore, analysts must weigh the importance of the military, political
and economic aspects in their analysis of states' security agendas.
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In general, the end of the Cold War has signified the end of strategic
conflict and heralded the end of viewing international politics purely through the
geopolitical perspective. The economic dimension of China's security has raised
some interesting questions on a wider level. The nature of conflict today can take
many forms and economic competition can become sources of tension. Offshore
territorial conflicts can be generated by a scramble to control energy resources,
fisheries and raw materials. In addition, issues such as maritime passage and
seabed boundaries need to be taken into account, especially since offshore
conflicts may prove more likely than onshore wars in Northeast Asia.
Conclusions
This thesis has sought to give more emphasis to the economic and political
dimensions in China's security, in addition to the traditional military dimension.
We can now recapitulate and reinforce some of the key conclusions drawn at the
end of the various chapters. The first relates to the fact that China's security
agenda is increasingly economically motivated as Beijing drives to great power
status. The second relates to the fact that threats to China's security interests
posed by other states, such as the United States, is increasingly taking the form of
the political rather than the military. These conclusions lead to the wider
implication that, in the post-Cold War era, security agendas of states tend to be
comprehensive and broad. Therefore, security analysts today must incorporate
economics and politics into their analysis of China's security agenda, and that of
other states' as well.
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